Thread by @diplocharlie

THREAD – One of the many questions related to the #US election next week is the future of American engagement in the #MiddleEast. All actors in the region are already hedging their bets. But what about #Europe’s interest in the Middle East & North Africa ?

https://twitter.com/robsatloff/status/1321166816052498436

Through 50+ interviews, I have looked back at the evolution of transatlantic cooperation in the MENA region since the end of the Cold War & tried in this @WashInstitute piece to assess the potential implications of the US election next week. washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…

Let’s start with a paradox: while for many in the MENA, Europe & the US represent the « West », there is no clear “Western” framework of cooperation about the Middle East.

During the “unipolar moment” (1990-2011), the US was the superpower & didn’t think it needed a strong alliance with Europeans in MENA. Beyond some bilat exceptions with the UK & France, US policy was mostly supported by regional allies and ad hoc coalitions.

Euros weren’t so interested either. Southern Euros had specific historical & geogr. interests & ties but Europe remained divided, risk-averse & mostly satisfied with US leadership. Many Euros contributed to the extent it could strengthen their own bilat ties with the US.

Europeans & Americans kept fairly different perspectives on MENA. It’s always informative to compare how they look at maps. E.g. The US military approach to the « broader Middle East » and « Europe » vs how the EU sees its ‘neighborhood’.

Transatlantic cooperation has traditionally existed via 4 formats:
1. Bilat tracks towards #UNSC res. (Lebanon 2005)
2. Ad hoc intl milit coalitions (1990; 2003)
3. Ad hoc multilateralism (Quartet re MEPP ; P5+1 re JCPoA)
4. Instit coop via NATO or EU (training missions in Iraq)

This dynamic evolved post « Arab springs », not for the best: Western response showed an increasing transatlantic mismatch. After blaming the US for the Iraq war in the 2000’, many Europeans tried to reverse Washington’s Middle East « fatigue » in the 2010’, esp in Libya & Syria.

The effects of European reliance on the US in its Southern Neighborhood have been numerous (e.g. terrorist attacks; a migration wave in 2015). This weakness triggered a slow but steady reaction. German speeches give a sense of the broader Euro evolution. auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/ne…

Europe took more action : military contributions to the fight against #ISIS in #Syria, #Iraq & #Libya, maritime operations in Libya & in the Gulf, billions of € in humanitarian aid in Syria, Iraq & Yemen as well as diplo initiatives on Iran, Syria, Libya & Lebanon.

Beyond French initiatives, Germans took more responsibility, incl. milit. (Iraq, Libya); Denmark, Estonia, Belgium, Netherlands have been militarily more active; Italy in Libya; the EU has worked more quickly for more robust mandates for maritime security.

These contributions had neither the ambition nor the ability to solve MENA crises short of US & regional convergences. The US military remains the US military, in MENA and beyond.

Euros also still have tactical differences & critical milit gaps. They still have a long way to go but they did more in recent years than US experts often acknowledge. Some examples below.

Bottom line: Transat coop in MENA isn’t really delivering, neither for the #US nor for Europe. Whoever wins the US election, the current US consensus on “ending #endlesswars”, combined with a messy but steady increase of EU engagement, require a rethink of transat coop in #MENA.

As I pointed out in a recent thread (below), there is an intense soul searching in the US regarding the right American footprint in the MENA after the « #endlesswars ».

https://twitter.com/diplocharlie/status/1316510883460284418

.@maxbergmann & @ErikBrattberg made the case for the US to support a stronger EU foreign policy. This clearly applies to MENA. There is an alternative between unilaterally leading coalitions as US superpower & preserving only narrow interests through transactional relationships.

https://twitter.com/diplocharlie/status/1316740361621045250

The election creates an opportunity for #Europe to prove its relevance to Washington. This is far from granted when you listen to US colleagues, as @JyShapiro noted here : ecfr.eu/special/mappin…

In return, to do more with less in #MENA, the #US needs to support the European geopolitical empowerment. Europe & the US can design a healthier & humbler agenda with few priorities.

Since the Biden doctrine is not finalized & the Trump doctrine is transactional, the ball is in Europe’s court to organize itself with small coalitions, as already exist on Libya or the JCPoA+). @ECFRMena made a similar case. ecfr.eu/specials/mappi…

With Biden or Trump, demands to Europe, like increasing milit spending & milit capabilities, will remain. But the US remains the elephant in the room of European defense & it therefore has a key role in signalling its support to a stronger Euro Defense pillar within NATO.

A humbler but more stable Western commitment is key. #Iran is the priority, but deescalation with Tehran requires coordinated push from US & Euros towards regional dialogs on #Iraq, #Syria, #Yemen. A joint discussion with #Turkey on Syria, Libya & #EastMed will be essential.

The focus should not only be on hard security. Europeans & Americans are best placed to design packages of assistance with the @IMFNews or the @WorldBank to help address the region’s structural governance and economic issues amplified by the COVID pandemic.

Since 1990, the Middle East is a clear case of US reluctance to share decisionmaking with Euros, while the Euros have balked at sharing burdens. Given changes in the region, as well as
in the US & Europe, transat coop can lead to a useful rethink of US & EU MENA policies. (End)