Ukrainian officials continue to report potential Russian preparations for renewed offensive operations in #Zaporizhia & #Kherson oblasts, though ISW has not observed indicators that Russian forces plan to renew offensive operations in these directions. (1/7)
2/ The #Ukrainian General Staff reported that #Russian forces are defending in #Zaporizhia and #Kherson oblasts but are trying to create conditions that will allow Russian forces to conduct offensives in some unspecified areas of this part of the front. isw.pub/UkrWar022823
3/ #Russian forces have conducted infrequent localized attacks in #Zaporizhia Oblast in recent months but have not conducted any meaningful offensive activity in #Kherson Oblast since withdrawing from the west (right) bank of the #Dnipro River in November 2022.
4/ @TheStudyofWar has not observed indicators that Russian forces are preparing to resume prolonged offensive activity in #Zaporizhia Oblast or any offensive activity in #Kherson Oblast.
5/ A #Ukrainian official also reported that #Russian forces are vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes on the Kinburn Spit in #Mykolaiv Oblast and may be preparing to withdraw from positions closer to the #Dnipro River on the east (left) bank in #Kherson Oblast. isw.pub/UkrWar022823
6/ #Ukrainian and #Russian forces continue to engage in reconnaissance activity and skirmishes in the Dnipro River delta while Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian force concentrations and logistics in southern #Ukraine.
7/ Geolocated footage from 27 FEB claims to show #Ukrainian Special Forces conducting a raid against #Russian forces on Krukhlyk Island (4km south of #Kherson City) & likely indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions on at least the northern part of Velikiy Potemkin Island.
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#Wagner Group financier Yevgeny #Prigozhin and several #Russian milbloggers continue to debate the appropriateness of criticism of Russian war efforts as they react to a proposed amendment to Russia’s Criminal Code which would increase punishments for “discrediting” the war.
2/ #Prigozhin yesterday defended his statements made earlier that day defending criticism of the war effort. He claimed that Russians should have the right to criticize Russian commanders and strategists, including himself, but not to criticize or “discredit” ordinary soldiers.
3/ Former Russian officer (and avid #Putin critic) Igor #Girkin feigned repentance and mockingly told his users not to make statements calling Russian leadership “illiterate, irresponsible mediocrities"...
#Russian forces continued limited attacks northeast of #Kupyansk and are fortifying border positions in #Belgorod Oblast. Russian forces also continued offensive operations around #Kreminna on March 2. isw.pub/UkrWar030223
2/ A #Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on March 1 that #Russian forces repelled a #Ukrainian attempt to regain positions in Hryanykivka (about 16km northwest of #Kupyansk).
3/ #Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai reported that Russian forces have concentrated a significant portion of their heavy military equipment in Luhansk Oblast but have been unable to use most of it due to unfavorable weather conditions on the frontlines.
Russian authorities appear to be concerned over a growing loss of leverage in #Serbia, which #Russia has worked to integrate into the Russian sphere of influence for many years. isw.pub/UkrWar030223
2/ #Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on March 2 that reports of Serbian authorities secretly transferring multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) ammunition to #Ukraine are a matter of “deepest concern.”
3/ Russian state-affiliated news aggregator Mash claimed on February 27 that #Serbian defense company Krusik supplied over 3,500 Grad MLRS rockets to #Ukraine but claimed that it is not clear that Krusik knew that Ukraine was the final buyer of the rockets.
Russian forces appear to have temporarily scaled back efforts to encircle #Bakhmut from both the southwest and northeast and may instead be focusing on pressuring Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the city by concentrating on the northeastern offensive. isw.pub/UkrWar030223
2/ The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut, Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km NW of Bakhmut), Dubovo-Vasylivka (7km NW of Bakhmut), Khromove (3km west of Bakhmut), and Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut).
3/ The repelled Russian assault near Khromove suggests that Russian forces have likely advanced northwest of #Bakhmut. Geolocated footage published on March 2 indicates that Russian forces likely secured gains south of Dubovo-Vasylivka and near Bila Hora (13km SW of Bakhmut).
German Chancellor Olaf #Scholz stated on March 2 that #Germany is negotiating with allies about providing security guarantees to #Ukraine but provided no further details on these proposed guarantees. isw.pub/UkrWar030223
2/ #Scholz mentioned the security guarantees while criticizing #China for failing to condemn the Russian invasion of #Ukraine and calling on Chinese authorities to pressure #Russia into withdrawing Russian forces from Ukraine.
3/ #Scholz’ statements are consistent with reports of a proposed #Ukraine-NATO defense pact that would provide enough arms to Ukraine to force #Russia to the negotiation table, but would not offer Article V protection or obligate #NATO states to deploy forces to Ukraine.
2/ ...and demonstrating the international economic and informational costs imposed on #Putin by his invasion of #Ukraine. isw.pub/UkrWar03012023
3/ @POLITICOEurope reported on March 1 that Vučić seeks to appeal to both #Russia and western institutions by continuing #Serbia’s #EuropeanUnion membership bid while refusing to impose sanctions against Russia, but Vučić said that Serbia must make "difficult choices" soon.