When the #Taliban took control of #Kabul, it also took control of #Afghanistan’s decades-old state media apparatus (the red line).
Simultaneously, it abandoned its own decades-old “Voice of Jihad” network (the yellow line).
2. This graph shows output from “Voice of Jihad” over the last five years. Note how it peaked in the summer months before collapsing, and staying collapsed, in August.
That was the point at which the #Taliban’s “Voice of Jihad” finally went silent.
3. This graph, on the other hand, shows output from #Afghanistan’s state media network, the Bakhtar News Agency. Note the pause in mid-August followed by a new, different pattern of activity.
That was the point at which the #Taliban took over.
4. Now, the #Taliban publishes around 200-250 new media products a week via the Bakhtar News Agency and #Afghanistan’s other state channels, like RFA.
5. These materials are profoundly different from official #Taliban comms in bygone years.
This graph shows military-focused content (blue) vs. governance-focused content (grey).
In other words, it shows that with the capture of #Kabul, the #Taliban’s brand transformed.
6. Enter #ISKP, which has been doing all it can to undermine the #Taliban’s new rule of late.
Interestingly, notwithstanding the 50+ attacks #ISKP’s deployed and the 1000s of #ISKP "suspects" the #Taliban’s rounded up, it has been all but ignored in #Taliban comms to date.
7. The absence of #ISKP-related comms in #Taliban output shouldn't be taken to suggest the #Taliban isn’t worried.
2. Drawing on ExTrac analytics and on-the-ground sources inside #Afghanistan, it provides in-depth analysis on #ISKP’s:
i. Origins and relations with the #Taliban;
ii. Operational trajectory;
iii. Outreach strategy; and
iv. Significance within the broader global #IS movement.
3. The first section describes #ISKP’s roots in the #TTP, identifies the issues at the heart of its rift with the #Afghan#Taliban, and considers the strategic influence of its current leader, Dr. Shahab al-Muhajir.
i) demonstrating that the #Taliban cannot provide the security it has been promising;
ii) framing #ISKP as a key power-broker in #Afghanistan; and
iii) goading the #US into extending, in some shape or form, its CT presence there.
2. From a strategic perspective, the attacks were as much aimed at the #Taliban as they were the #Afghan citizens and #US soldiers that were killed.
As the #Taliban tries to consolidate its position in #Afghanistan, #IS will do all it can to undermine it.
3. The more pressure #ISKP puts on the #Taliban, the harder it will be for its nascent government to maintain centrifugal force.
If the #Taliban's fringes rebel and the movement fragments, so too will #Afghanistan—and if that happens, #ISKP will have much more room to breathe.
After a months-long period of resurgence, its activities have fallen off a cliff—and this is not in response to any known counter-#ISKP operation.
2. In June 2021, #ISKP reported 19 times as many ops as it did in June 2020.
This month, it's reported just 11 attacks and been totally inactive for 11 days—that’s three times less activity compared with last month and the longest period of inactivity since October last year.
3. #ISKP’s recovery in #Afghanistan began in June last year. This follows its being declared ‘defeated’ at the hands of the #ANDSF at the end of 2019 (with help from the #Taliban).
Since then, its ascendancy has been fairly steady, as noted here:
1. Last night, #IS published a new statement from its spokesman Abu Hamza al-Qurashi in which, among other things, he lauded the recent exploits of #ISWAP—#IS’s West Africa Province—in #Nigeria, alluding to Abubakar #Shekau's group, #JAS, as "khawarij."
2. #Qurashi said #IS was “pleased to hear the news of the bay’a” of former #Shekau followers.
This wasn't rhetoric. In the last two weeks, #ISWAP has been claiming attacks in parts of Borno in which it was previously inactive, places in which #JAS had previously been dominant.
3. After its victory over #JAS in May, many #JAS fighters joined #ISWAP, which consolidated these gains and began launching attacks in former #JAS areas quicker than many had anticipated it would.
The first such attack took place on 13 June southeast of #Maiduguri, near #Bama.
1. Most #Afghanistan analysis of late has been preoccupied with the strategic inroads being made by the #Taliban.
Meanwhile, #IS’s affiliate in #Afghanistan, #ISKP, has been experiencing a dramatic resurgence in the country, one that has gone almost entirely under the radar.
2. Yesterday, #ISKP reported 3 attacks, killing and injuring 44. The day before, it claimed to have killed/injured 20.
(While devastating, these ops are small compared to the 4 biggest of 2020, in which more people were killed than all other attacks combined since Jan '20.)
3. While #ISKP’s attacks in 2021 have so far been of a smaller scale than the biggest ops of last year, they are increasingly being targeted at civilians.
This graph shows how, since Jan '21, #ISKP has been walking back its war on the #ANDSF and focusing more on non-combatants.