Thread by @pauldalyesq

Here's a piece I wrote in February, warning of last-minute court challenges to a Brexit delay or revocation, and attendant chaos:

blogs.spectator.co.uk/2019/02/the-br…

Nothing of the sort happened, so I was wrong, and it's worth taking this as a teachable moment.

1/

In this piece, which was briefly one of the most-read items on the Spectator website:

(a) I probably over- and under-estimated Brexiteers, and

(b) may have over-estimated the strength of the potential legal challenges (there were some but they have fizzled out very quietly)

2/

I think I over-estimated Brexiteers' legal nous.

Sir Bill Cash's first letter attacking the legality of asking for a delay was badly misconceived:

publiclawforeveryone.com/2019/03/26/did…

His second was better (in my view) but still met considerable, considered resistance from experts

3/

I may, in turn, have over-estimated the strength of the legal arguments.

After all, the government has a large margin of appreciation in using its statutory and executive powers:

administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2019/03/2…

And who wants to go to court on a long shot?

4/

Here's where I think I probably under-estimated the hardcore Brexiteers.

I thought they wanted a No-Deal Brexit at any cost.

But a last-minute legal challenge would have plunged key UK institutions into chaos.

With victory uncertain perhaps they held back for that reason.

5/

And they may have thought that, even if they had won and the courts (improbably) pushed the UK off the No-Deal precipice, they would have been seen to have won on a technicality.

+> a No-Deal Brexit, even for the hardcore, requires some basic level of democratic legitimacy.

6/

Of course, I am very glad I was wrong.

Next time, I will think more carefully about over- and under-estimating the strength of legal arguments and the character of those involved.

ENDS