Thread by @JessicaWestPhD

AFTERNOON SESSION, DAY 1, SESSION 3 of #SpaceThreatsOEWG 🧵

Item 6 c) recommendations on possible norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviour

Topic 1: norms, rules, and principles derived from existing international legal and other normative frameworks

#Russia continues to insist that NGOs are not permitted to make statements during the formal session.

#Canada respectfully disagrees with Russia. The matter is closed. The Chair has ruled and will not change established UN practice.

"As we tell kids in Canada, sometimes, you get what you get, and you don't get upset. It's time to move on."

#Philippines requests that states who wish to do so begin substantive discussion at this point.

The Chair has made a ruling to move on to substantive work.

#Russia insists cannot move to substantive discussion. #Philippines notes the group is already in substantial discussion. #Iran suggests Chair conduct informal consultations with delegates. The #UK argues that this is the 11th day of the #SpaceThreatsOEWG. Procedure is settled.

#India point of order regarding Chair's ruling.

#Russia point of order. There is no consensus on consensus.

I've honestly lost the thread on the discussion at this point.

Chair is applying rule 106 of UNGA procedure which says the chairman shall declare open/closing of discussion….rule on points of order and have complete control of procedures at any meeting.

Chair has ruled that NGOs may participate at the end of discussions in a formal setting, as clearly described in the mandate of the #SpaceThreatsOEWG resolution, based on established practice, which is extensively documented.

#Russia point of order. Long monologue.

Chair notes that Russia can challenge the ruling by the Chair. Clarifies that observers can participate during formal session and other NGOs informal.

#Russia challenges ruling because it lacks consensus (isn't that why it's a ruling?).

No consensus for Russia's challenge.

#Russia seems to be challenging the ability of the Chair to make a ruling.

I see placards being waved.

#Canada: fundamental mischaracterization of what is going on here. NGOs participated first session, with no objection, based on a list of orgs provided.

The Chair has made a ruling. It's time to let #Indonesia take the floor.

#China: the core issue is not about NGOs, but the interpretation of the resolution, namely on the principle of consensus. Regarding the Chair’s ruling, we should try to avoid this situation.

China suggests that meeting be adjourned in favour of consultation.

#Russia is asking about documentation of the decision re NGOs....regarding non-observer NGOs, I tweeted this during the first meeting of the first session:

https://twitter.com/JessicaWestPhD/status/1523589733158244352?s=20&t=R8uRxAArU1FyzdgTpT_plw

Observer NGOs including @ICRC spoke during the formal session during the first session.

Chair reiterates that this discussion was held during the organizational meeting in February 2022, and agreement was reached.

We must not repeat the same discussion on procedure. Everyone here has emphasized commitment to constructive discussion. Yet we haven't even started.

#Indonesia on behalf of #ASEAN: ASEAN pleased to continue work on conduct of space activities as reflected in space law including principles of the OST.

Convinced of need to negotiate legally binding instrument in the CD on #PAROS including prohibition of weapons/force.

#ASEAN calls for universal, comprehensive, non-discriminatory approach to missiles in all aspects negotiated within UN.

#Philippines calls attention to paper with #Germany

Touches on UNGA commitment not to conduct destructive ASAT tests and other activities on which to elaborate norms: docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Wor…

#Germany notes constructive participation in drafting the paper from #Nigeria as well.

#Germany and #Philippines paper sees potential in 4 areas.
1. expanding kinetic ASAT test restriction.
2. RPO and dual-use capabilities: principle that any physical contact requires prior consent from other party
3. Special protection for space-based critical infrastructure

#Germany cont:
4. Establish principle preventing the permanent loss of command and control over a space object

#SaudiArabia recommends
- confidence-building measures to promote peaceful use of space
- Upholding principles sustainability and transparency including sharing info on launch
- Preventing damage to ground stations (damage/destruction), long-term debris, space traffic
- #PAROS

#Nigeria: Underscore need for this session to structure deliberations to consider pragmatic and adaptable proposals and refrain from using time on matters that could derail the goal

#Nigeria: #PAROS must be addressed. Proposed measures to promote responsible behaviour must seek to reduce risk of escalation, prevent misunderstanding.

Highlights need for transparency in dconduct of space activities

#Nigeria stresses that states without capacity/desire to develop weapons deserve CONCRETE non-usage assurances. States that conduct activities for peaceful purposes must be assured of undue interference.

Highlights humanitarian consequences of conflict in outer space.

#US: at UNGA First Committee Russia stated that satellites providing support to Ukraine “may be a legitimate target for a retaliatory strike.” Must think about this given Russia’s capabilities.

#US: Most critical issue to address is not doctrines and strategies or unworkable treaties but behaviours that can lead to misunderstandings and conflict.

Paper submitted includes 7 principles. Find them here: docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Wor…

#US: first principle in the paper is adherence to international law applicable to outer space, including 4 core treaties, UN Charter, and other international law including armed conflict/IHL.

#US #OST is core treaty.

Includes rules/restraints on use of outer space including national security. Due regard. International consultations. Moon and other celestial bodies = only peaceful purposes. Prohibitions #WMD.

Ratification of the 4 core treaties is not universal.

#US notes that states such as #Iran have not ratified core treaties. Iran has launched military satellites that are not registered with the UN. This does not aid transparency.

#UK has circulated a working paper on the #SpaceThreatsOEWG website:

docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Wor…

#UK notes geopolitical tensions is driving development of counterspace capabilities.

Clear in article 3 of OST that wider international law is applicable. Includes #IHL. Recognition of protection for civilians/objects in space is likely to promote restraints.

#Japan has circulated a working paper with proposal for norms.

Two key considerations for this session:
1. Secure the long term sustainability and free future access to outer space as basis for all space activities. In line with article 1 of #OST.

#Japan asserts that behaviours that generate long-lived debris esp. deliberate destruction of systems should be a priority issue to address here. Causes collateral damage to future space users. Reiterates commitment not to conduct destructive DA ASAT testing

#Japan second priority: Voluntary and pragmatic #TCBMS to reduce misunderstanding.

#Netherlands: 3 principles:
1. space security is not only about weapons, but shared values as well we can build on shared values of OST

#Netherlands
2. Time to act: practical steps include: directory of global points of contact, space lexicon, global space security portal are practical steps. Also recommendations by #Brazil, and Hague Code of Conduct. Mechanism to share space situational awareness data.

#Netherlands:
3. Remain convinced that responsible behaviour is key driver space security. Voluntary norms = what. Shared values = why. LBI = where to.

#Netherlands is ready to join growing moratorium on destructive direct-ascent #ASAT tests!!!!!

I think that I heard that right?!

#Canada working paper: docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Wor…

#Canada: Should start with broad principles as a foundation for more comprehensive norms down the road.

Points to reaffirm:
- Space is not lawless. International law and IHL applies. Does not legitimize conflict

#Canada cont:
- ratification, implementation, adherence international framework governing space activities includes 4 space treaties/OST

Hague code of conduct: should provide advance notification of launches, coordinate with states that might be affected by reentering debris.

#Canada cont:

Responsible/irresponsible are not the same as legal/illegal. Illegal actions remain illegal.

#Austria: Feasible way forward would be operationalization of Article 9 by clarifying key concepts such as due regard to corresponding interests of other states. See paper by #Philippines.

#Austria Implementation of Article 9 is a legal obligation, but norms and responsible behaviour can inform state practice. Could include set of actions on how to conduct activities without impairing interests of other actors. Article 9 also refers to harmful interference.

#Austria: IHL applies in outer space without reservation.

Other relevant agreements:
Environmental modification convention
Application of law of neutrality
Importance of existing guidelines including LTS
Hague Code of Conduct.

#China: OST is cornerstone but banned only the entry of #WMD without ruling out the placement of other weapons in outer space or banning threat or use of force against outer space objects.

US = policy of warfighting domain. Pursues military buildup/superiority.

#China notes that states claim that even if something is legal, it may not be deemed responsible. This is flawed logic. Uses soft law to judge hard law.

Dichotomy b/w responsible/irresponsible is flawed. Should discuss norms of international legal behaviours.

#China argues that only benchmark of responsible behaviour is whether peaceful and legal.

Claims not clear how to define due regard concept. Some countries made proposals...need to consider legal applicability and avoid loopholes.

#China: All discussions must be based on international law and support #PAROS. Must not challenge authority of intl law or override it to reinvent the wheel with another set of rules and evaluation criteria.

Compliance with law and new legal agreement are two sides of same coin

#China calls on all countries to observe following norms:

Complying with purpose and principle of the UN charter and international law including #OST and supporting CD negotiating legally-binding instrument on outer space arms control.

#France will close today's discussion: emphasizes pragmatism. Adopt standards that we could put in place NOW while taking time to define those that require further discussion (like LTS process)

#France has a paper with 4 key points: docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Wor…

#France 4 points:
1. legal framework including #IHL
2. Principles in 2013 GGE relevant. Reduce mistrust, misunderstanding, can be verified. Should focus on actions and effects of space activities rather than capacity. Must address an acknowledged problem. Technical not pollical.

#France
3. Universal. Stand the test of time. Possible verification mechanisms. Universal. Stand the test of time. Possible verification mechanisms.

#Frace cont
3. Certain TCMBs in 2013 GGE report remain relevant i.e. sharing info on doctrine and legislation, notification of launch, and list of national space safety contact points.

#France cont.

4.Priorities: behavours with impact on space enviro – favours norm preventing creation of intentional long-lived debris, destructive asat launches. Behaviours with high risk of misunderstnaindg: standard to require consent from another state before RPO.

#France cont....Behavoiur with direct consequences on security of populations/property. Finally emergence of such norms should be done bearing in mind need for dialogue/exchange of concerned stakeholders.

* Supports standing space security forum open to all UN members.

END