1. On 19 September, following weeks of inactivity, #ISKP once again started reporting attacks from #Afghanistan.
That day alone, it claimed seven operations—this is the largest number of attacks reported by #ISKP in a single day in years.
2. This spate of attacks has so far focused on what #IS is calling the ‘apostate #Taliban militia.’
It appears to signal the start of the new, reinvigorated #Afghanistan campaign that #IS first said was on the horizon back in August.
3. Notably, aside from #ISKP’s two attacks on #KIA at the end of August, it had been entirely inactive in #Afghanistan until this week.
The last time it went dark for that long was in June/July 2020.
4. So far, aside from the #Kabul attacks in August, all these attacks have taken place in either #Nangarhar or #Kunar.
Three others have been reported from #Pakistan’s NW border region, to which #ISKP lays claim even though #Pakistan has its own separate #IS wilaya.
5. From a tactical perspective, all but one of #ISKP’s recent attacks in #Afghanistan have relied on IEDs.
IEDs have long been a go-to for #ISKP, but this rate of usage is greater than usual. It suggests #ISKP's cells are really trying to lay low.
6. #IS has so far only issued attack reports on these ops.
However, the day it claimed the #Jalalabad bombs, #ISKP’s local media centre published a video attacking the #Taliban for 'supporting Shi’is.’
Whether this deliberately coincided with the op claims remains to be seen.
7. Last month, we speculated that #ISKP would try to double down in #Afghanistan to demonstrate the #Taliban’s inability to provide security and to frame itself as a key power-broker.
Based on the last few days, it seems it's now attempting to do that.
8. For more on #ISKP’s origins, operational trajectory, outreach strategy, and significance within the broader global #IS movement, check out our in-depth report (and the full Twitter thread) here:
1. In recent months, we’ve been tracking chatter about the World Cup in #Qatar across #IS, #AQ, and Shi'a militant group (#SMG) networks online.
2. Interest has been fairly limited in #AQ & #SMG ecosystems but #IS|ers have been calling for attacks, with momentum for these calls spiking in recent days.
Graphs show incidence of posts with “Qatar” (yellow), “World Cup” (blue), and “football” (red).
3. One #IS call-to-arms singles out teams / supporters of Coalition member states, above all #US and #France.
There have also been multiple assertions that attacks needn’t happen only in #Qatar, the logic being that an attack anywhere during the WC will be maximally disruptive.
1. Following the explosions at #Saky airbase on Tuesday, satellite imagery (from @Planet) of their aftermath has emerged.
Multiple buildings and aircraft were destroyed – with at least three distinct craters clearly apparent.
L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
2. Several aircraft housed in 3-sided berms were destroyed, while others closer to the apparent impact craters seemed to survive.
There are a few possible explanations for this (for e.g., some aircraft may have been carrying munitions while others were not).
L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
3. In videos shared across pro-#Kremlin Telegram that had reportedly been shot immediately after the first 'strike,' smoke can be seen billowing before a large explosion at the site.
1. Over the last few days, we’ve been tracking a major new influence campaign being deployed by the #Taliban in #Afghanistan.
On 22 July, its networks on Twitter and Telegram were three times more active than usual – more active than they've been across all of 2022 to date.
2. This surge was the result of a defensive comms campaign aimed at legitimising the #Taliban, sparked when @Meta banned its media agencies, Bakhtar/RTA, last week.
In the wake of that, thousands started tweeting #BanTaliban in the hope that @Twitter would follow suit.