Thread by @adrianzenz

THREAD: What can we learn from the fact that Beijing did not even try to do a halfway decent job when framing myself & @dtbyler as supposedly working for a 'U.S. intelligence agency'? globaltimes.cn/content/117204…

1. The report cites outdated affiliations. Both myself and Darren have new affiliations since this summer/autumn.

2. The framing is not even remotely believable. Darren and I never ever collaborated. We only ever met once in person. We were simply lumped together.

3. There was not even the attempt to give any (even false) "evidence" for this framing. The report does not even cite that I briefed the State Department & the National Security Council at the White House, both of which would make such framing more believable (well, kind of).

4. Left-wing / Communist social media accounts have routinely portrayed my research as funded by organizations that are themselves funded by the US govt or the CIA. But they did not allege that I actually work for U.S. intelligence, because that claim is far less credible.

5. Meaning, this framing is a crude, poorly done attempt to smear us through a claim that is not credible but to the most gullible of persons.

That begs the question: who is the audience? Who is supposed to believe this?

6. Domestic audience: a domestic audience would believe such an outrageous claim, but they are largely not aware of Western research on Xinjiang. Or are they? Have the NYT Xinjiang Papers and the #ChinaCables changed the game?

7. Overseas BRI nations etc: nations who already lean towards Beijing's narrative, or who see benefit in parroting it. Is this framing attempt even relevant for them? Perhaps Beijing thinks so after the #ChinaCables China Cables. But why then such a poor framing job?

8. Communists (western or others): but they already came up with better (at least more believable) framing attempts of their own (see #4).

9. Darren and myself: Beijing uses this to message us that we are the tip of the spear in this issue, and that we may be subject to greater repercussions. But not likely an attempt to dissuade us, as Beijing would have first have tried more subtle attempts (which it did not).

10. Most likely explanation: this framing attempt was not actually designed to really convince anyone who was not already convinced, and neither was it designed to intimidate Darren or myself.

11. Most likely conclusion: Chinese officials / state media were simply under pressure to respond after the recent massive leaks. Any response at all, regardless of the quality or ability to actually convince anyone.

This has wider implications for understanding CCP propaganda.

11. I welcome thoughts, comments, additions, and wider implications.

And: I think that the Pierce Brosnan profile picture was way better than Sean Connery. But most of you obviously thought differently.