1. Ukraine's war is our war - & must be won.
That means restoring UA's 1991 borders & ensuring UA's ability to defend them - & the people within them.
2. After victory we have to get #Ukraine into #NATO & the #EU as fast as possible.
- As @SwedishPM has said:
This should be merit based but cannot again be an excuse for going soft or going slow on UA's accession.
- we have to institutionally tie our future to UA's.
3. We have to overcome any residual fears of #Ukraine's victory and #Russia's defeat.
As @EliotACohen said in Warsaw - RU must lose & know it has lost:
on the battlefield, its offensive military capability for 10 years & has lost Ukraine for good.
4. We should not be afraid to embrace the systemic competition against autocratic regimes
- but we have to equip democratic societies to win: militarily, economically, but also ideationally. We have to have the right mentality & ensure the substance behind our claimed superiority
5. We must focus resolutely on deterring & containing #Russia.
- over time this *may* spur change in RU but this is not our priority.
- we must focus on stopping RU from doing harm beyond its current borders.
6. To properly deter & contain #Russia we have to improve our deterrence & nuclear IQ
- too many western societies lack understanding of how effective deterrence works
- we strengthen our deterrence by boosting our will & ability to fight - precisely so that we don't have to.
7. Boosting capabilities & communicating our effective effective deterrence will also help counter nuclear blackmail.
- we have effective nuclear deterrence with Russia and China & need to explain that more clearly to our populations, taking lessons from e.g. UK, US & NCEE.
8. If we do think about #Russia we must stop valorising illiberal elements within the so-called Russian opposition (eg Navalny).
- & stop the endless hunt for 'good Russians' which obscures the fact that we have a Russia problem not a Putin problem.
9. - BUT, we also need to stop buying into BS Russian exceptionalism: there's no reason why, over time, RU *cannot* become a democratic, liberal state
To claim otherwise fuels the dangerous exceptionalism that lets Russians think they can get away with especially awful things.
10. We also need to drop any lingering great power exceptionalism of our own - we need to drop the great power lenses that see CEE thru the prism of Russia & Inso-Pacific thru prism of China.
- We need to arm ourselves like great powers but see the world like smaller states.
11a. Lastly, we need to fix our own roof- & more than that, do some serious home improvement.
- #Russia works in the cracks in our societies that we made. We need to fix those - but more generally build societies that are politically, economically &environmentally sustainable.
11b. We rightly claim that liberal democracy is a superior system - but we have to make its benefits more tangible to more of our people.
- we have to offer meaningful hope of progress to turn the costs of geopolitical, tech & green transitions into investments in a better future
And that's how we deal with #Russia
- by prioritising #Ukraine's victory & equipping ourselves to win the systemic competition against autocratic regimes.
Its fundamentally about ensuring free societies can not only survive but thrive. #NeoIdealism.
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Is #Germany's #Zeitenwende
a) "a Fundamental Change?"
b) 🇩🇪's emergence as a "Leading Power"?
c) "a mere buzzword"
d) "bullshit"
* its been described as all those things
- but how to judge & why does it matter? A 🧵 1/10 ip-quarterly.com/en/zeitenwende…
📷Michael Lucan CC 3.0
Olaf #Scholz' 'turning point' speech in Feb '22 declared #Russia’s full-scale invasion of #Ukraine a 'watershed moment' (#Zeitenwende") -something happening to #Germany & others- but also set out the Zeitenwende as a task for🇩🇪 to develop new capabilities & a new approach.
2/10
There were 5 key elements in this initial framing (broadly speaking): 1) Support for #Ukraine 2) Bolstering #Germany's Defence 3) Diversification of Energy Supply (esp away from🇷🇺!) 4) A New Approach to Authoritarian States 5) Getting 🇩🇪's role in the #EU, #NATO &🌍right
3/10
There's been criticism of the detail (esp re #Poland, which has already delivered Leos) - but @JeremyCliffe's main point is right.
▶️I'd actually take it further (it's not about #Germany but about #Ukraine), which is why we need to talk about #Finland🧵
I've repeatedly praised #Finland's approach to standing up #Russia & have written on its own #Zeitenwende in joining #NATO.
I've also repeatedly praised @MarinSanna as a figurehead of #NeoIdealism - who's been wonderfully clear on how & why #Ukraine must win & RU must lose
/2
So, to be clear, this is not a general critique of🇫🇮or '🇫🇮 bashing'!
- BUT on the tank issue, I think #Finland has got it wrong.
- According to public info they have agreed to send
3 Patria Leopard2R heavy mine breaching tanks
-But NO #Leopard2 MBTs ip-quarterly.com/en/zeitenwende…
/3
What a silly, one-eyed yet quite indicative article.
The author (who I know a little & respect) is right about PiS’ vile tactics & #Poland’s well documented rule of law issues
- BUT totally blind to #Germany’s own faults re Poland, #Russia & #Ukraine 1/4 politico.eu/article/poland…
Most glaringly
- how #Germany trampled over #Poland’s concerns on Nordstream
- & how it free-rode on security, enriched & entrenched RU & undermined #Ukraine, helping RU enact the very sphere of influence logic he bemoans from far right allies of Morawiecki (eg Le Pen)
2/4
The article also fails entirely to address a widespread concern that while #Germany sees itself as having built an EU for all, others see the EU as primarily set up to benefit 🇩🇪 (esp DE business).
- with criticism of the #EU dismissed as nationalism (unacceptable to DE)
3/4
Ever tried to Global #Britain but ended up accidentally pulling a little #England?
- Turns out you’re not alone.
A🧵on British identity, foreign policy & why we need to properly understand #Brexit to move beyond it.
- based on a new article I have out in @ISQ_Jrnl
1/25
The article, which I'm really happy to have in top IR journal @ISQ_Jrnl, challenges a received wisdom about #Brexit – that it both reflected & reinforced a general, almost tribal polarisation of British society. 2/ academic.oup.com/isq/article-ab…
This might seem counter-intuitive (& against the evidence) but stay with me - its not that simple & that’s important. Not only for understanding Brexit but for getting the UK’s international affairs right in future [spoiler: it matters for other countries too] 3/
If the #EU & it’s member states really wanted to do something about #Orban’s #Hungary, they would.
- The mess over ratifying #Sweden & #Finland’s NATO membership is only the latest incident & 🇭🇺‘a continuing presence is a stain on 🇪🇺reputation & effectiveness.
🇭🇺should go. 🧵/1
In case anyone doubts the game playing over 🇫🇮& 🇸🇪’s #NATO membership the country’s foreign minister Peter Szijjarto made it clear earlier this week
- Fidesz now says it will support accession but it has been a farce & again cast doubt on 🇪🇺competence /2
Thankfully, Commission VP @VeraJourova (already among the tougher voices on Orban in Brussels) seems to have had enough
A lesson we should have learned from recent years is that we can’t treat illiberal actors in a liberal way. #NeoIdealism
/3
On 25/02/22 as I was pushing my sleeping daughter in her stroller, listening to @BBCr4today, Nick Robinson spoke from the roof of the hotel where he was holed up in #Kyiv.
And, looking over the city, he said something that stopped me in my tracks. #Ukraine
2/
@bbcnickrobinson urged listeners to follow his gaze as he looked over this ‘modern, dynamic and vibrant European city’ ...
now, this may not seem like much, but for anyone who has followed #Ukraine for a long time, its significance would have been immediately apparent.