ExTrac Profile picture
1 Nov, 8 tweets, 8 min read
1. A quick thread on official #Taliban comms.

When the #Taliban took control of #Kabul, it also took control of #Afghanistan’s decades-old state media apparatus (the red line).

Simultaneously, it abandoned its own decades-old “Voice of Jihad” network (the yellow line).
2. This graph shows output from “Voice of Jihad” over the last five years. Note how it peaked in the summer months before collapsing, and staying collapsed, in August.

That was the point at which the #Taliban’s “Voice of Jihad” finally went silent.
3. This graph, on the other hand, shows output from #Afghanistan’s state media network, the Bakhtar News Agency. Note the pause in mid-August followed by a new, different pattern of activity.

That was the point at which the #Taliban took over.
4. Now, the #Taliban publishes around 200-250 new media products a week via the Bakhtar News Agency and #Afghanistan’s other state channels, like RFA.
5. These materials are profoundly different from official #Taliban comms in bygone years.

This graph shows military-focused content (blue) vs. governance-focused content (grey).

In other words, it shows that with the capture of #Kabul, the #Taliban’s brand transformed.
6. Enter #ISKP, which has been doing all it can to undermine the #Taliban’s new rule of late.

Interestingly, notwithstanding the 50+ attacks #ISKP’s deployed and the 1000s of #ISKP "suspects" the #Taliban’s rounded up, it has been all but ignored in #Taliban comms to date.
7. The absence of #ISKP-related comms in #Taliban output shouldn't be taken to suggest the #Taliban isn’t worried.

Rather, it's because the #Taliban is suppressing news of its ops—and the broader message they send about its ability to secure #Afghanistan.
public-assets.extrac.io/reports/ExTrac…
8. We’re monitoring this situation closely. For more information on our #Taliban comms tracking capability, visit extrac.io.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with ExTrac

ExTrac Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @Ex_Trac

22 Sep
1. On 19 September, following weeks of inactivity, #ISKP once again started reporting attacks from #Afghanistan.

That day alone, it claimed seven operations—this is the largest number of attacks reported by #ISKP in a single day in years.
2. This spate of attacks has so far focused on what #IS is calling the ‘apostate #Taliban militia.’

It appears to signal the start of the new, reinvigorated #Afghanistan campaign that #IS first said was on the horizon back in August.
3. Notably, aside from #ISKP’s two attacks on #KIA at the end of August, it had been entirely inactive in #Afghanistan until this week.

The last time it went dark for that long was in June/July 2020.
Read 9 tweets
1 Sep
1. Here’s our detailed briefing note on #ISKP:

public-assets.extrac.io/reports/ExTrac…
2. Drawing on ExTrac analytics and on-the-ground sources inside #Afghanistan, it provides in-depth analysis on #ISKP’s:

i. Origins and relations with the #Taliban;
ii. Operational trajectory;
iii. Outreach strategy; and
iv. Significance within the broader global #IS movement.
3. The first section describes #ISKP’s roots in the #TTP, identifies the issues at the heart of its rift with the #Afghan #Taliban, and considers the strategic influence of its current leader, Dr. Shahab al-Muhajir.
Read 7 tweets
27 Aug
1. The logic behind the #Kabul attacks is clear:

i) demonstrating that the #Taliban cannot provide the security it has been promising;
ii) framing #ISKP as a key power-broker in #Afghanistan; and
iii) goading the #US into extending, in some shape or form, its CT presence there.
2. From a strategic perspective, the attacks were as much aimed at the #Taliban as they were the #Afghan citizens and #US soldiers that were killed.

As the #Taliban tries to consolidate its position in #Afghanistan, #IS will do all it can to undermine it.
3. The more pressure #ISKP puts on the #Taliban, the harder it will be for its nascent government to maintain centrifugal force.

If the #Taliban's fringes rebel and the movement fragments, so too will #Afghanistan—and if that happens, #ISKP will have much more room to breathe.
Read 7 tweets
25 Aug
1. Concerning signals coming from #IS in #Afghanistan.

After a months-long period of resurgence, its activities have fallen off a cliff—and this is not in response to any known counter-#ISKP operation.
2. In June 2021, #ISKP reported 19 times as many ops as it did in June 2020.

This month, it's reported just 11 attacks and been totally inactive for 11 days—that’s three times less activity compared with last month and the longest period of inactivity since October last year.
3. #ISKP’s recovery in #Afghanistan began in June last year. This follows its being declared ‘defeated’ at the hands of the #ANDSF at the end of 2019 (with help from the #Taliban).

Since then, its ascendancy has been fairly steady, as noted here:

Read 9 tweets
23 Jun
1. Last night, #IS published a new statement from its spokesman Abu Hamza al-Qurashi in which, among other things, he lauded the recent exploits of #ISWAP#IS’s West Africa Province—in #Nigeria, alluding to Abubakar #Shekau's group, #JAS, as "khawarij."
2. #Qurashi said #IS was “pleased to hear the news of the bay’a” of former #Shekau followers.

This wasn't rhetoric. In the last two weeks, #ISWAP has been claiming attacks in parts of Borno in which it was previously inactive, places in which #JAS had previously been dominant.
3. After its victory over #JAS in May, many #JAS fighters joined #ISWAP, which consolidated these gains and began launching attacks in former #JAS areas quicker than many had anticipated it would.

The first such attack took place on 13 June southeast of #Maiduguri, near #Bama.
Read 7 tweets
3 Jun
1. Most #Afghanistan analysis of late has been preoccupied with the strategic inroads being made by the #Taliban.

Meanwhile, #IS’s affiliate in #Afghanistan, #ISKP, has been experiencing a dramatic resurgence in the country, one that has gone almost entirely under the radar. Image
2. Yesterday, #ISKP reported 3 attacks, killing and injuring 44. The day before, it claimed to have killed/injured 20.

(While devastating, these ops are small compared to the 4 biggest of 2020, in which more people were killed than all other attacks combined since Jan '20.) Image
3. While #ISKP’s attacks in 2021 have so far been of a smaller scale than the biggest ops of last year, they are increasingly being targeted at civilians.

This graph shows how, since Jan '21, #ISKP has been walking back its war on the #ANDSF and focusing more on non-combatants. Image
Read 5 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal Become our Patreon

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(