Thread by @bctallis

WE NEED TO TALK ABOUT HOW WE TALK ABOUT #GERMANY
This thread (pic) gained a lot of traction

But gives a misleading impression (to put it mildly)

Rooted in an outdated view of German identity

That excuses inaction on #Ukraine & makes much needed 🇩🇪change much less likely.
🧵

The thread starts from the premise that the main driver of 🇩🇪 policy is a demilitarised, non-aggressive identity that seeks to be a 'force for good'. It understands this as forged in reaction to the Nazi period (seen as a key lens through which #Germany is perceived abroad). 2/

Now, I'm very sympathetic to the idea that national identity matters in (foreign) policy - & that national identity is shaped inter-nationally. In fact I have an academic article about to be published on just that ... focusing on ... #Germany.
Which discusses at length ...
3/

The incredible work that Germans, including ordinary people, musicians, artists, filmmakers & politicians did to reckon with Nazi crimes
- AND forge a better, more progressive identity for #Germany. A moral regeneration to complement the post-war economic & political renewal 4/

So it might seem like we're on the same page ...
But here's the problem. This neat tale gives a partial, outdated & overly rosy view of #Germany's identity politics & its relation to🇩🇪foreign & security policy - as well as being used to support some v. questionable assertions 5/

Dealing with the identity & foreign policy aspects first. Not having an "aggressive foreign policy" (as the OP put it) has not prevented #Germany from taking some pretty aggressive positions & pursuing policies that aggressively pursued🇩🇪interests (incl. at others expense). 6/

For example,🇩🇪 #Russia policy of recent years (which was NOT Ostpolitik in the Brandtian sense - but rather a betrayal of that). All *Trade* & no real effort for *Change*. This greedily pursued #Germany's economic interests, dressed in the cloak of 'peace', & trampled on #CEE 7/

Or, #Germany's policy toward #Greece (& others) during the Eurozone crisis, inflicting considerable pain, & doing so through nationally defined (often stereotyped) lenses. You may argue this was defending rules & principles, but it's hard to deny it was pretty aggressive. 8/

We can also see this ruthless pursuit of self-interest in the recently released papers on #Germany's negative attitude to #NATO expansion for #CEE, not to mention on recognising Ukraine & the Baltic states' independence. *At the same time* as re-unifying its own state-IN NATO. 9/

DDR integration, on whose terms & with what effects, also merits more discussion (but not here).
Pursuing🇩🇪own interest, to others detriment - 'security for me, but not for thee' - seems pretty aggressive (not all aggression lies in invading other countries).
10/

Bizarrely, OP claimed that🇩🇪is still accused of militarism (not for the last 77 years!).
OP also claimed #Germany didn't want to be "associated with military power" despite the Bundeswehr's role (as keystone of #NATO's Cold War ground force) & national service to staff it
11/

Ignoring this disrespects those who served & how #Germany dedicated a good portion of the proceeds of its economic miracle to meaningfully re-arming for territorial defence (w/o being militaristic).
AND ignores🇩🇪's world-class weapons & defence industry (which OP works for) 12/

Which both equips & enriches #Germany but also supplies others with the means to pursue aggressive & militarised foreign policy should they wish.
So, there are at least 2 key problems with the characterisation of 🇩🇪as LT not doing:
a) military
b) aggressive foreign policy
13/

All of this gives a misleading impression of a #Germany robbed of its hard-won innocence by a dirty world that doesn't live up to 🇩🇪's own noble quest to be a force for good & so 🇩🇪is forced to change.
Don't get me wrong🇩🇪has done MANY great & good things incl. on refugees 14/

especially in 2015 when it did so almost alone but also now as the OP points out (even if in absolute or relative numbers it's way behind others).
& e.g. in the end, it came through on #EU enlargement for #CEE even if then undermined the region & coddled its wannabe tyrants 15/

with e.g. #Orban 🇩🇪was deterred by the charge of aggressive policy in way it wasn't with #Greece
Which brings us to other specifics.
It's claimed that "we all" misjudged #Putin - that's true for many in W. Europe, but not #CEE, which was ignored (& gets ignored in OP's analysis)

Charitably, its possible to ascribe some strands of #Germany's #Russia & #CEE policy to misplaced faith in liberal convergence - something others were also guilty of to a lesser extent. Yet🇩🇪profited handsomely & was willing to ignore others' suffering & warnings to do so 17/

OP's view also ignores 🇩🇪's cheap-riding on #NATO allies (especially 🇺🇸) for defence favouring gain-taking trade with #Russia over playing a full part in Europe's defence. #Germany has of course massively supported the #EU - but also pushed it in ways that served🇩🇪interests 18/

That's fine, but let's not pretend that its from a position of innocent altruism that Germany needs to suddenly conjure a strategic culture. It has long had a strategic culture - but has, some would say cynically, downplayed the militarily aspects of this since the Cold War.
19/

What is true is that in doing so, it neglected its military to the extent that it is in genuinely parlous state. So much so that even the much trumpeted €100bn is nowhere near enough to properly address (& that too is getting nitpicked & walked back) - as w. H.weapons for🇺🇦. 20/

This adds a bit of context to #Germany's initially noble-minded 'peaceful' identity that from c.90s on came to be at best naive & more often cynically self-serving.
But there's more ... The OP gives great credit to Chancellor #Scholz for supposedly overturning this
mentality 21/

Ignoring, for the moment, that both the 100bn & cancelling NS2, & sending weapons to #Ukraine were really the bare minimum that could be expected - overturning previous bad decisions & untenably selfish policy ... the celebration (from the OP) is definitely coming too soon. 22/

A real #Zeitenwende needs far more than a speech & a few course corrections. As anyone following #Germany's debate knows, it's others fighting tooth & nail to do more for #Ukraine & genuinely reform 🇩🇪 foreign & security policy. #Scholz equivocates & obfuscates (kindly put) 23/

Green, FDP & CDU (& some SPD) politicians have been fighting for change but have often been blocked.
Rather than #Germany "trying to reconcile its values with a difficult situation" a society wide battle is on for what those values are & how to enact them at home & abroad 24/

That fight is where I'd locate the integrity in #Germany's current debate on #Ukraine & about itself.
Perpetuating false impressions of🇩🇪 past & ID gives excuses to those who resist the much needed changes that would better serve Ukrainians, Germans & their allies.
End/

PS - The OP @nicholadrummond rightly points to shortcomings from others e.g. the #UK on #Russia's dirty money & oligarch influence. Some will call whataboutism - I don't think it is - & we all need to reflect on all of our shortcomings, but combined with the rosy view of🇩🇪 it ...

speaks to a phenomena that was quite common in e.g. #UK & #US in recent years, especially among Centrist (R&L), remain supporting or Trump opposing constituencies. I know the UK better than US (hence book examples below) but #Germany became a repository of hope & decency

an ideal state & society (unsustainable in reality) onto which desires for different British and American dreams were projected. #Germany had done the hard work of reckoning with its awful past in ways that #UK & US hadn't. This may contribute to misleading, partial views of 🇩🇪