(a) the momentum 4 Intra-Afghan dialogue in the wake of US-#Taliban deal;
(b) activated state & non-state actors;
(c) first ditched Dr Abdullah 4 Ghani 2 scuttle former’s chance, (1), to win elections .....
....(ie, by having engineered results via NDS/RAW as even US flagged its concerns), (2), to preempt his joining Govt as proposed by US.
Against this backdrop,
(i) pointed reaction of Abdullah camp (ie holding anti-🇮🇳-n protests across 🇦🇫 & burning 🇮🇳-n flags) followed &....
(ii) 🇮🇳’s Ambassador refused to meet Abdullah to send him a message;
(iii) It culminated in overtures from Abdullah towards Pakistan including defacto recognition of #Durand line as “Chaman-Buldak border” & desire to revisit ties with Islamabad.
(1) US-Taliban deal;
(2) stalled release of listed TB prisoners;
(3) termed Govt prisoners released by TB as “civilians”;
(4) refused “Sayaf formula” 4 inclusive govt;&
(5) launched hand picked narrow based negotiators;
(a) acquiesced to Ghani’s fraudulent win;
(b) legitimise his oath taking despite signalling all along that they will not make peace hostage to ambitions of Ghani, etc;
(c) reluctantly supported his negotiators.
—raised (a) anti-ethnic Tajik proxy group 2 counter Abdullah & balance US; & (b) recruited Taliban proxy.
🇮🇳’s nightmare is Taliban inclusive Afghan Govt; so it put all eggs in Ghani’s basket. But Ghani will loose either way: meet Najibullah’s fate or flee back 2 🇺🇸