1. The problem is not that he advocates "hard Brexit" but that he promises the implausible: We can have a trade deal with the US and adopt fundamentally different "pro-competitive" regulatory approach with no consequences for EU trade... and why?
2. Because at the same time we can agree mutual recognition with the EU or get the WTO to force the EU to recognise the UK's rules. This obscures the real choice ministers must make by encouraging them to believe there is no trade off.
3. If you are fundamentally changing your regulatory approach this will have an effect on the level of practical obligations placed on both regulators and businesses. This in turn affects competitiveness and health and safety outcomes.
4. From the EU's perspective allowing for flexibility means permitting more unsafe and more unfair competition. The EU won't offer deep MR to a large trading partner on it's doorstep while it stacks the deck in it's favour and while it undermines the EU's common approach to regs.
5. Nor will it permit the UK becoming a backdoor for US products. If you compare the US approach to the EU's in a bunch of areas, (cosmetics, cars and yes agri-food) there are fundamental incompatibilities in the requirements.
6. If the UK then wants to try and force the EU to recognise it's rules via the WTO it will run into problems. Under the Legatum option the case for equivalence is undermined by pivoting to US style approach anyway. But even if the UK remained as is, it's still unlikely to work
7. At best the WTO might say the EU has to engage in talks on MR. It's not going to rule that the EU has to open up the single market to a third country. In practice the WTO is a member driven organisation and will to a degree reflects the interests of it's most powerful members.
8. The EU will also defend itself vigorously if the UK tried to bring such a frontal assault on its main prize. It is also hardly going to further the establishment of a long term partnership with so many areas of cooperation at stake.
9. Ultimately the picture most often painted by Singham is one where there are no hard choices and the most wishful outcome is presented as watertight. This has obviously informed policy insofar as the Mansion House speech is totally reliant on the implausible idea of general MR
10. This doesn't mean we shouldn't explore the boundaries of the possible or interrogate EU positions. A great example by @LydgateEmily from @UKTPO below explores what you might be able to do with MR. However the trade offs are also acknowledged explicitly sro.sussex.ac.uk/69554/2/WPS-12…
11. But we also have to recognise that the EU and the 27 as part of it has powerful interests of it's own. Only then can the decisions be taken on what is possible, what is plausible and what delivers the result of the referendum. ends/
