It’s not at all clear that the Secretary of Defense even has the authority to fire the Secretary of the Navy—who’s appointed by the President under 10 U.S.C. § 8013(a)(1):
law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10…
§ 8013 says he’s subject to _direction_ of SecDef, but says nothing about removal.
law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10…
§ 8013 says he’s subject to _direction_ of SecDef, but says nothing about removal.
Of course, even if this is right, it’s a technicality—since (1) Spencer resigned anyway; and (2) the President unquestionably could fire him.
But once again, we get an object lesson in the technical but important law of appointing and removing executive branch officers.
But once again, we get an object lesson in the technical but important law of appointing and removing executive branch officers.
And #SCOTUS has been clear since at least 1839 that, unless a statute specifically says otherwise, the appointing authority (here, the President) is the default removal authority:
caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-cou…
caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-cou…
And here's @realDonaldTrump's tweet in which he says Spencer's "services have been terminated" by _Esper_, something Esper had no legal authority to do (but Trump did):
