THREAD: amidst the #ChinaCables, a lot of new evidence and analysis in my latest paper on the re-education campaign (which came out on Nov 24, same day as #ChinaCables), got buried. Below is a detailed thread outlining new key findings.
jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cl…
jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cl…
Firstly, the gov't itself says that re-education work must "wash brains, cleanse hearts, support the right, remove the evil (洗脑净心扶正祛邪)". archive.is/ARyEg
The government website with this highly incriminating statement was deleted literally the day after I first cited it in a publication. The archived version above remains available.
The government refers to those detained in "vocational skills training" facilities as “three types of persons” (三类人员): persons in “prison, custody or in re-education”(被收押，判刑，教育转化). Other gov't sources refer to them as "detained trainees (收押培训人员)"
Xinjiang pours extensive policing resources into preventing these detainees from escaping. For example, Poskam County’s 2019 budget states that its "vocational training" camps employ 435 security guards (保安员). archive.is/o/hEYxE/www.ka…
Qira County’s 2018 budget shows that of a total of 2,619 assistant police officers (协警), 810 are assigned to the county’s vocational camps. web.archive.org/web/2019031301…
Crucial new source of data are detailed local government lists from minority townships and villages. Some of these lists show the internment status of local minority populations.
Local government lists showing the internment status of local minorities indicate that re-education camps are the by far most common form of internment: 84-98% of those interned are in such camps, with the others being in detention centers or in prisons.
Adult internment shares in rural Uyghur majority population regions are shockingly high: between 8.5 - 28.4%. Shares between 15-20% were most common. Main target are household heads, with internment shares up to 50%. Followed by their sons (up to 20%), wives only 4% or less.
The data shows that the internment drive has targeted middle-aged men, typically either household heads or adult sons. Compared to 2010 census age cohorts, persons aged 20-29 are less likely to be interned, while persons aged 30-59 are more likely to be in internment.
This squarely refutes Beijing's narrative of training young adults. Young women, often showcased in propaganda videos, are especially unlikely to be interned for "training" (although many of them are being trained in closed facilities outside the re-education internment system).
Another key new source of data are proxy indicators such as welfare payments and detainee food subsidies. In Qapqal County, welfare payouts to vocational training detainee families rose by 220% in first half of 2018. In some townships, this made up 60% of all welfare payments!
Then, Xinjiang's 2018 budget shows that the regional government gave 1.59 billion RMB in food allowance subsidies for vocational training internment persons (职业教育培训中心学员) to minority prefectures, most of it to Uyghur regions. Enough to feed 100s of thousands.
Very disconcerting is mounting evidence that at least some regular vocational training "schools" have also become securitized internment facilities. E.g. the “Xinjiang Higher Level Vocational School” ( 新疆高级职业学校). Secure internment sections were added in 2nd half of 2017.
The leaked classified document confirms that each county in Xinjiang must establish an “Education and Training Bureau" (职业技能教育培训服务管理局), which overseas vocational internment camps. Their budgets are part of the domestic security apparatus.
Also, a 2016 United Front Work Department report states that in Kashgar City, every township & urban district had established a “legal school” (fazhi xuexiao 法制学校), while every village and urban district had set up a “transformation through education room” (教育转化室).
A gov't spreadsheet from Yarkand County shows that every township and at least most major urban districts have their own vocational training internment facility. At times, they have both this and a "transformation through education" camp. Detention centers come on top of that.
In Qapqal County, where Turkic minorities make up only slightly >50% of the population, a letter to the county government complains about the fact that the county’s townships are suffering from a serious lack of cadres because they have been deployed to the vocational camps.
Meanwhile, internment / re-education camp floor space kept increasing dramatically. Yengishahar County's re-education camp (法制教育转化学校) increased floor space by ~535 percent from 04/2018 to 05/2019, not counting smaller auxiliary buildings or attached factories.
Gov't data shows that the state keeps a detailed record of the devastating social impact of the internment campaign. Households are deprived of labor, unable to repay loans, leaving elderly/sick persons and young children in very precarious conditions.
One document shows a family of 7 from Yarkand County: father sentenced to prison, mother in re-education, five children aged 3 to 14 years are left orphaned.
In another family, the middle generation (husband and wife) are interned or imprisoned, leaving the elderly grandparents to care for two very young grandchildren. The grandmother is seriously ill, and the husband will be in prison until the year 2030.
The cumulative effect of the internment and the related police state has been a DRAMATICALLY declining net population growth rate in Xinjiang, almost entirely focused on Uyghur majority regions. The decline in 2017 was marked, but in 2018 it became dramatic.
Meanwhile, Xinjiang embarked on an all-out witch hunt to suppress officials from leaking any information on the camps. Cadres are "strictly forbidden" to respond to related media interviews or to reveal any information for any reason at all.
In sum, the available empirical evidence has increased significantly compared to the first research paper from May 2018, when our knowledge of the situation was still in its infancy. Now, we have a fairly wide and diverse range of data, besides many detailed witness statements.
