1. The #Ukrainians' short-term expectations of a defeat of Russia may be overly optimistic. Yet, the mid-term implications of the fundamental changes in the international images of #Russia and #Ukraine during the last two weeks may indeed lead to some sort of Ukrainian victory.
2. Russia's foreign ambitions were already before 2022 overstretched & disproportionate to the capacity of the Russian economy. Now the ambitions have become even more extravagant while the Russian economy is seemingly entering not a recession but a more or less deep depression.
3. On top of the currently imposed & forthcoming sanctions, there will be mounting further problems for Russia's economy resulting from (a) the gradual disengagement of risk-averse as well as ethically woke trade, research and investment partners, not least of the EU, and from...
4. (b) a re-inforced implementation of green (or even temporarily of nuclear) technology solutions especially in the field of energy, at the expense of Russia's main export commodities oil, gas and coal, and from....
5. (c) more and more likely political instability in Russia triggered by both, growing popular awareness of Russian war crimes in Ukraine, and social calamity following the closure of factories, agencies, companies etc.
6. ... as well as rising inflation, shortages, & other economic problems. In sum, the already growing gap between Russian public income, on the one side, & public subsidies for certain groups, regions, projects etc., on the other, will now rise far more steeply than before 2022.
7. This widening gap between #Russian earnings and expenditures will pose ever-tougher questions about the continuing governmental support for all Russian endeavors abroad. While the first "victims" of such cuts may become such entities as Transnistria, Abkhazia, DNR/LNR etc, ...
8. ... one can already imagine a situation in which the continuing subsidization of Russia's most expensive such foreign project, the continuing occupation of illegally annexed Crimea, will come under scrutiny.
9. While a short-term crushing victory for Ukraine may be out of immediate reach, in the mid-term, the coming Ukrainian victory may be rather comprehensive, and result in the recovery of all currently lost lands.
2. Die riesigen #Energierlieferungen sind durch eine riesige, immobile und schwer ersetzbare Exportinfrastruktur möglich. Daher ist dieser apodiktische Satz eine Spekulation: #Putin|s "Entschluss steht fest und ist aus meiner Sicht durch keine #Sanktion der Welt zu beeinflussen."
1. Allegedly, Poland may be ready to provide its airfields for EU-delivered Soviet-era fighter planes of Ukraine flying attacks against Russian troops over Ukrainian state territory.
2. This would fundamentally change the dimension of the war, as a NATO and EU member starts indirectly supporting #Ukraine's defense efforts. If it materializes, it partly answers Ukraine's request for a #NoFlyZone over Ukraine.
3. In case this becomes indeed possible, the remaining question would be how many able pilots and functioning planes Ukraine and its partners can bring together on Polish airports.
Somebody is unhappy & has complained to #Facebook/#Meta about my many shares concerning #Russia's #war against #Ukraine. @Facebook has blocked me til 6 March 2022. I complained on 27 February to @Meta that the block has plain political reasons. So far, the block remains in place.
It is not that my posts are exceptionally important. Yet, note that Russia wages an explicitly anti-Western #war in #Ukraine. I am the Western political scientist who has spent most time in Ukraine during the last 20 years (17). I am thus one, among many other, obvious targets.
UPD: Several colleagues kindly sent additional complaints to Facebook during the last half hour. As a result, I seem to have been just unblocked again. Thanks for the empathy and support! That was fast.
NEW APPROACH NEEDED 1. Russia's is now massively targeting civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. It is engaged in military operations in the vicinity of nuclear materials locations, e.g. near the defunct #Chornobyl_NPP and operational #Zaporizhzhia_NPP with its six active reactors.
2. New developments of the last 24 hours mean that the nature of the war is evolving & that the stakes for the West are increasing. Momentous changes on the ground call for congruent changes in the West's approaches to, & policies towards, Russia and Ukraine in at least two ways.
3. First, in view of Russia's now explicitly terroristic war conduct vis-a-vis the civilian population, limiting arms deliveries for Ukraine to only defensive weapons is neither ethically nor strategically justifiable any more. The Kremlin wants to reach its aim via open terror.
1. #Russia now still controlls less or not much more than 20% of #Ukrainian territory. When, in 2008, Russia captured 20% of #Georgia's territory, no economic sanctions whatsoever were applied. Instead, Russian-Western relations IMPROVED after Russia's 5-day war and occupation.
2. As Medvedev's short speech at the public Russian Security Council meeting last week indicated, the Kremlin's decision to officially invade Ukraine was based on Russia's 2008 experience as well as subsequent developments, & on an assumption of consistency in Western behaviour.
3. The 2014 #sanctions imposed for the annexation of #Crimea & intervention in #Donbas have been mild & manageable for Russia. The most significant EU sanctions adopted on 29 July 2014 were an obvious response to #Russia's downing of #MH17 rather than invasion of #Ukraine itself.