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The problem with this piece by @GoodwinMJ is that it implicitly assumes that a deal that would have satisfied the minority to whom Farage appeals was actually available. telegraph.co.uk/politics/2019/…
The truth is that there was no such deal. As explained here (and passim elsewhere, as @GoodwinMJ must be aware). .
As for “no deal”, that was and is opposed by a solid majority of voters (as well as MPs) - for good reason. But even ignoring that, it would not in fact even have satisfied the Farageist minority.
Farage would have been the first to howl at the inevitable economic/political/legal consequences of “no deal” and at the almost immediate U.K. return to the table - in an even weaker position - that would have followed.
The problem with making the false assumption that @GoodwinMJ does is that you misdiagnose - as I think he does - the only way in which Farage could/should have been contained.
Since appeasement was impossible, the only option was to confront, rather than pander to, the simplistic myths he peddles. Explaining the real trade-offs. And reminding everyone of the narrowness of the Leave vote and urging compromise.
And, when she became PM in 2016, May was in a position to do it. But, as we know, she didn’t: and perhaps doing so was just beyond her imagination and skill-set.
And the danger with leaving the “a clean solution available that was both workable and capable of commanding anything like majority support” narrative unpoked is that it opens the door to “we were stabbed in the back” narratives like this from @JuliaHB1.
And as we know from 20C history, “we were stabbed in the back by an elite” myths take you to nasty places. Which is why responsible academics writing in this area have to poke those myths, hard.
