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ExTrac

@Ex_Trac

Nov 1, 2021 • 8 tweets • 8 min read • Read on X

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1. A quick thread on official #Taliban comms.

When the #Taliban took control of #Kabul, it also took control of #Afghanistan’s decades-old state media apparatus (the red line).

Simultaneously, it abandoned its own decades-old “Voice of Jihad” network (the yellow line).

2. This graph shows output from “Voice of Jihad” over the last five years. Note how it peaked in the summer months before collapsing, and staying collapsed, in August.

That was the point at which the #Taliban’s “Voice of Jihad” finally went silent.

3. This graph, on the other hand, shows output from #Afghanistan’s state media network, the Bakhtar News Agency. Note the pause in mid-August followed by a new, different pattern of activity.

That was the point at which the #Taliban took over.

4. Now, the #Taliban publishes around 200-250 new media products a week via the Bakhtar News Agency and #Afghanistan’s other state channels, like RFA.

5. These materials are profoundly different from official #Taliban comms in bygone years.

This graph shows military-focused content (blue) vs. governance-focused content (grey).

In other words, it shows that with the capture of #Kabul, the #Taliban’s brand transformed.

6. Enter #ISKP, which has been doing all it can to undermine the #Taliban’s new rule of late.

Interestingly, notwithstanding the 50+ attacks #ISKP’s deployed and the 1000s of #ISKP "suspects" the #Taliban’s rounded up, it has been all but ignored in #Taliban comms to date.

7. The absence of #ISKP-related comms in #Taliban output shouldn't be taken to suggest the #Taliban isn’t worried.

Rather, it's because the #Taliban is suppressing news of its ops—and the broader message they send about its ability to secure #Afghanistan.
public-assets.extrac.io/reports/ExTrac…

8. We’re monitoring this situation closely. For more information on our #Taliban comms tracking capability, visit extrac.io.

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More from @Ex_Trac

ExTrac

@Ex_Trac

Nov 17, 2022

1. In recent months, we’ve been tracking chatter about the World Cup in #Qatar across #IS, #AQ, and Shi'a militant group (#SMG) networks online.

2. Interest has been fairly limited in #AQ & #SMG ecosystems but #IS|ers have been calling for attacks, with momentum for these calls spiking in recent days.

Graphs show incidence of posts with “Qatar” (yellow), “World Cup” (blue), and “football” (red).

1: #SMG; 2: #AQ; 3: #IS

3. One #IS call-to-arms singles out teams / supporters of Coalition member states, above all #US and #France.

There have also been multiple assertions that attacks needn’t happen only in #Qatar, the logic being that an attack anywhere during the WC will be maximally disruptive.

Read 5 tweets

ExTrac

@Ex_Trac

Oct 10, 2022

1. Time for a status update on #IS.

We’ve been collecting and analysing #IS comms and chatter continuously for the last few years.

This is what the short- (50-day) and long-term (200-day) rolling averages look like for #IS attacks as of 10 October 2022.

2. In #Syria, after a three-fold decline across 2020/21, #IS’s reported activities have been hovering at roughly the same level since last summer.

Note that there was a fleeting surge after the #Ghwayran prison-break, but nothing sustained.

See tweet #12 for caveat.

3. In #Iraq, #IS’s network is seemingly in a similar place.

These days, less than half as many attacks are being reported on average compared with this time in 2020 and 2021.

See tweet #12 for caveat.

Read 13 tweets

ExTrac

@Ex_Trac

Sep 20, 2022

1. In his latest statement, #IS spokesman Abu ‘Umar al-Muhajir spoke at length about #IS’s targeting of Christian communities in #Africa.

This continent-wide campaign is likely to intensify across #Mozambique, #DRC, and #Nigeria in the next few months, peaking in December.

2. As part of this, Muhajir spoke about recent developments in #Mozambique.

September has seen #IS’s cells penetrating further south there than ever before, razing "Christian villages" to the ground as they go.

L: #IS-related violence in 2021
R: #IS-related violence in 2022

3. At the beginning of this month, about 20 #IS fighters from #CaboDelgado crossed the #Lurio river and entered #Nampula province.

Up until that point, #Nampula state had seen just one attack claimed by #IS. As of today, that number is at eight and counting.

Read 7 tweets

ExTrac

@Ex_Trac

Aug 11, 2022

@Planet

1. Following the explosions at #Saky airbase on Tuesday, satellite imagery (from @Planet) of their aftermath has emerged.

Multiple buildings and aircraft were destroyed – with at least three distinct craters clearly apparent.

L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug

2. Several aircraft housed in 3-sided berms were destroyed, while others closer to the apparent impact craters seemed to survive.

There are a few possible explanations for this (for e.g., some aircraft may have been carrying munitions while others were not).

L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug

3. In videos shared across pro-#Kremlin Telegram that had reportedly been shot immediately after the first 'strike,' smoke can be seen billowing before a large explosion at the site.

Read 9 tweets

ExTrac

@Ex_Trac

Jul 29, 2022

1. The attack on #Kabul Cricket Stadium is as yet unclaimed, but it’s worth noting that, as of today, #ISKP has been inactive for 13 days in a row.

That’s the longest period since September 2021, when it was gearing up to launch the most intensive campaign in its recent history.

2. This summer’s slump has seen #ISKP become somewhat sidelined as an issue in #Afghanistan.

This graph shows mentions of the keyword “Daesh” on #Taliban social media since mid-2020.

Note how things peaked in Q4 2021 when #ISKP was at its most virulent.

3. We’ve also seen a slump in official #ISKP media releases (as in, those published through #IS’s Central Media Diwan).

Importantly, this lull hasn’t been reflected in the activities of #ISKP’s less globally prominent Pashtu and Dari media offices.

Read 7 tweets

ExTrac

@Ex_Trac

Jul 25, 2022

1. Over the last few days, we’ve been tracking a major new influence campaign being deployed by the #Taliban in #Afghanistan.

On 22 July, its networks on Twitter and Telegram were three times more active than usual – more active than they've been across all of 2022 to date.

@Meta

2. This surge was the result of a defensive comms campaign aimed at legitimising the #Taliban, sparked when @Meta banned its media agencies, Bakhtar/RTA, last week.

In the wake of that, thousands started tweeting #BanTaliban in the hope that @Twitter would follow suit.

3. Responding to this, the #Taliban launched its own campaign, #AfghansSupportTaliban, on 22 July.

Within three days, it was shared more than twice as many times as the initial anti-#Taliban hashtag (200k+).

Here’s where it all started.

Read 10 tweets

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