1. [Thread] Qatar and its United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Military Industrial Complex Bingo foreign policy. Some time ago, somewhere, I wrote about Qatar’s approach to foreign policy that actively sought to entangle the 5 permanent UNSC states
2. Qatar’s foreign policy has long been aimed at making it as influential & as important a state to as many states/groups as possible; to make sure that as many of these important states/groups have an active stake (benefit) tied up in Q’s continued stability & status quo
3. Q foreign policy once seemed to actively target the UNSC P5 states (China, France, UK, US, Russia). Huge gas exports and even larger investments (some in critical UK infrastructure) entangled the UK. Perennial promise of defence procurement.
4. Similarly large investments and a long-term military procurement regime entangled France. Growing investment was aimed at China, while Q has long exported lots of oil & LNG there. Qatar is also the Yuan’s regional clearing house.
5. Lots of Q-US links befitting the US’s regional importance. Deep educationally-based soft power links (Ed City, RAND ed reforms etc.). Q long sought to use its diplomatic links to help US (Taliban etc).
6. Hosting critical air base for the US. Q tried to export LNG to the US. Israel links in part a sop to the US. Heavy lift aircraft from late2000s. Increasing investment in DC. Russia: Some time ago, Qatar’s idea was to form a gas OPEC, cat-nip of an idea for Russia.
7. Q thus established at least three (US, UK, France) or four (+ China) very strong international relations. This gave the former Emir confidence and a feeling of resounding security. Multiple other foreign relations helped, of course.
8. But these UNSC relations were arguably particularly important: these states are the only ones with expeditionary military capability & with military forces prepositioned in the Gulf.
9. And they are the quasi-arbiters of international ‘legitimacy’ and gatekeepers of important UN sanctions/actions as the UNSC P5.
10. [Incidentally, Q also had a long history of exporting gas / other relations with the non-permanent members of the P5. Though not enough evidence, of course, to determine UNSC position as the *cause*]
11. Well, in light of the Gulf crisis, [see my FA piece foreignaffairs.com/articles/middl… ] Q seems to be returning to its UNSC bingo, but adding in the military industrial component to the mix. Recently we have seen:
12. UK: 24 Typhoon fast-jet deal >$8.5bn. France: Upped 24 Rafael fast-jet deal to 36, plus 490 armoured cars >$14bn. US: 36 of the most advanced F-15s in the sky >$12bn. Multiple other procurements ongoing.
13. Q making other inroads too. China: Q acquired SY-400 short range ballistic missile system. Russia: discussions about procuring the S-400 air defence system.
14. So what does Qatar think it is getting here?
15. Capability. No doubt that the equipment they are buying is top of the line. Chinese missiles immediately increase deterrence. Potential future air wings also have potent deterrence. But the wider military logic is curious.
16. So many air platforms will be hideously complex to manage, train, maintain, and run. In no ideal world would an air force fly so many differing platforms. The Qataris know this, of course, so evidently believe there are other advantages
17. Indeed, underpinning Q’s UNSC diplomacy bingo – now its military-led bingo – is a belief that Q gains far more. A: that it is seem as a source of significant investment. B: that it mandates near-daily interaction with senior mil and pol types
18. C: that this will socialise these folk into seeing Q as benign/helpful. D: that, as with the UK Typhoon, Q integrates itself to some degree, into the UK defence setup [ leicestermercury.co.uk/news/local-new… ]
19. E: such procurement enlists the services of local military industrial complexes to add to Qatar’s own upped lobbying efforts. F: That, perhaps, Q develops the ability/right/opportunity to call up these leaders in a crisis to, assertively, ask for help?
20. This all sounds plausible, logical, and this kind of foreign policy modus operandi likely proved to be important in the Gulf crisis. But, at least from my open source/academic perspective, this modus operandi remains unproven.
21. It represents the hope & expectation of strong relations. But Gulf history (thinking of Kuwait mostly) has shown that assiduous ‘dinar diplomacy’ has failed (massively) in the past.
22. Q’s elite are not daft & know all of this. With the 2014 and 2017 crises being nasty surprises, I doubt they’ll want to be surprised again. So I expect a genuine push to boost mil effectiveness / potency, and not just a reliance on mil bingo.
23. Building military effectiveness / deterrence is (very) difficult. But, not least with the nature of the top of the line kit, and the massive reliance on foreign contractors inherent in these deals, Q’s leaders will strive to make the state as prickly as possible.
