1. Last night, #IS published a new statement from its spokesman Abu Hamza al-Qurashi in which, among other things, he lauded the recent exploits of #ISWAP—#IS’s West Africa Province—in #Nigeria, alluding to Abubakar #Shekau's group, #JAS, as "khawarij."
2. #Qurashi said #IS was “pleased to hear the news of the bay’a” of former #Shekau followers.
This wasn't rhetoric. In the last two weeks, #ISWAP has been claiming attacks in parts of Borno in which it was previously inactive, places in which #JAS had previously been dominant.
3. After its victory over #JAS in May, many #JAS fighters joined #ISWAP, which consolidated these gains and began launching attacks in former #JAS areas quicker than many had anticipated it would.
The first such attack took place on 13 June southeast of #Maiduguri, near #Bama.
4. In the #Bama attack, #ISWAP fighters (likely #JAS defectors) assaulted a local #NA base. The photo-report published after the attack featured adolescent fighters, with one image showing a teen posing in front of the burning barracks.
5. That attack was followed by a number of other #ISWAP assaults in former #JAS areas—in #Kwamdi (15 June), #Kumshe (19 June), #Konduga (20 June), and #Mayanti (21 June).
To reiterate, these were not areas in which #ISWAP was active prior to this month.
6. To be sure, not all of #JAS has defected. At least one group in #Chad|ian and #Niger|ien parts of Lake Chad continues to operate separately.
That said, in a video last week it appealed directly to #IS’s leadership to mediate between it, other #JAS elements, and #ISWAP.
7. At ExTrac, we are tracking these dynamics closely.
If you’d like to know more about our reporting, visit extrac.io or email info@extrac.io.
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1. In recent months, we’ve been tracking chatter about the World Cup in #Qatar across #IS, #AQ, and Shi'a militant group (#SMG) networks online.
2. Interest has been fairly limited in #AQ & #SMG ecosystems but #IS|ers have been calling for attacks, with momentum for these calls spiking in recent days.
Graphs show incidence of posts with “Qatar” (yellow), “World Cup” (blue), and “football” (red).
3. One #IS call-to-arms singles out teams / supporters of Coalition member states, above all #US and #France.
There have also been multiple assertions that attacks needn’t happen only in #Qatar, the logic being that an attack anywhere during the WC will be maximally disruptive.
1. Following the explosions at #Saky airbase on Tuesday, satellite imagery (from @Planet) of their aftermath has emerged.
Multiple buildings and aircraft were destroyed – with at least three distinct craters clearly apparent.
L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
2. Several aircraft housed in 3-sided berms were destroyed, while others closer to the apparent impact craters seemed to survive.
There are a few possible explanations for this (for e.g., some aircraft may have been carrying munitions while others were not).
L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
3. In videos shared across pro-#Kremlin Telegram that had reportedly been shot immediately after the first 'strike,' smoke can be seen billowing before a large explosion at the site.
1. Over the last few days, we’ve been tracking a major new influence campaign being deployed by the #Taliban in #Afghanistan.
On 22 July, its networks on Twitter and Telegram were three times more active than usual – more active than they've been across all of 2022 to date.
2. This surge was the result of a defensive comms campaign aimed at legitimising the #Taliban, sparked when @Meta banned its media agencies, Bakhtar/RTA, last week.
In the wake of that, thousands started tweeting #BanTaliban in the hope that @Twitter would follow suit.