Observations about securing our election technology:
- It's a critically important problem.
- Current systems are frightfully vulnerable.
- The best solutions are really boring and don't involve cutting edge technology
- The cutting edge solutions make things worse.
- It's a critically important problem.
- Current systems are frightfully vulnerable.
- The best solutions are really boring and don't involve cutting edge technology
- The cutting edge solutions make things worse.
Basically, we need (all these are currently feasible/available):
- precinct-counted optical scan paper ballots
- risk limiting audits
- Pay a LOT of attention to securing county backend systems; more funding required.
- precinct-counted optical scan paper ballots
- risk limiting audits
- Pay a LOT of attention to securing county backend systems; more funding required.
All that said, there's been considerable movement and consensus over the last few years that these things are needed; there seems to actually be bipartisan agreement on what to do. Cautiously optimistic about the direction voting tech is going, for the first time in 15 years.
