Thread by @JMJalel_H

The war in #Ukraine will bring a sea change in the #Libyan crisis

#JeuneAfrique kindly included a few of my thoughts on why observers really ought to brace for substantial side effects, not just minor ones.

[ thread on the #Russia facet of the #Libya reality c. 2022 ]

https://twitter.com/jeune_afrique/status/1500886979944275969

Since the Feb. 24 launch of the invasion of Ukraine, apart from lots of unfounded speculation, there’s been not a shred of evidence to suggest any number of #Russian fighters have left Libya.

In fact, over the last several months, the number of Russians in #Brak has increased.

Historically, 1 of the top reasons #Russia has acquired a clandestine #military presence in #Libya is the fact that it’s key strategic territory on #NATO’s southern flank. The #Ukraine crisis of 2014 deepened the Kremlin’s perception of NATO as hostile to Russia’s core interests.

Russian entrenchment in Libya fits w/in a “pincer movement” strategy vis-à-vis Wstrn Europe. This is clear in the realm of hydrocarbons flows.

Now that war’s raging in Ukraine, don’t expect the mini Russian army in Libya to just depart from such a convenient & valuable territory

Since 2020, it’s partly thanks to a defense #line maintained by more than 2 thousand Russians stationed in several airbases & camps that Haftar’s armed coalition has maintained itself in Libya’s east & in the southwest.

No Haftar sympathizer will admit that.

Map by @dhadelli 👇🏻

If the clandestine Russian mission were to leave, the security & political equilibrium in Libya as we have known it since 2020 would be completely upset. Haftar’s armed coalition would lose much of its clout — and the probability of war-fighting within Cyrenaica would increase.

In a surreptitious & shrewd manner, the Russians made themselves indispensable to the relative #calm to which everyone has become accustomed since June 2020. (American lethargy has helped.)

Today, Russian elements are stationed near many of #Libya’s strategic #oil installations.

As things stand today, it is impossible to get the #Russia to leave #Libha unless a war effort is undertaken.

If you think that the Russians now ensconced in Libya will just somehow pack up & leave in a smooth, polite manner, I would, in all humility, invite you to think again.

All of the above will remain the case for several months to come, regardless of who is in power in Tripoli.

But as of this minute, Libya has two rival prime ministers & the United States’ attitude re this question will sure have an effect on what happens in the immediate future.

Fathi #Bashagha, the Libyan politician who on Mar. 1 was endorsed by the Tobruk Parliament, is de facto a partner of Russia, thru his deep alliance w/ #Haftar.

Conversely, Moscow has expressed some support for Bashagha, who is still not recognized as PM by Washington or the UN.

Situation is delicate.

e.g., a set of meaningful Libyan militias & factions back Bashagha within the greater Tripoli area.

If the US were to suddenly interfere against Bashagha, a deadly war could easily erupt in the capital.

There is little appetite for urban war right now.

But this doesn’t mean that American thinking hasn’t experienced a profound change since Putin’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine.

The Americans will now view Russia’s Libyan associates very differently compared to previous years.

The apathy of 2014-2021 is likely dead & buried.

Also, the galvanization of #Turkey as a firm, dynamic NATO member-state vis-à-vis Ukraine may potentially disrupt the Turkish-Russian #entente that has supplied the foundation of the lull which #Libya has known since June 2020.

Morality: expect a 𝙥𝙖𝙧𝙖𝙙𝙞𝙜𝙢 𝙨𝙝𝙞𝙛𝙩.