The mandates are published, the talks start Monday, and I think we all know who's going to win EU-UK trade talks.
The EU.
If you're anti-Brexit pro-EU.
The UK.
If you're pro-Brexit anti-EU.
I don't have such certainty. This is going to be a strange negotiation (thread) 1/
The EU.
If you're anti-Brexit pro-EU.
The UK.
If you're pro-Brexit anti-EU.
I don't have such certainty. This is going to be a strange negotiation (thread) 1/
First, neither side particularly wants the agreement that is likely to come out of talks, which is somewhat unusual in trade talks. Ideally, the EU would like a closer relationship with the UK in their regulatory orbit, the UK would like unchanged trade with no obligations. 2/
We have a time limited binary deal or no-deal situation which gives less time than any major modern trade deal ever negotiated. This provides limited time for positions to evolve, red lines to be tested, stakeholders considered. It will strain both sides. 3/
EU-UK trade talks are also unusual in being trade talks in which trade is scarcely a consideration. On the UK side see Peter Foster's thread yesterday on business group reaction. We know the EU's focus has been on level playing field issues above all. 4/
A final unusual feature is the absence of an agreed start point. Trade talks typically start with some scoping and public consultation. We have a Political Declaration to be cited by either side if it seems to provide a messaging advantage 5/
(for the avoidance of doubt I don't believe either side was sincere in negotiating the Political Declaration, it served a political purpose then, as it will do now.) 6/
Let's look at negotiating tactics. On the UK side aggressive public messaging about the EU and our willingness to walk away (you'll have seen Dmitry's thread) combined with technical simplism (part genuine part not) about a 'bog standard FTA' 7/
The UK position has clear weaknesses. The actual impact of no trade deal, Scotland, still some concerns in Conservative Party. Above all, what they think as a strength, their majority and lack of consultation. They have no 'we can't get that through Parliament' card. 8/
The EU's strategy seems to be to use the limited time to impose as much standard text as they can, and add pressure in related areas like data equivalence. They can also point to hard line attitudes on level playing field from Member States and the European Parliament 9/
Again the EU has a significant weakness in a key area, the Level Playing Field. There really isn't a precedent for enforceable non-regression, and finding a sweet spot that will work for their side and also the UK might sign is not going to be easy. 10/
I deliberately left Northern Ireland out of the main analysis as it deserves standalone consideration as another complex factor. We go into talks with the UK denying what has been signed, probably as a provocation, more worryingly possibly some believe what they say 11/
To put it mildly the politics of the Northern Ireland protocol are difficult. The UK denying what has been signed is causing huge alarm in the EU, who believe currently that this means the current government cannot be trusted, so a hardline is necessary in talks 12/
However if talks break down this looks bad for the Northern Ireland protocol with questions as to whether the UK government would really break an international treaty. I don't think they would, ultimately, but even to consider such a matter raises tensions 13/
Conversely the best chance of 'dedramatised checks' as per earlier Barnier suggestion lies in constructive future relationship talks, with a separate Northern Ireland annex tying up loose ends like all-Ireland services as well as protocol implementation 14/
I discount UK-US talks as having any meaningful impact on UK-EU talks, as the EU knows only too well trying to get the US to make concessions and managing public opinion while it happens are both fraught. Good luck they'll say, inwardly laughing. 15/
As many others have said there isn't a huge gulf on substance between the UK and EU. The @instituteforgov has the detail. Technically there could be a deal. Though the timing allows for few slip ups. Whether there is depends though on the politics. 16/ instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/fut…
@instituteforgov For there to be a deal the UK will have to accept many EU regulatory approaches. The EU will have to limit direct UK rule taking. Both will cooperate fully on Northern Ireland. All technically achievable. But a big political ask on both sides. 17/ end
