Thread by @CSDS_Brussels

Yesterday, we held the first "Defence and Statecraft Forum" & we were honoured to welcome a number of great guests. For those that couldn't make it, we are going to write a thread on the main points (in no particular order)🧵 /1

@Brussels_School #Defence #Statecraft

Supporters of #Ukraine are not doing enough to think about the plan for and repercussions of the country's eventual accession to the #EU and #NATO. One implication is that political and military support will have to be drastically enhanced. /2

Western countries have been providing weapons and support to #Ukraine, albeit more can certainly been done. However, as Ukraine presses #Russia there is a need to send Main Battle Tanks and Armoured Fighting Vehicles, as well as to ramp up deliveries of munitions.

/3

The #EU was better prepared for Russia's 2022 invasion of #Ukraine than in 2014, but still a long way to go before we share risk assessments in Europe and have trust in the intelligence received from eastern flank countries and the US. We should take #Putin at his word.

/4

Germany's #Zeitenwende marks a paradigm shift but the measures taken on defence, energy and support for #Ukraine only carry Berlin to the bare minimum of what was expected of them anyway. Question now is if #Germany can go further on deterrence and defence.

/5

#Europe is at risk of falling back into a strategic malaise. #US defence reassurances to Europe and #Russia's weakening army makes it more likely that European governments will bury their heads in the sand on defence spending and capabilities. A most worrying development.

/6

The EU's response through the #EuropeanPeaceFacility has been impressive. Its plans for common defence procurement are promising too. The Union's dilemma, however, is not a poverty of ideas but a real reluctance to inject real money into these instruments. #EPF too low!

/7

Europe's major defence industrial challenge today is being able to backfill stocks, while continuing to support #Ukraine. The US could give Europeans the space they need to develop the #EDTIB, as there is a risk that Europe's manufacturing capacity is in decline.

/8

On Europe's overall defence and deterrence posture, there is a real and serious question about credibility. #Nuclear threats and rhetoric are in plain sight and the cost of misunderstanding #Russia is huge. Europe needs to better integrate its nuclear and conventional forces.

/9

In the coming months and years, Europeans need to be prepared for a discussion about the relevance of @NATO`s 2% of GDP goal and defence investment pledges. The times have changed, and targets need to keep up with the pace. Are Europeans prepared for an increase in spending?

/10

The West is rightly focusing on military supplies and conventional defence at the moment. However, the weakening of #Russia means the Kremlin will increasingly rely on cyber attacks and more. Is Europe prepared to ensure its #resilience in the #cyber domain?

/11

#Strategic competition today is about how states (or groups of states) control flows of goods, manage data and people and secure raw materials and technologies. #Power is networked but #China is omnipresent.

/12

China is involved, believe it or not, in each of Europe's dependencies: energy, US security guarantees and economic & tech. #China controls #renewable #energy tech sources such as solar panels, and Beijing is closely watching #Europe and US during the war on #Ukraine.

/13

On the question of #decoupling from #China, the broader economic relationship would not be so effected but Europe has significant dependencies in high-tech sectors like #semiconductors. How Europe can overcome tech and supply bottlenecks is a vital and pressing question.

/14

Being a "first mover" in technology domains is really critical. Who develops tech can except public uptake and this gives room to set standards. Whoever comes in second place in areas like #AI and #quantum will not be able to set standards - rule taker or rule maker?

/15

It's clear that #NATO is planning for an era of strategic competition. This means not only investing in deterrence but also responding to #ideological conflict, #hybrid threats & erosion of international order. The Alliance needs to maintain its tech edge and #resilience.

/16

The #EU is preparing for an era of 'messy #multipolarity' that implies battles over systems, ideologies, narratives and spaces. Everything is becoming #weaponised. The Union needs to stop being reactive and focus on the long game.

/17

As the world looks like splitting between democratic & authoritarian states, strategy needs to be more adaptable but also focused on core interests. Europe needs to be humble. Not every state sees things the way the continent does. Anti-Western ideologies are coming back.

/ends