As promised, here are my thoughts on the Withdrawal Agreement - this can't possibly be comprehensive on 585 pages of text, plus a short future declaration, but highlighting the main points and how we got to them. Then a verdict - ec.europa.eu/commission/sit… 1/
First, obviously, the backstop. There is to be a UK-wide Customs Union as we know, but Northern Ireland is to be subject to a 90-page list of single market regulations, which the rest of the UK is not. 2/ 
Now we know that the EU did not want a UK-wide element at all, so this represents something the UK had to push for. In return, the EU has put in place level playing field mechanisms on labour, environment, state aid, but they aren't subject to arbitration 3/
The UK managed also to negotiate a fishing exemption during a Customs Union, a demonstration of how the negotiation worked, hard for UK to alter fundamentals, but we could get specific asks 4/
The Customs Union is not in fact fully defined, and the two sides have to agree how it will actually operate by July 2020. 5/
We also get the opportunity to extend the transition period on a one-off basis - again something the EU were never fully comfortable with, but realistic given trade talks can't possibly be complete in 21 months 6/
An extension of the implementation period will cost, unlike the Customs Union 7/
Also, we continue to get the benefit of EU trade agreements during any extension to the implementation period 8/
The review of the progress towards a new agreement comes within the future partnership document, and involves a high-level conference every 6 months to review progress. 9/
Two final points on the Customs Union, as some have already noted, this would not provide frictionless trade for GB with the rest of the EU, also UK authorities run the UK process, but potentially under EU supervision 10/
Let's look at some other areas, and it is good news for the UK in data and financial services, where we endeavour to ensure a smooth transition (future partnership document) 11/
Less good on future judicial cooperation, which is heavily dependent on our acceptance of ECJ oversight 12/
Geographical Indications is a clear win for the EU, as predicted, there was no way they wouldn't want to see these protected in the Withdrawal Agreement 13/
We can sign new agreements during the transition period, so Liam Fox will be happy with that at least, but they can't come into force until afterwards, and of course this will be dependent on the Customs Union elements 14/
Trade defence measures shall be run during transition and customs union by the EU. No surprise 15/
On Gibraltar we establish a new joint committee with Spain, I must confess I am unsure about the significance of the aviation clause in the agreement though 16/
The consultation process between the UK and EU is exceptionally weak. There is a joint committee meeting annually, and UK experts could be invited to Commission meetings. This really is wholly inadequate 17/
Finally before we get to the verdict, out of my area, but I did enjoy what I will call the 'we don't trust the Home Office' clause - an independent body to supervise rules on citizens rights 18/
In conclusion (1) business and individuals will be very happy with the level of certainty that this will provide until 2020 and the possibility of that extending, but frankly less so with the inadequate consultation and limited Customs Union provisions. 19/
As to whether this is a good deal as a whole, it isn't particularly, but that is mostly a consequence of the constraints given by EU and UK. If you don't like it you have to explain which of those constraints should be lifted - and that is a political decision 20/ ends
PS the legal disclaimer applies - I have attempted to extract some of the key elements for general understanding, but fine legal minds will be disagreeing on what this could all mean for years to come - so this must all be provisional.
