1/ A few thoughts of context on Netanyahu’s revelation that Iran has, apparently, been lying about the progress/extent/existence of its nuclear weapon programme. nytimes.com/2018/04/30/wor…
2/ On 24 April an article in Jane’s Defence Weekly based on intelligence sources claimed that Iran is only two years away from producing an atomic bomb. However, this was 24 April 1984.
3/ Also in 1984, US Senator Alan Cranston said Iran would have nuclear weapons by 1991.
4/ In 1992 Benjamin Netanyahu insisted that 1995-1997 was the right time-frame.
5/ In 1992 Shimon Peres suggested that Iran would be nuclear capable by 1999.
6/ A 1992 House Republican Research Committee claimed that there was a ‘98 percent certainty that Iran already had all (or virtually all) of the components required for two or three operational nuclear weapons.’
7/ A 1995 report quoting US and Israeli officials goes for the millennium as the date.
8/ In 1995, Netanyahu expected Iran to have a nuclear weapon within three to five years.
9/ In front of Congress in 1996, Netanyahu warned that the deadline for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon was ‘getting extremely close.’
10/ In 1997 US/Israeli sources noted that the date had been pushed back to 2007-2009;
11/ In 2005 Israel’s Defence Minister warned that a ‘point of no return’ would be passed within two years.
12/ In 2007 Mossad went for 2009 as the magical date.
13/ In 2009 it was predicted that Iran would be “nuclear-equipped” within one year and Meir Dagan the former head of Mossad suggested that 2015 is the nearest viable date.
14/ Wikileaks notes that Netanyahu told a Congressional delegation in 2009 that Iran was around ‘one or two years away’ from the bomb threshold. Later in 2009 he told another delegation that Iran already had the capability that might come to fruition in a couple of years.
15/ In 2012 Netanyahu was reported as arguing that a bomb was but a few months away.
16/ Also in 2012 he gave his awesome sharpie-wielding UN speech arguing that Iran was one year away from building a weapon.
17/ This is not an exhaustive list. Nor does it necessarily mean that this time Netanyahu’s rhetoric is incorrect, misleading, or just plain untrue. Iran’s deliberate ambiguity on this topic evidently makes even analysis difficult
18/ And a similar timeline could doubtless be written about Iran’s lies and obfuscations on the issue.
19/ One needs to analyse the merits of the message on its own. But in considering this, the motivations & history of the messenger are important considerations. And, of course, it’s not just about whether to cancel the deal of not. It’s about considering what would replace it.
20/ It’s also worth considering the wider implications for US diplomacy of one President cancelling another’s deal.
