Thread by @Sustainable2050

Reading @UNEP's Emissions Gap Report 2019
On the massive task ahead to break the rising trend in global greenhouse gas emissions, and to turn it around to rapid reductions.
unenvironment.org/resources/emis… #COP25

@UNEP GHG emissions have risen at a rate of 1.5% per year in the last decade, stabilizing only briefly between 2014 and 2016. Total GHG emissions, including from land-use change, reached a record high of 55.3 GtCO2e in 2018.

@UNEP Fossil CO2 emissions from energy use and industry, which dominate total GHG emissions, grew 2.0% in 2018, reaching a record 37.5 GtCO2 per year.

@UNEP By 2030, global GHG emissions would need to be 25%(!) and 55%(!!) lower than in 2018 to put the world on the least-cost pathway to limiting global warming to below 2˚C and 1.5°C respectively.

@UNEP Here's the split between (rich) OECD countries and non-OECD countries. Not only CO₂ (in non-OECD only), but also methane (CH₄), nitrous oxide (N₂O), and fluorinated gases were on the rise in the past decade, both in OECD and non-OECD countries.

@UNEP You can see some 'decoupling' (decreasing emission intensity) between GHG emissions and GDP, both in OECD and in non-OECD countries it's around 2% per year. But since that's less than the economic growth rate, emissions keep growing.

@UNEP And yes, part of the emissions reduction in rich countries was achieved by displacing production to developing countries. But the difference (between the solid and the dashed lines) is not as big as many people assume.

@UNEP Without displacing production, European emissions would still have gone down since 1990, US emissions would have increased somewhat more than they already did, and China and India would still have seen sharp, though somewhat smaller, increases.

@UNEP The G20 countries account for 78% of global GHG emissions. 6 of them (China, EU, India, Mexico, Russia and Turkey) are projected to meet their "Paris commitments" with current policies. Among them, India, Russia and Turkey are projected to be more than 15% lower.

@UNEP The EU projects its "-40% by 2030" Paris commitment can be overachieved if domestic legislation is fully implemented in its member states.
[btw, the new Commission already aims for -50..-55%]

@UNEP In contrast, seven G20 members require further action of varying degree to achieve their Paris commitment (NDC): Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, Korea, South Africa and the USA.

For Brazil, all emissions projections were revised upward, reflecting the recent trend towards increased deforestation, among others. In Japan, current policy projections have been close to achieving its NDC target (Paris commitment) for the last few years.

Studies do not agree on whether Argentina, Indonesia (uncertainty on land use and forestry emissions) and Saudi Arabia (lack of information on its climate policies) are on track to meet their Paris commitments.

In the EU, continuous strengthening of emission reduction policies has led to a noticeable downward shift in current policy scenario projections for 2030 since the 2015 edition of the Emissions Gap Report.

An increasing number of countries have set net
zero emission targets domestically and 65
countries and major subnational economies,
such as the region of California and major cities
worldwide, have committed to net zero emissions
by 2050.

However, only a few long-term strategies
submitted to the UNFCCC have so far committed
to a timeline for net zero emissions, none of which
are from a G20 member

Five G20 members (the EU and 4 individual members) have committed to long-term zero emission targets, of which 3 are currently in the process of passing legislation and 2 have
recently passed legislation.
The other 15 G20 members have not yet committed to zero
emission targets.

What emission reductions are needed to comply with the #ParisAgreement goals?
Current Paris commitments (NDCs) would lead to 4-6 billion tCO2 less emissions by 2030, compared to current policies. But that's only enough to stabilize global emissions at a very high level.

Sticking to a 2°C pathway however, would require serious global emission reduction, already by 2030: compared to the current Paris commitments of the countries we need to reduce emissions by 12 to 15 billion tCO2/year.

But since even 2°C of warming leads to massive climate damage, the countries agreed in Paris (COP21) to keep global warming *well below* 2°C. That's what the 1.8°C line in the graph stands for. As you can see, it requires another 5 billion tCO2/year reduction, by 2030.

On top of that, they agreed to try to limit global warming to 1.5°C. We know, i.e. from IPCC's special report, that this would make a huge difference with 2°C, in climate effects all around the world. It's not a luxury: even at 1.5°C, climate damage will be much worse than now.

Staying on track for 1.5°C requires massive emission reductions by 2030: 29-32 billion tCO2/year, compared to the countries' Paris commitments. That's roughly halving global emissions, in just 11 years. A monumental task, but the stakes are high!

If, on the other hand, only the current Paris commitments would be (fully) implemented, we'd have a 66% chance to keep warming below 3°C by 2100. And a 34% chance of ending up even higher.
[That's a climate disaster scenario, just to be sure]

[When concluding the #ParisAgreement, it was of course well known that the current Paris commitments are not enough to achieve its goals. That's why the Agreement has a 'ratcheting up' mechanism, to improve those commitments over time. This Emissions Gap report shows the urgency]

The ratchet mechanism of the Paris Agreement foresees strengthening of national commitments (NDCs) every five years. 2020 was identified as a critical next step in this process: countries should communicate or update their NDCs by this time. 2025 is too late.

Since serious global climate action still hasn't begun, the required cuts in emissions are now 2.7% per year from 2020 for the 2°C goal and 7.6% per year on average for the 1.5°C goal. Evidently, greater cuts will be required the longer that action is delayed.

Further delaying the reductions needed to meet the goals would imply future emission reductions and removal of CO2 from the atmosphere at such a magnitude that it would result in a serious deviation from current available pathways.

This, together with necessary adaptation actions, risks seriously damaging the global economy and undermining food security and biodiversity

If the multiple co-benefits associated with closing the emissions gap are fully realized, the required transition will contribute in an essential way to achieving the United Nations 2030 Agenda with its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Climate protection and adaptation investments will become a precondition for peace and stability, and will require unprecedented efforts to transform societies, economies, infrastructures and governance institutions.

At the same time, deep and rapid decarbonization processes imply fundamental structural changes are needed within economic sectors, firms, labour markets and trade patterns.

Legitimacy for decarbonization therefore requires massive social mobilization and investments in social cohesion to avoid exclusion and resistance to change.

Just and timely transitions towards sustainability need to be developed, taking into account the interests and rights of people vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, of people and regions where decarbonization requires structural adjustments, and of future generations.

Fortunately, deep transformation to close the emissions gap between trends based on current policies and achieving the Paris Agreement can be designed to bring multiple co-benefits for humanity and planetary support systems.

For example: reducing air pollution, improving human health, establishing sustainable energy systems and industrial production processes, more efficient and sufficient consumption and services, less-intensive agricultural practices, mitigating biodiversity loss, liveable cities.

Climate policies in line with the 1.5°C goal will require upscaling energy system supply-side investments to between 1.6 trillion and 3.8 trillion $/year globally on
average over the 2020–2050 time frame, depending
on how rapid energy efficiency and conservation
can be ramped up.

For the energy system, the report discusses 5 important transition options, taking into account their relevance for a wide range of countries, clear co-benefit opportunities and
potential to deliver significant emissions reductions:

● Expanding Renewable Energy for electrification
● Phasing out coal for rapid decarbonization of energy
● Decarbonizing transport with a focus on electric mobility
● Decarbonizing energy-intensive industry
● Avoiding future emissions while improving energy access

Implementing such major transitions in a number of areas will require increased interdependency between energy and other infrastructure sectors, where changes in one sector can impact another.

Similarly, there will be a strong need to connect demand and supply-side policies and include wider synergies and co-benefits, such as job losses+creation, rehabilitation of ecosystem services, avoiding resettlements and reduced health and environmental costs by reduced emissions

Any transition at this scale is likely to be extremely
challenging and will meet a number of economic,
political and technical barriers and challenges. But:

First, technological and economic developments present opportunities to decarbonize the economy, especially the energy sector, at a cost that is lower than ever.

Second, the synergies between climate action and economic growth and development objectives, including options for addressing distributional impacts, are better understood.

And finally, policy momentum across various levels of government, as well as a surge in climate action commitments by non-state actors, are creating opportunities for countries to engage in real transitions.

A key example of technological and economic trends is the cost of renewable energy, which is declining more rapidly than was predicted just a few years ago. Renewables are currently the cheapest source of new power generation in most of the world.

While demand-side material efficiency widens the spectrum of emission mitigation strategies, it has largely been overlooked in climate policymaking until now and will be important for the cross-sectoral transitions.

In 2015, the production of materials caused GHG emissions of ~11.5 GtCO2e, up from 5 GtCO2e in 1995. The largest contribution stems from bulk materials production, such as iron and steel, cement, lime and plaster, other minerals used in construction, plastics and rubber.

Two thirds of those materials are used to make capital goods, with buildings and vehicles among the most important.

The growth in (emissions from) materials production took place in developing and emerging economies, and it is important to keep in mind the discussion about the point of production and points of consumption. See figure below.

Material efficiency and substitution strategies affect not only energy demand and emissions during material production, but also potentially the operational energy use of the material products. Analysis of such strategies therefore requires a systems or life cycle perspective.

The mitigation potential from demand-side material efficiency improvements is discussed in the context of the following categories of action:

● Product lightweighting and substitution of high-carbon materials with low-carbon materials to reduce material-related GHG emissions associated with product production, as well as operational energy consumption of vehicles.

● Improvements in the yield of material production and product manufacture.
● More intensive use, longer life, component reuse, remanufacturing and repair as strategies to obtain more service from material-based products.

● Enhanced recycling so that secondary materials
reduce the need to produce more emission-intensive
primary materials.

This is elaborated for housing and cars, showing that increased material efficiency can reduce annual emissions from construction and operations of buildings and manufacturing and use of passenger vehicles, thus contributing a couple of GtCO2eq in emission reductions by 2030.

And that concludes my summary of the summary of @UNEP's Emissions Gap Report 2019, important input for #COP25, about to start in Madrid!
I hope it was useful. If so, please RT the first tweet of this thread, so your followers can read it too.

You can find the report itself here: wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/hand…
and more materials here: unenvironment.org

Oh, and if you hate scrolling (a lot), here's a link to the top of my thread:

https://twitter.com/Sustainable2050/status/1199409063408353291?s=20

I guess now it's a circular one ;)