Some thoughts on Pakistan, China, and the Carter Doctrine: A few months ago, the first reports came out that China was looking to establish a combined air and naval base in Jiwani, Pakistan washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jan/…
This report was subsequently confirmed by other sources in the following months. maritime-executive.com/editorials/wil…
Building a base in Jiwani (or nearby) would make a great deal of sense for China. After all, China is desperately dependent on imported oil to run its ever-growing economy. And Jiwani sits nearby the incredibly vital Strait of Hormuz. maritime-executive.com/article/china-…
From a strategic perspective, a base at Jiwani would make classically good sense. It sits astride one of the world’s most vital lines of communication, is backed by land controlled by a nuclear-armed ally, and could block U.S. lines of retreat from the Arabian Gulf.
If rumors come true and a combined air/naval base takes shape, power projection forces like H-6 bombers, J-20 stealth fighters, and DF-21/26 anti-ship ballistic missiles could threaten the region and provide top cover for China’s ever-growing bluewater navy. (Graphics from CNAS) 
China already established an overseas base in Djibouti, one which seems fairly non-threatening as it has no runways or integrated dock facilities and could be easily isolated from sources of supply.
By contrast Jiwani could boast real runways, integrated port facilities, and a land connection to China itself. In fact, China plans to spend over $60B specifically to connect by road and rail the Gwadar/Jiwani area. economist.com/asia/2017/09/0…
Combined w/ forces based from airfields in China as well as island fortresses in the SCS, China could contest control of the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Eastern Indian Ocean and Strait of Malacca. Naval forces based from the huge, PRC-owned port at Hambantota could support.
This video shows just what that might look like. Red circles represent ranges for DF-21 ASBMs, H-6 bombers armed wi/ anti-ship cruise missiles, and J-20 stealth fighters. Orange circles show the range of H-6 bombers with land-attack cruise missiles.
Now, to the Carter Doctrine: in 1980 the U.S. declared: “Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America…
…and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” I’ve rarely heard this doctrine in recent discussions of OBOR/BRI, etc. But it seems that an entirely natural effort by the PRC to secure its energy supplies will naturally run afoul of it.
Of course, one huge change since then has been the remarkable shale-oil revolution in N. America. Just as China’s appetite for oil has grown, U.S. oil imports are dropping, with much less U.S. reliance on Middle Eastern oil.
So, looking at lessening U.S. reliance, a growing Chinese ability to challenge for control of oil for themselves, and growing U.S. political impatience with perceived free-riders, it seems this should be a wake-up call for current U.S. allies in Europe and Asia.
For the U.S., I'd say that from amongst tax cuts, a growing entitlement state, a continuing "gentlemens' agreement" amongst the services, and continuing worldwide command of the maritime commons, we can probably only count on picking three in the long run.
As always, all opinions mine alone. The end.
Drilling down a bit more re classically good strategic sense, I mean so literally in accordance with principles of classic naval strategy, specifically the work of Mahan. This should be of no surprise, as we know that PRC naval strategists study his work. nationalinterest.org/article/mahan-…
Here Mahan describes the strategic value of a place, depending principally on 1) its position relative to important strategic lines 2) its military strength, offensive and defensive, and 3) the resources available to it.
First, here is Mahan on the "situation" or strategic location of a place, which could hardly be better than a port fronting on the Gulf of Oman, close to the Eastern entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, with a never-ending stream of oil tankers filing by.
Next, on the military strength of a port, he divides it into defensive & offensive strength. Jiwani could be amply defended here - a peninsula surrounded on 3 sides by water, backed by land defended by the huge and nuclear-armed Pakistani Army.
It could also be defended by the mobile area-denial systems we've already seen deployed to China's other overseas bases - in the South China Sea. This chart shows ranges of these systems superimposed on the local area, with ASCM coverage that could almost seal the Gulf of Oman.
Mahan describes offensive strength of a port in terms of its capacity to support a fleet. If we have seen anything proven in the last few years, it is China's ability to build astoundingly massive ports and airfields in a short amount of time.
In fact, as @AndrewSErickson has written, the folks who have *already* had the construction contract at Gwadar are literally the same folks who brought us THIS.
For the 3rd factor, resources, Mahan divides them into natural resources and artificial resources - those provided by society for either civil or military use. As discussed elsewhere, China plans to spend 10s of billions of $$$ to upgrade road and rail infrastructure to that area
Perhaps answering questions of some as to why China might build another port in addition to already-built Gwadar, Mahan again may provide the motive. Beyond the characteristics of a strategic position, he goes on to discuss the specific advantages of having two ports on a coast.
I'm far from an expert on Mahan, and this may all be coincidence. But as I was reading these passages having heard of China's potential plans, it seemed to resonate with me. Excerpts taken from "Mahan on Naval Strategy", by John Hattendorf.
Next item to drill down on: the balance of maritime forces available for the Indian Ocean region. You might look at the roster of forces shown above and take comfort in the larger numbers of US carriers, large surface combatants, and SSNs. But to do so discounts some key things:
First, China has been pursuing a very different area-denial strategy to secure its sea lanes w/in the 1st island chain, mostly with missiles and land-based air (see SCS islands). The carriers it's building are probably not intended for the open Pacific - that would be suicide.
Rather, consider that the PRC blue water navy (Type 55 cruisers, carriers, etc.) is probably not built for a home game, which could be covered by huge numbers of smaller ASW escorts (see the chart), land-based air power and anti-ship missiles. Rather, it may mostly go afield.
Next, as the non-status quo power, if the CCP feels forced to engage in a major conflict, it may control the timing, will probably strike preemptively and, as I've discussed in other work, may take a number of U.S. vessels off the board in the 1st few hrs. warontherocks.com/2017/02/has-ch…
Last, given the potentially devastating effects of long-range precision strikes on U.S./allied fixed bases in the Pacific, mobile platforms like U.S. carriers, submarines and surface ships, as well as USAF bombers, may have to pick up the slack for strike and local air defense.
Given all that, we can use some basic back-of-the-envelope estimates to see what the balance of forces might be in the IO region. Assumptions: 20% of all ships are in long-term maintenance. 1 in port and 1 fwd-deployed underway CVN are disabled by surprise on day 1.
More assumptions: 75% of US SSNs are required to hunt the 75% of PRC subs that stay in WESTPAC. 12 distributed US LSC & 12 SSCs operate independently in WESTPAC. W/ few airfields, 6 US CSGs are required to provide 24/7 air cover in 3 spots in WESTPAC (IVO Japan, Taiwan and SCS).
More: 4 US SSNs, 12 LSCs & 6 SSCs are required elsewhere (N. Atlantic convoys if Russia teams up w/PRC, defending sea lanes to Japan, etc.). PRC keeps 12 LSC (DDGs) and 36 SSC (ASW frigates) in WESTPAC for local air defense and convoy ops, all operating under A2/AD umbrella.
Here is what the balance of forces might look like given all that. It shows the two main effects from PRC's development of long-range precision strike: 1) major naval strike forces can be sent elsewhere and 2) key US/allied naval forces may have to pick up slack from fixed bases.
So, in a dozen or so years from now, the PRC presence in the IO/PG could go from one that is only ostensibly there for anti-piracy (with submarines?) to one that could genuinely contest for control of the region in the event of a major conflict.
Of course, lots of caveats: this analysis assumes a pretty rough start (though that is an explicit objective in PRC doctrine). It also writes off most allied forces (which I think would likely be busy maintaining sea lanes to their home countries).
It also assumes Indian neutrality, and a continuing rapid expansion of the PLAN, though things hardly seem to be slacking off. And there are likely many other things I haven't thought of. popsci.com/china-type-055…
But the point is that trends are not moving in the right direction to maintain global command of the commons. And whether we know it or not, we are likely to see a major challenge to a doctrine most have forgotten about, just as they take for granted the air that they breathe.
Adding this thread to this general discussion of China's future in the IO/Persian Gulf region.
A bit more on Gwadar and the fact that it's already being used for naval logistical support.
Some key quotes from the new 2018 China Military Power report that are relevant to this thread (relating to BRI, China's need to secure energy SLOCs, and how the BRI will have a military angle no matter what).
