ExTrac Profile picture
12 Nov, 4 tweets, 5 min read
1. The latest issue of #IS's newspaper contained another nine reports of attacks in #Syria.

This means that, across the last week alone, #IS has reported 17 ops in #Syria.

That’s more attacks in a single week than were reported across August, September and October combined. Image
2. #IS is framing the recent surge in attacks in #DeirEzzor governorate as 'a strong comeback.'

The question remains as to whether or not it will be sustained in the coming weeks. ImageImage
3. Significantly, and in stark contrast with recent weeks, #IS also reported ops across #Raqqa and #Hasaka as well as in #DeirEzzor.

Per its comms at least, #IS has been totally inactive in #Raqqa and #Hasaka since June. Image
4. For more information on our monitoring and analysis capabilities, contact info@extrac.io or visit extrac.io.

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More from @Ex_Trac

12 Nov
1. #IS has started reporting attacks from #CaboDelgado again.

This follows a three-month pause in its comms from #Mozambique.

Specifically, in the last three days alone, it’s claimed 16 operations. Image
2. After the recapture of Mocimboa da Praia three months ago by #Mozambique, #Rwanda & #SouthAfrica (among others), #IS’s comms went dark.

However, its network there was far from inactive, as these latest data, combined with what @ACLEDINFO has been reporting, indicate. Image
3. From a geographic perspective, #IS’s self-reported activities in recent months have been confined to the Mocimboa da Praia district of #CaboDelgado.

No attacks were reported from Palma, even though @ACLEDINFO data (displayed in yellow) suggests otherwise. Image
Read 6 tweets
1 Nov
1. A quick thread on official #Taliban comms.

When the #Taliban took control of #Kabul, it also took control of #Afghanistan’s decades-old state media apparatus (the red line).

Simultaneously, it abandoned its own decades-old “Voice of Jihad” network (the yellow line).
2. This graph shows output from “Voice of Jihad” over the last five years. Note how it peaked in the summer months before collapsing, and staying collapsed, in August.

That was the point at which the #Taliban’s “Voice of Jihad” finally went silent.
3. This graph, on the other hand, shows output from #Afghanistan’s state media network, the Bakhtar News Agency. Note the pause in mid-August followed by a new, different pattern of activity.

That was the point at which the #Taliban took over.
Read 8 tweets
22 Sep
1. On 19 September, following weeks of inactivity, #ISKP once again started reporting attacks from #Afghanistan.

That day alone, it claimed seven operations—this is the largest number of attacks reported by #ISKP in a single day in years.
2. This spate of attacks has so far focused on what #IS is calling the ‘apostate #Taliban militia.’

It appears to signal the start of the new, reinvigorated #Afghanistan campaign that #IS first said was on the horizon back in August.
3. Notably, aside from #ISKP’s two attacks on #KIA at the end of August, it had been entirely inactive in #Afghanistan until this week.

The last time it went dark for that long was in June/July 2020.
Read 9 tweets
1 Sep
1. Here’s our detailed briefing note on #ISKP:

public-assets.extrac.io/reports/ExTrac…
2. Drawing on ExTrac analytics and on-the-ground sources inside #Afghanistan, it provides in-depth analysis on #ISKP’s:

i. Origins and relations with the #Taliban;
ii. Operational trajectory;
iii. Outreach strategy; and
iv. Significance within the broader global #IS movement.
3. The first section describes #ISKP’s roots in the #TTP, identifies the issues at the heart of its rift with the #Afghan #Taliban, and considers the strategic influence of its current leader, Dr. Shahab al-Muhajir.
Read 7 tweets
27 Aug
1. The logic behind the #Kabul attacks is clear:

i) demonstrating that the #Taliban cannot provide the security it has been promising;
ii) framing #ISKP as a key power-broker in #Afghanistan; and
iii) goading the #US into extending, in some shape or form, its CT presence there.
2. From a strategic perspective, the attacks were as much aimed at the #Taliban as they were the #Afghan citizens and #US soldiers that were killed.

As the #Taliban tries to consolidate its position in #Afghanistan, #IS will do all it can to undermine it.
3. The more pressure #ISKP puts on the #Taliban, the harder it will be for its nascent government to maintain centrifugal force.

If the #Taliban's fringes rebel and the movement fragments, so too will #Afghanistan—and if that happens, #ISKP will have much more room to breathe.
Read 7 tweets
25 Aug
1. Concerning signals coming from #IS in #Afghanistan.

After a months-long period of resurgence, its activities have fallen off a cliff—and this is not in response to any known counter-#ISKP operation.
2. In June 2021, #ISKP reported 19 times as many ops as it did in June 2020.

This month, it's reported just 11 attacks and been totally inactive for 11 days—that’s three times less activity compared with last month and the longest period of inactivity since October last year.
3. #ISKP’s recovery in #Afghanistan began in June last year. This follows its being declared ‘defeated’ at the hands of the #ANDSF at the end of 2019 (with help from the #Taliban).

Since then, its ascendancy has been fairly steady, as noted here:

Read 9 tweets

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