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In 2011 Republicans used the debt ceiling to cripple Obama and impose trillions in cuts. Today, Dem leaders agreed to lift the debt ceiling for the remainder of Trump’s presidency but reimpose it in 2021, when Republicans could again use it to cripple a Democratic president.
I’ve been asking around for defenses of this deal and the main rationale being offered is that top Democrats don’t think McConnell will weaponize the debt ceiling against a Democratic president in 2021.
We saw him block Garland with our own eyes.
It’s as bad as it looks.
We saw him block Garland with our own eyes.
It’s as bad as it looks.
This is right. Let’s say McConnell loses and Dems retake the majority in 2020. Republicans saw relentless obstruction work wonders against Obama. Since then, their incentive structure has only grown to reward obstruction *more.* They’d double down.
One counterargument is, “Dems are weak and would never credibly hold the debt ceiling hostage!” Sure. But no one’s saying hold it hostage and extract some big concession. It’s simpler: don’t agree to lift it for the remainder of Trump’s term, then reimpose it on the next POTUS.
“Dems can’t really believe McConnell won’t use the debt ceiling against a Dem POTUS,” you say. Well, here’s a story from today in which Dem senators say we should reimpose the 60-vote threshold on judges on because Rs will listen to their “better angels.” politico.com/story/2019/07/…
This tweet is confusing - sorry. I’m not urging Dems to refuse to lift the debt ceiling lift for the remainder of Trump’s term. I meant, the worst of all worlds is to lift it for the remainder of Trump’s term, then reimpose it on the next POTUS.
The alternative isn’t holding the debt ceiling hostage - it’s just a shorter (but still very responsible) increase! For instance, an increase through FY2020 would push the real deadline into lame duck, letting it be renegotiated between the election and the next inauguration.
