Here on #EconTwitter, it has recently been discussed how forecasters could have been so wrong about #inflation. A 🧵 on the drivers of inflation in #Germany (with similarities in other €-countries). 1/
While in the US, several factors seem to be at play and inflation seems to be increasingly broad based, in Germany (and most of the €-area), inflation is still relatively limited to some components. Especially, one key factor is not always fully appreciated:Natural gas prices.2/
The recent increase in natural gas prices (the border prices of which have increased by 270 % over the past year) has not been seen by analysts in advance. The reason is that much of it has to do with recent fear about supply constraints from Russia, 3/
which in turn have a geo-political background (#Ukraine/#Russia) and therefore have been difficult to be predicted by economists. 4/
To make this point: In August and September, natural gas prices were “only” 170 % above last year’s prices. This increased to a plus of 270 % until November. 5/
Just to put those 270 % in perspective: In the 1973 oil crisis, for the US, at its peak the increase in monthly imported oil prices was about 300 % year-on-year. In the 1979/80 oil crisis, prices never increased by more than 110 % year-on-year. 6/
When making their autumn forecast, the leading German economic research institutes calculated with a gas price of 80 €/MWh and simulated a FALL in gas prices as their “alternative scenario”. The new increase just was not seen (actual peak was ~180 €). gemeinschaftsdiagnose.de/wp-content/upl… 7/
Getting natural gas prices wrong has a huge impact on the inflation forecast.
Natural gas is not only a key source of energy for Germany (covering about one fourth of the country’s primary energy needs), it is also the key MARGINAL energy supply. 8/
As gas is used in power plants to provide the electricity that more sluggish energy sources cannot, its price has a disproportionate influence in other energy markets, too. The rise in wholesale prices in electricity can be linked to the increased natural gas prices. 9/
Moreover, for private households, natural gas is the most important source of heating energy. While natural gas retailers have not yet fully passed on the price rise to customers, the impact on CPI inflation is disproportionate 10/
as natural gas’ weight in the basket is 2.5 % (for comparison, car fuels together are ~ 3,5 %) and, given low tax rates on natural gas relative to car fuels, any price change in net gas prices has a larger impact on CPI than a change in car fuels. 11/
destatis.de/DE/Themen/Wirt…
What is more, natural gas enters a number of industrial processes in which it cannot be quickly or easily substituted. A sustained and strong increase in prices as we have seen is thus a significant cost push for firms, 12/
and as we see in goods price inflation, this is passed on to customers. Hence, the impact of energy on CPI inflation is not only direct (about half of the latest increase in German CPI is a direct increase in energy prices), 13/
but also indirect and turns up in other prices. Still, these indirect effects are not yet a proper inflationary process in which wage and prices increases lead to permanently higher inflation. Especially, there is no sign of wage pick-up yet. 14/
What does this all mean for the @ecb? The situation in the €-area is different from that in the US. The @ecb needs to be vigilant, but so far, not hiking rates soon seems a plausible reaction. At the moment, we are seeing a one-off price shock, 15/
combined with some temporary supply disturbances in certain sectors (car production).

While it will take some more time for gas prices to work through into consumer prices, and thus measured inflation might remain above 2 % for some months 16/
(and longer if a war in #Ukraine would lead to gas supply disruptions), the proper reaction to this is yet to hold tight, not to react in panic. 17/

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More from @SDullien

18 Dec 21
Es wurde hier auf #Econtwitter zuletzt immer wieder von der vermeintlichen „Effizienz“ des #CO2-Emissionshandels gesprochen. Leider hält das Argument einer genaueren empirischen Betrachtung nicht stand. Ein 🧵 1/
Ich kenne das Lehrbuch-Argument eines statischen Emissionshandels mit perfekten Märkten. Und klar, da kommt in Betrachtung ein effizientes Ergebnis heraus, weil der Emissionsabbau immer dort stattfindet, wo er am günstigsten ist. 2/
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Emis…
Leider hat das mit der Realität eines Emissionshandels über die Zeit, wie er etwa beim EU-ETS besteht, nichts zu tun. Hier kann man empirisch schnell erkennen, dass die Ergebnisse ineffizient sind.
Um das zu verstehen, muss man sich die intertemporale Effizienz ansehen. 3/
Read 17 tweets
15 Dec 21
Hier auf #Econtwitter wurde zuletzt wiederholt behauptet, ein #CO2-#Zertifikatehandel würde zur makroökonomischen Stabilisierung beitragen, weil ja die Preise in der Krise fallen und im Boom steigen.

Diese Schlussfolgerung ist leider Unsinn. Ein 🧵 1/
Natürlich stimmt es, dass die CO2-Preise im Emissionshandel in der Krise regelmäßig eingebrochen sind und danach in der Erholung gestiegen sind.

Allerdings trägt dies nicht zur makroökonomischen Stabilisierung, sondern eher zur Destabilisierung wieder. 2/
Warum ist das so?
Zunächst: Bei Energiepreisen allgemein ist die Erfahrung, dass fallende Energiepreise über höhere Kaufkraft zu mehr Nachfrage führen und damit die Wirtschaft ankurbeln.
Das liegt allerdings daran, dass Länder wie Deutschland ihr Öl und Gas überwiegend 3/
Read 16 tweets
9 Dec 21
The @EU_EESC has just published a study by @repasi, @chris_ptz, @AndrewWattEU, Sebastian Watzka and me on the economics and legal issues of changing EU #fiscal rules.
Our conclusions: Quite sweeping changes are possible without treaty change. A Thread. 1/
eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/pu…
In the study, we look at different reform proposals for the fiscal rules (including that of the the @EFB_EU), dissect them into the different elements and evaluate the legal and economic issues surrounding the elements. 2/
The specific elements are: Moving towards an expenditure rule (with the detailed questions of benchmarks, investment clauses and the escape clause as well as adjustment speed), the change in the debt anchor and the adjustment towards it as well 3/
Read 14 tweets
21 Nov 21
During the first #Covid19 wave, Germany was seen as an example for swift and effective action and managed the pandemic better than others.
In this fourth wave, we are seriously behind the curve and the rest of the world wonders what went wrong. A T. 1/
In the spring of 2020, the pictures from Italy led to a very quick reaction by German politicians. Contacts were limited and retail businesses as well as restaurants and hotels closed before the virus spread broadly. 2/
The government of Angela Merkel (with the vice-chancellor Olaf Scholz) quickly summoned the heads of the Länder and imposed an (overall) common approach in the crisis. 3/
Read 25 tweets
1 Nov 21
Weil auch nach meinen theoretischen Erläuterungen zur #Schuldenbremse hier die Diskussion mit wissenschaftlich fragwürdigen Argumenten weitergeführt wurde, noch einmal, um welche Frage es geht, und welche Fakten uns KEINE Antwort geben können. 1/
Was war die Frage? Ich hatte die These aufgestellt, dass die Schuldenbremse dazu führt, dass die öffentliche Hand weniger investiert.
Was heißt aber in diesem Zusammenhang „weniger“? 2/
Wenn wir in der Ă–konomie (oder Medizin oder sonst wo, wo es um kausale Analysen geht) die Frage stellen, wie ein Faktor A auf das Ergebnis X wirkt, dann geht es um den Vergleich einer Situation mit dem Faktor A gegenĂĽber einer hypothetischen Situation ohne den Faktor A. 3/
Read 15 tweets
29 Oct 21
Mein Tweet zu maroden Schulbauten und der #Schuldenbremse hat viel Aufregung verursacht.
Ein paar Erläuterungen, warum die abgefallene Decke vielleicht nicht direkt mit der SB zusammenhängt, warum die SB aber trotzdem ein Problem für Schulbauten ist. 1/

Zunächst: Ich weiß nicht, ob die Decke so alt und unsaniert war, dass sie aus Geldmangel abgefallen ist oder ob beim Bau gefuscht wurde. Beides kommt vor, und nicht nur in Berlin.
Und natürlich läuft in Berliner Verwaltungen einiges nicht so, wie man sich das wünschen würde. 2/
Aber: Das ändert nichts daran, dass viel dafür spricht, dass die Schuldenbremse in ihrer jetzigen Form mit zu der verlotterten Infrastruktur in Deutschland beigetragen hat – und vor allem einer schnellen Sanierung im Weg steht. 3/
Read 17 tweets

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