Last yr #UkraineWar became the organizing principle of Russian foreign policy
➡️7 trends
1 Full turn to non-West
2 China’s junior partner
3 Less leverage vis middle powers
4 Struggle in the neighbourhood
5 Russia MFA sidelined
6 Wagner normalized
7 End of compartmentalization
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1. Full turn to the non-West:
Judging its break with the West to be total & irreversible, Russia's leadership has intensified its (pre-existing) turn to #MENA, #Africa, #LATAM, #Asia-Pacific.
Shunned & sanctioned, Russia needs to make up for losses wherever it can... (2/22)
Russia's push to expand engagement does resonate.
Last spring, #MENA states for instance refused to take the West’s side vs Russia - for complex reasons: docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA… (3/22)
At Conference of Disarmament in Geneva yday, #Russia slightly more conciliatory on #NewSTART:
-"Important" that treaty continues to operate
-This fact means its parties "share an understanding of the risks emanating from a situation of strategic uncertainty and unpredictability"
-#NewSTART "keeps a window of opportunity open" for continued dialogue on strategic stability, with a focus on developing a possible agreement to replace it.
-US-RUS understandings reached in Geneva (2021) "retain the potential for the resumption and development of a comprehensive and substantive dialogue on future arms control, incl. involving all key players."
/1 RUS embassy in Germany: The decision will bring “permanent escalation”, “battle tanks with German crosses will again be sent to the ‘eastern front’ which will inevitably lead to the deaths of not only Russian soldiers, but also the civilian population” aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/25…
/2 Maria Zakharova on her Telegram account: the German decision confirms that this is a “pre-planned war” against #Russia
Not making headlines, the @OPCW Executive Council is in session this week.
Despite zero progress in clarification on the #Navalny poisoning - with #Russia issuing denials & accusations - #Western states seem to have decided NOT to up the ante vis-a-vis Russia at this time..(1/5)
Looking at statements issued at the Council this week, many - US, UK, Finland, Romania, Latvia, Germany, etc - recall #Navalny poisoning & bemoan lack of #Russian cooperation to date,...(2/5)
..but there seems to be no push to escalate the issue (ie. initiate procedures similar to those that led to #Syria's suspension from #OPCW last year).
I wonder why.
Desire not to further add to pile of problems with #Russia? Keep minimum engagement in multilateral fora? (3/5)
On #OPEC cuts: Narrative that "Saudi is screwing us (i.e. West) on oil" is part of the problem - as seen by many in the #MiddleEast.
They resent expectation that #Saudi "should help" keep prices low to a) mitigate fallout of #RussiaUkraineWar & b) cater to US domestic politics.
We may disagree, but do well to understand where they're coming from more broadly:
Since Feb, a reluctance in Gulf capitals (& elsewhere in #MiddleEast) to take action "with" the West "against" Russia in #RussiaUkraineWar (join sanctions, pump more oil) has had multiple layers:
1. A perception that the war is not “theirs” + a tendency to view it as fuelled in part by US/#NATO actions vis Russia (rather than as a Russian war of aggression against #Ukraine).
Unlike in the #West, the war does not register as a test for a “rules-based international order”
As a result of 1) Turkey successfully mediating grain exports from Ukraine ports & 2) #Russia increasingly shunning traditional mediation platforms (Geneva),
Turkey is poised to become chief intermediary on operational issues re #RussiaUkraineWar un.org/en/black-sea-g… (3/18)