Jalel Harchaoui Profile picture
Apr 17 13 tweets 7 min read
[ thread 🧵 on the NOC’s LFB account ]

In late May 2019, Belqacem Haftar visited DC in a bid to secure U.S. assistance in setting up a mechanism meant to deposit $$$ proceeds from #oil exports into a special account in lieu of sending them straight to the CBL in Tripoli.
The next year, in the summer of 2020, the US & the UN endorsed the idea of preventing oil $$$ proceeds from being funneled directly & systematically to the CBL in Tripoli.

But the rationale now promoted was not the one advocated by Haftar & his associates.
In 2020, international diplomats began suggesting the formation of a special #committee overseeing the equitable & transparent distribution of oil #revenues among the three provinces, & among essential #budget categories.

Said #committee would be above the govt & above the CBL.
On Aug 21, 2020, PM Fayez al-Serraj & HoR chairman Aqila Saleh issued similar declarations meant to pave the way for a #ceasefire.

Both statements specified that the $$$ inflows from oil sales were now to be #warehoused in a “special” account at the #LFB.
The importance of the stipulation above can’t be overestimated, for it enabled the #NOC to step in as the owner of said “special” account w/ #LFB.

If anyone tells you that this little tweak was anything less than a major earthquake in Libya’s political economy, don’t believe ’em
In Sep 2020, after GNA Deputy PM Ahmed Maetiq met w/ Khaled Haftar in Russia, the LNA put an end to its $10bn oil blockade.

As oil $$$ resumed coming in, they got stored in a “special” LFB account owned by the NOC—in conformity w/ the new idea.

The CBL was no longer at the top.
Yet the Financial Committee wasn’t set up.

Reason being: both Gov Kabir & new PM Dabaiba dragged their feet.

Owing to basic power considerations, the 2 men were uneager to implement a mechanism allocating $$$ revenues thru an organ hierarchically above the govt & above the CBL.
But efforts to promote the formation of a Financial #Committee resumed in earnest last month.

And on Apr 13, the NOC released $8bn from its LFB account in exchange for receiving LYD37.6bn from the govt & the CBL.

https://t.co/tpHy9rqxBV
Some Libyan watchers noticed that the Apr 13 precedent exemplified a pattern whereby the hierarchy at the very top of the Libyan state was now looking different compared to the usual pecking order.

At the tip of the pyramid is now the NOC’s $$$ account.

One could even argue that the Apr 13 decision marked the beginning of what may emerge as the new modus operandi of Libya’s public #expenditures.

Going forward, the main allocations of public dinars will #potentially be declared in the exact same way as what we saw on Wednesday.
In sum, the old idea of a Financial Committee at the very top, wherein the NOC plays a key role, may already be in the process of getting implemented now, as we speak.

So why the oil #blockade by Haftar’s factions all of a sudden? Why do the blockaders demand Sanallah’s #firing?
Well, the reason Egypt & the eastern Libyan factions are so angry is rather simple:

Arrangements like the one we saw on Apr 13 between the NOC & the GNU give PM Dabaiba a shot in the arm.

Dollars go to the CBL on an immediate basis—& that could give Dabaiba a new lease on life.
What Belqacem Haftar asked DC for back in May 2019 was a setup giving the LNA discretionary power over how every oil dollar gets allocated & spent.

The modus operandi that’s emerging now isn’t quite exactly what the Haftars wanted.

Hence the discontent . . .

[ end of thread ]

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More from @JMJalel_H

May 19
Further clashes are bound to unfold soon in #Tripolitania.

Because:

• some #local rivalries have become too tense.

#macro fault lines have shifted too far away from #Libya’s Jun 2020 equilibrium, which so many policymakers & watchers take for granted;

[ see 🧵 thread👇🏻]
One must, right off the bat, acknowledge the outsized importance of #Zawiyah actors in today’s NW Libya configuration.

The most zealous pro-Dabaiba fighters on 5/17 in #Tripoli were led by #Bahrun.

& the #Buzeriba forces (who didn’t fight on 5/17) are ferociously anti-Dabaiba.
Other #local antagonisms that became evident on 5/17 in Tripoli include Mustafa Qaddur’s animosity vs. his #Mukhabarat superior & Dabaiba ally Hussein al-#Ayeb.

Nawassi — which holds a major grudge against Bahrun, too — coordinates w/ Buzeriba & Wershefana’s Muammar al-Dhawi. Image
Read 12 tweets
Apr 6
[ thread🧵]

Is a protracted #stalemate burgeoning in Libya?

PM #Bashagha took his oath in Tobruk a month ago—& he still hasn’t swept into office or begun governing.

He himself told the media about the physical act of #entering Tripoli “w/in days”, but that hasn’t happened yet.
Bashagha & his ministers entering Tripoli soon is w/in the realm of the possible.

But the thing is, That won’t necessarily be enough to discard Dabaiba.

I.e., entering Tripoli won’t necessarily put an end to the current crisis.

A slew of profound issues are still outstanding.
A big chunk of opinion & sentiment in both Tripoli & Misrata remains skeptical about Bashagha.

Latter has been making a bit of progress but there’s still a gap.

Plus, the passage of time alone isn’t doing all that work for free, *no matter* how isolated & weak Dabaiba looks.
Read 10 tweets
Mar 8
The war in #Ukraine will bring a sea change in the #Libyan crisis

#JeuneAfrique kindly included a few of my thoughts on why observers really ought to brace for substantial side effects, not just minor ones.

[ thread on the #Russia facet of the #Libya reality c. 2022 ]
Since the Feb. 24 launch of the invasion of Ukraine, apart from lots of unfounded speculation, there’s been not a shred of evidence to suggest any number of #Russian fighters have left Libya.

In fact, over the last several months, the number of Russians in #Brak has increased.
Historically, 1 of the top reasons #Russia has acquired a clandestine #military presence in #Libya is the fact that it’s key strategic territory on #NATO’s southern flank. The #Ukraine crisis of 2014 deepened the Kremlin’s perception of NATO as hostile to Russia’s core interests.
Read 13 tweets
Feb 1
[thread]

The possibility of a #parallel govt — capable of rallying several presidential candidates & other anti-Dabaiba forces — has been pre-announced by #Aqila for months.

Such an entity may indeed emerge now.

Beyond symbolism & posturing, will it affect the current reality?
Militarily, bcos Dabaiba has secured the mobilization of Mahjub, Halbus, & al-Jahawi, Bashagha won’t be in a position to contribute much in Misrata, Tajura, or Tripoli itself.

For the #parallel govt to create pain for Dabaiba, it’ll have to consider being in cahoots w/ the #SSA.
In the eventuality above, a new #parallel govt may pull off truly bothersome disruptions in the greater #Tripoli area, but Dabaiba will not be removed from power by force in the foreseeable future.

No can do.

The Turkish-backed setup now protecting the PM is just too formidable
Read 8 tweets
Apr 9, 2020
Deciphering the #Serraj vs #Kabir squabble.

1 must go back to May-Oct 2018, when both #UN & #US began exerting a pressure on the #CBL in #Tripoli.

At the time, an #LNA attack on the capital wasn't seen as imminent, nor was a #Hibri-#Kabir reunification considered a hot priority
Following #Haftar's Jun '18 #OilCresc blockade, #US (thru the #UN) helped #CBL devise a measure, which was implemented after the Aug-Sep '18 LoC battle in Tripoli.

An LoC #tax now made the de-facto conversion rate 3.9 dinars to 1 $.

$10k packages were introduced for households.
The #US-designed measure—rolled out by #Kabir in Oct ’18—was effectively a devaluation of the dinar w/ the added benefit of attracting banknotes back into the system.

The measure turned out to be a success.

It also reduced the amount of political controversy surrounding #Kabir
Read 13 tweets
Feb 12, 2020
[ Thread: Internationalized #manpower in the war for #Tripoli ]
Long before #Ankara began sending #Syrian Turkmen fighters in Dec to help the #GNA, the number of gung-ho fighters willing to go risk their lives on behalf of the #LNA in W #Libya was insufficient.

That is an important reality even if pro-#LNA voices are loathe to acknowledge it
That’s why the #LNA has used #Sudanese mercs throughout 2019. On LNA side, Sudanese mercs have been basically part of the furniture, eliciting little comment.

Above issue is also the reason why the arrival of a few hundred #Russian fighters near #Tripoli in Sep had a big effect.
Read 11 tweets

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