Thread by @RobRakove

On September 15, 1979, the cover of the Kabul Times depicted General Secretary Nur Mohammed Taraki's earlier appearance at the Non-Aligned Movement's summit in Havana. By the time the papers reached the public, Taraki had been ousted and imprisoned.
#Afghanistan1979

The coup within the Khalq, which proved disastrous for Afghanistan, had its roots in growing tensions within the governing faction, as well as between the Soviets and Hafizullah Amin. As we've seen, the Soviets largely blamed Amin for the regime's brutality and incompetence.

Yet Amin also had rivals within the Khalq, a quartet whom he creatively dubbed the "Gang of Four," including the former defense minister Mohammed Aslam Watanjar. When Taraki left for the Havana meeting, in early September, tensions between Amin and his rivals grew.

In a September 1 memorandum, detailed by Vassili Mitrokhin, the KGB called for removing Amin, and counseling Taraki to broaden his government, among other items. Notably the memo also counseled dialogue with Babrak Karmal, of the rival Parcham faction.
wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/…

On his way back from Havana, Taraki visited Moscow, on September 10. There, the Soviet leadership warned him in no uncertain terms about the "concentration of excessive power in the hands of others."

Reportedly, Taraki also met with Karmal, who had been brought to Moscow.

Upon his return to Kabul, on September 11, Taraki confronted a dangerous rift within his government. He found Amin refused to deal with his rivals.

Amin had likely also learned something of Taraki's meetings in Moscow - Taraki's delegation was packed with Amin loyalists.

The government was clearly in crisis. The four dissident ministers visited the Soviet embassy on the 13th, fearing arrest; one asked for Soviet help in arresting Amin.

The Politburo wrote back, unequivocally:

"We cannot . . . arrest Amin . . . since this would be a direct interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and would have far-reaching consequences. Indeed, this is practically unfeasible.
digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111561

Four Soviet envoys visited Amin and Taraki on the evening of the 13th and Amin professed agreement with their views on the need for unity. The Gang of Four avoided their own homes, fearing arrest. Amin demanded their firing and Taraki refused, charging Amin with insubordination.

The standoff between the two Khalqists worsened through the 14th . Taraki professed to Soviet envoys at the presidential palace that he had become concerned by Amin's concentration of power. But, at the Soviets' suggestion, he invited Amin to join the conversation.

What followed is yet another of the Rashomonic events that shaped Afghanistan's descent into calamity. The attached image is the account of the Soviet first secretary D. B. Ryurikov (from Mitrokhin, p. 60).

Soviet observers later suggested that Amin had staged this as a pretext for what followed; it seemed more his style than Taraki's. In any case, he fled the premises. From the Ministry of Defense, he ordered the arrests of Taraki and his supporters.

These unfolded through the evening of the 14th, into the morning of the 15th. Soviet diplomats pleaded with Amin to show restraint, but he was enraged by the apparent assassination attempt (Mitrokhin, 61). The Gang of Four sought refuge, mainly in the Soviet embassy.

U.S. diplomats did not discern the extent of internecine tensions within the Khalq, but a series of cables on the 14th observed some of the violence of Amin's purge. The U.S. defense attache heard an explosion and observed Amin's soldiers at the palace. aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?…

If extant cables are any guide, however, they remained unaware of Taraki's ouster. As Taraki and his wife sat in an improvised palace cell, the U.S. embassy reported, somewhat inappropriately, that he had "[brought] home some bacon from Havana."
aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?…

It fell to the Soviet Politburo to make some sense of their latest Afghan setback. Meeting on the 15th, they reviewed recent Afghan events and faulted Taraki for his indecision. Amin now held all the levers of power.
digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111565

The decision, authored by Andrei Gromyko and Dmitri Ustinov argued for dealing with Amin and counseling that he show restraint toward Taraki's supporters and toward Taraki himself. Soviet forces should avoid any involvement in repressive action.

And Amin's unsmiling visage accompanied news of his elevation to the general secretaryship and Taraki's "retirement" (ostensibly for health reasons) on the next day's Kabul Times. content.library.arizona.edu/cdm/compoundob…

One cannot understand the Soviet intervention without close consideration of Amin's coup in September and the consequent fraying of Soviet-Afghan relations.

Moscow had sought his ouster, but instead found itself confronting an enraged, unbridled, paranoid Amin.