ExTrac Profile picture
Oct 10 13 tweets 15 min read
1. Time for a status update on #IS.

We’ve been collecting and analysing #IS comms and chatter continuously for the last few years.

This is what the short- (50-day) and long-term (200-day) rolling averages look like for #IS attacks as of 10 October 2022.
2. In #Syria, after a three-fold decline across 2020/21, #IS’s reported activities have been hovering at roughly the same level since last summer.

Note that there was a fleeting surge after the #Ghwayran prison-break, but nothing sustained.

See tweet #12 for caveat.
3. In #Iraq, #IS’s network is seemingly in a similar place.

These days, less than half as many attacks are being reported on average compared with this time in 2020 and 2021.

See tweet #12 for caveat.
4. In #Afghanistan, #ISKP reporting is the lowest it’s been since Jan 2021 (when #ISKP was still mid-recovery after the 2019 rout).

This is partly a reflection of reality (#ISKP really is less active than it used to be) but also of disinformation (#ISKP under-/mis-reporting).
5. In #Nigeria, by contrast, #ISWAP is significantly more active than it was in 2019, with a demonstrated ability to rapidly and at will expand operations.

Not only that, its sphere of influence has expanded across #Nigeria. No longer is it confined to the Lake Chad Basin.
6. As for the #DRC, there, #ISCAP/#ADF activities have also been on the rise, with two protracted surges earlier this year.

Note that there was a small burst of additional activity after the #Butembo prison break, but - so far - nothing sustained (just like in #Syria).
7. Over in #Mozambique, #IS’s local affiliate is lashing out more than ever, though it is territorially weaker than it was in 2020 and 2021.

In any case, it is clear that this network is now far more firmly in the orbit of #IS’s core administration.
8. On the official comms side, #IS’s Media Diwan has a new rest rate of five to ten photo-reports and one (max) video each week.

This is a far cry from the Media Diwan of 2015, which typically published 20-25 videos and around 175 photo-reports each week back then.
9. As for #IS’s munasirin, they are marginally less active than they were in 2021.

Interestingly, besides the #Ghwayran surge, the other two peaks in 2022 have come just *before* #IS published new leadership statements (dates indicated below).

Make of that what you will.
10. In terms of platform preference, #IS munasirin still overwhelmingly favour Telegram, though there was a short-lived experiment with WhatsApp between April and June 2022 (see left).

Compare that with #AQ's more sustained usage of WhatsApp across the same period (see right).
12. Important caveat: We know #IS has a tendency to deliberately withhold claims, so these data should only be understood as indicative.

For more on this under-reporting dynamic, see this analysis by @charliewinter and @gregorypwaters:
mei.edu/sites/default/…
13. For more information about our work, contact info@extrac.io or visit extrac.io.

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More from @Ex_Trac

Sep 20
1. In his latest statement, #IS spokesman Abu ‘Umar al-Muhajir spoke at length about #IS’s targeting of Christian communities in #Africa.

This continent-wide campaign is likely to intensify across #Mozambique, #DRC, and #Nigeria in the next few months, peaking in December.
2. As part of this, Muhajir spoke about recent developments in #Mozambique.

September has seen #IS’s cells penetrating further south there than ever before, razing "Christian villages" to the ground as they go.

L: #IS-related violence in 2021
R: #IS-related violence in 2022
3. At the beginning of this month, about 20 #IS fighters from #CaboDelgado crossed the #Lurio river and entered #Nampula province.

Up until that point, #Nampula state had seen just one attack claimed by #IS. As of today, that number is at eight and counting.
Read 7 tweets
Aug 11
1. Following the explosions at #Saky airbase on Tuesday, satellite imagery (from @Planet) of their aftermath has emerged.

Multiple buildings and aircraft were destroyed – with at least three distinct craters clearly apparent.

L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
2. Several aircraft housed in 3-sided berms were destroyed, while others closer to the apparent impact craters seemed to survive.

There are a few possible explanations for this (for e.g., some aircraft may have been carrying munitions while others were not).

L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
3. In videos shared across pro-#Kremlin Telegram that had reportedly been shot immediately after the first 'strike,' smoke can be seen billowing before a large explosion at the site.
Read 9 tweets
Jul 29
1. The attack on #Kabul Cricket Stadium is as yet unclaimed, but it’s worth noting that, as of today, #ISKP has been inactive for 13 days in a row.

That’s the longest period since September 2021, when it was gearing up to launch the most intensive campaign in its recent history.
2. This summer’s slump has seen #ISKP become somewhat sidelined as an issue in #Afghanistan.

This graph shows mentions of the keyword “Daesh” on #Taliban social media since mid-2020.

Note how things peaked in Q4 2021 when #ISKP was at its most virulent.
3. We’ve also seen a slump in official #ISKP media releases (as in, those published through #IS’s Central Media Diwan).

Importantly, this lull hasn’t been reflected in the activities of #ISKP’s less globally prominent Pashtu and Dari media offices.
Read 7 tweets
Jul 25
1. Over the last few days, we’ve been tracking a major new influence campaign being deployed by the #Taliban in #Afghanistan.

On 22 July, its networks on Twitter and Telegram were three times more active than usual – more active than they've been across all of 2022 to date.
2. This surge was the result of a defensive comms campaign aimed at legitimising the #Taliban, sparked when @Meta banned its media agencies, Bakhtar/RTA, last week.

In the wake of that, thousands started tweeting #BanTaliban in the hope that @Twitter would follow suit.
3. Responding to this, the #Taliban launched its own campaign, #AfghansSupportTaliban, on 22 July.

Within three days, it was shared more than twice as many times as the initial anti-#Taliban hashtag (200k+).

Here’s where it all started.
Read 10 tweets
Jul 7
1. We’ve been tracking #Kremlin comms around the #Kremenchuk strike last week.

The dynamics—which see pro-war online ecosystems serving as a staging area for conspiracies that are ultimately adopted by the #Russia|n state—are similar to what we saw after #Bucha and #Kramatorsk.
2. This cycle repeats whenever #Russia finds itself accused of atrocities.

First, there’s denial.

That then morphs into scattershot conspiracies.

Then, the theory that “sticks,” best slotting into #Russia's campaign narrative, ends up being adopted as the official line.
3. Here’s how it panned out in #Kremenchuk.

News of the 27 June attack spread rapidly on Telegram.

Within minutes of the missile’s impact, a popular pro-#Kremlin channel reported that “something big” had been hit, sharing a photo of a smoke pile as evidence.
Read 12 tweets
Jun 16
1. Since #IS announced its new ‘province' in #Mozambique at the beginning of May, there's been a significant spike in its activity.

This is not accounted for by a new strategic offensive. Rather, it is down to a (major) change in tactics and areas of operation. Image
2. An important first thing to note is that the numbers we’ve been seeing of late are lower than the all-time high we saw back in 2021 -- but not by much. Image
3. The main thing that's changed is #IS’s targeting focus.

In recent weeks, there has been a very clear, very pronounced shift from targeting local security forces to targeting civilians, especially Christian communities. Image
Read 7 tweets

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