Thread by @jaredcrubin

Now that my book, Rulers, Religion & Riches, has been out over a year, I thought I would share its figures and tables. To the extent possible in 280 characters, I will place each of them in the context of the broader arguments made in the book.

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Table 1.1 is a motivating table, meant to show that the contemporary Middle East is poorer, has worse governance, and is more subject to conflict than the "West".

The question is, given the Middle East's vast head start (by, say, 1000), how did we get to this point?

Figures 1.1-1.4 are also meant as motivation. They show the transition of densely populated areas from 800-1800. Urban population is our best metric for economic growth in the pre-modern economy. The transition from the "Islamic world" to W. Europe is clear.

Figures 2.1-2.2 summarize the theoretical argument. In short, rulers desire to stay in power & there are people who can help them by providing legitimacy or coercion. In return they bargain over laws/policies, which are thus reflective of all parties' bargaining power & interests

Figs 2.3 & 3.1 provide an explanation for why institutions can evolve (or stagnate) over time for endogenous reasons. This is key: the argument does not rely on exogenous shocks to explain divergence. Fig 3.1 shows the role that religious legitimacy can play in this process

Table 3.1 shows the world's largest empires. It is simply meant to show that the early Muslim empires were *large* by any standard. This rapid growth in empire, which co-evolved with Islam, required an ideology that could legitimate rule.

Table 3.2 is meant to show how the revival of commerce in Europe (starting around 1000 or so) is reflected in growing urban populations. This is where European takeoff (slowly!) begins...

Chapter 4 is on changes on views on taking interest (usury) in Christianity & Islam. Table 4.1 shows how, once commerce began to revive in Europe, secular rulers were quick to make moderate interest-taking legal (even if it were banned by the Church)

Chapter 5 is on the spread of printing in Europe and its prohibition in the Ottoman Empire. Fig 5.1 & Tables 5.1-5.2 show some of the European printing data. In short, printing spread fast & wide in Europe by 1500 (Gutenberg's press was invented in 1450)

Ch. 6 is about the connection between printing & the Reformation. It makes the case the Reformation spurred political (legitimating) change facilitating economic success. Fig 6.1-6.4 are motivating evidence, showing Protestant places did indeed do better (through the present day)

Fig 6.5 and Tables 6.1-6.3 show the data connecting the spread of the printing press to the Reformation. In short, cities that adopted the printing press were 29 percentage points *more likely* to adopt the Reformation by 1600!

Figure 6.6 is key. My argument is that the Reformation was important not bc of any components of Protestant faiths, but because it caused rulers to search elsewhere for legitimacy. They turned to parliaments, meaning more power for the economic elites who were well represented.

Fig 6.7 brings the argument back to the Ottoman Empire, laying out the idea that not only did Ottoman legitimating arrangements inhibit the spread of the press, but this process was self-reinforcing and made future adoption all the less likely.

Ch 7 is on economic growth in England and the Dutch Republic following their Reformations. I make the case that this was largely due to the rising influence of their parliaments. Tables 7.1-7.3 are mainly motivating, showing growth did indeed occur after their Reformations

Ch 8 is on stagnation in (Catholic) Spain and (Muslim) Ottoman Empire. Tables 8.1-8.2 and Fig 8.1 are meant to show a puzzle: these were huge, wealthy empires in the 16th century. It is by no means obvious they would stagnate relative to NW Europe

Figs 8.2-8.3 reveal the degree of Spanish stagnation. Real wages fell for centuries--even relative to pre-Black Death levels--and by 1850 were *significantly* lower than in 1300!

Tables 8.3-8.5 show religious shares in various regions of the Ottoman Empire. The point is that (Muslim) religious legitimacy was important in many--but not all--parts of the empire.

Tables 8.6-8.7 show the (relative) decline in Ottoman state capacity, which I attribute in part to the manner in which they derived legitimacy and used the military for coercion and tax revenue.

Ch 9 concludes. Fig 9.1 merely shows just how far the "reversal of fortunes" between W. Europe and the Middle East had come by 1914. Europe had large colonial empires, the Middle East was struggling to keep Europe out of its affairs.