ExTrac Profile picture
25 Aug, 9 tweets, 8 min read
1. Concerning signals coming from #IS in #Afghanistan.

After a months-long period of resurgence, its activities have fallen off a cliff—and this is not in response to any known counter-#ISKP operation.
2. In June 2021, #ISKP reported 19 times as many ops as it did in June 2020.

This month, it's reported just 11 attacks and been totally inactive for 11 days—that’s three times less activity compared with last month and the longest period of inactivity since October last year.
3. #ISKP’s recovery in #Afghanistan began in June last year. This follows its being declared ‘defeated’ at the hands of the #ANDSF at the end of 2019 (with help from the #Taliban).

Since then, its ascendancy has been fairly steady, as noted here:

4. That is, until mid-August this year, when #ISKP suddenly went silent.

Its last attack was reported on 14 August—the day before #Kabul fell to the #Taliban.
5. This dynamic could be driven by a range of factors.

It could be that the #Taliban simply has a better handle on #ISKP than the #ANDSF and #US did.

It seems more likely, however, that #ISKP is deliberately laying low.
6. #IS affiliates tend to lay low when they are either:

i) In 'survival mode' (e.g., in #Syria now, see thread below); or
ii) Planning something (e.g., in the run up to attrition campaigns, see graph).

7. Given that just weeks ago #ISKP was an order of magnitude more active than it was the same time last year, it seems unlikely that its silence now can be explained by its having suddenly entered into ‘survival mode.’
8. On that basis, it is critical that all parties in #Afghanistan monitor the situation closely. There are lots of ‘ideal’ targets for #ISKP at risk right now.

We’re monitoring this closely. If you’d like to know more, visit extrac.io or email info@extrac.io.
9. #IS has claimed responsibility for just *one* suicide operation, yet multiple bombings have been reported from #Kabul.

This is unusual and unprecedented - suggests that other operations could be imminent/underway.

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More from @Ex_Trac

1 Sep
1. Here’s our detailed briefing note on #ISKP:

public-assets.extrac.io/reports/ExTrac…
2. Drawing on ExTrac analytics and on-the-ground sources inside #Afghanistan, it provides in-depth analysis on #ISKP’s:

i. Origins and relations with the #Taliban;
ii. Operational trajectory;
iii. Outreach strategy; and
iv. Significance within the broader global #IS movement.
3. The first section describes #ISKP’s roots in the #TTP, identifies the issues at the heart of its rift with the #Afghan #Taliban, and considers the strategic influence of its current leader, Dr. Shahab al-Muhajir.
Read 7 tweets
27 Aug
1. The logic behind the #Kabul attacks is clear:

i) demonstrating that the #Taliban cannot provide the security it has been promising;
ii) framing #ISKP as a key power-broker in #Afghanistan; and
iii) goading the #US into extending, in some shape or form, its CT presence there.
2. From a strategic perspective, the attacks were as much aimed at the #Taliban as they were the #Afghan citizens and #US soldiers that were killed.

As the #Taliban tries to consolidate its position in #Afghanistan, #IS will do all it can to undermine it.
3. The more pressure #ISKP puts on the #Taliban, the harder it will be for its nascent government to maintain centrifugal force.

If the #Taliban's fringes rebel and the movement fragments, so too will #Afghanistan—and if that happens, #ISKP will have much more room to breathe.
Read 7 tweets
23 Jun
1. Last night, #IS published a new statement from its spokesman Abu Hamza al-Qurashi in which, among other things, he lauded the recent exploits of #ISWAP#IS’s West Africa Province—in #Nigeria, alluding to Abubakar #Shekau's group, #JAS, as "khawarij."
2. #Qurashi said #IS was “pleased to hear the news of the bay’a” of former #Shekau followers.

This wasn't rhetoric. In the last two weeks, #ISWAP has been claiming attacks in parts of Borno in which it was previously inactive, places in which #JAS had previously been dominant.
3. After its victory over #JAS in May, many #JAS fighters joined #ISWAP, which consolidated these gains and began launching attacks in former #JAS areas quicker than many had anticipated it would.

The first such attack took place on 13 June southeast of #Maiduguri, near #Bama.
Read 7 tweets
3 Jun
1. Most #Afghanistan analysis of late has been preoccupied with the strategic inroads being made by the #Taliban.

Meanwhile, #IS’s affiliate in #Afghanistan, #ISKP, has been experiencing a dramatic resurgence in the country, one that has gone almost entirely under the radar. Image
2. Yesterday, #ISKP reported 3 attacks, killing and injuring 44. The day before, it claimed to have killed/injured 20.

(While devastating, these ops are small compared to the 4 biggest of 2020, in which more people were killed than all other attacks combined since Jan '20.) Image
3. While #ISKP’s attacks in 2021 have so far been of a smaller scale than the biggest ops of last year, they are increasingly being targeted at civilians.

This graph shows how, since Jan '21, #ISKP has been walking back its war on the #ANDSF and focusing more on non-combatants. Image
Read 5 tweets
23 Apr
1. Last week, #Biden said #US troops would withdraw from #Afghanistan by 11 Sep. Critics say setting the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks as a deadline is a big propaganda win for the #Taliban.

Here's a thread exploring what the #Taliban has made of the announcement to date.
2. To do this, we tracked the impact of the (so far) one and only statement the #Taliban has made on the matter, in which it welcomes #Biden’s confirmation that the #US will pull out but condemns the fact that it is happening 6 months later than was agreed under #Trump.
3. True to form, the #Taliban published its response in five languages—Arabic, Dari, English, Pashto, and Urdu—with all versions emerging on 15 Apr. We plugged each of them into ExTrac’s social listening system to see how much of a splash they made in the subsequent seven days.
Read 9 tweets

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