1/ As a historian of US Foreign Policy, a few quick thoughts on Amb. Taylor's opening statement to Congress: washingtonpost.com/context/openin…
2/ Amb. Taylor says (p3) he met with Pompeo on May 28 when he was asked to become acting Ambassador after Yovanovich was sacked, and made clear that he understood why she was sacked, and that he wasn't going to come in unless Pompeo could assure Giuliani would have no role.
3/ Taylor says (p. 4) that upon arriving in Kiev he found two policy making channels, "one regular," ie the normal embassy chain of command, and one highly irregular" consisting of Volker, Sondland, Perry and Giuliani, a "shadow" policy group making its own decisions.
4/ Taylor realizes by June (p. 5) that this second, irregular channel is underminin existing US policy around the conditions of a Zelensky visit. Notes with alarm that Sondland "Did not want to include most of the regular interagency participants" in a 6/28 call planned with Z.
5/ Taylor is now alarmed, as any good bureaucrat would be. Sondland (p. 5) says wants to make sure "no one is transcribing or monitoring" the June 28 call with Zelensnky. Volker says he will meet Z next day and "planned to be explicit" about Trump's conditions for a WH visit.
6/ Taylor says the irregular policy channel is now in charge, with Giuliani - who has no policymaking authority and no clearance - running things. For an Ambassador, this must have been setting off multiple alarms. By mid-July, Taylor himself is being excluded from meetings.
7/ On July 18, Taylor learns OMB has suspended security assistance at direction of President Trump. Embassy Taylor has *meticulously* documented every exchange. This is both bc of training and because he is alarmed and making sure he leaves a paper trail.
8/ Taylor says irregular policy channel "running contrary to long standing goals of US policy." Taylor notes that at multiple meetings all cabinet level secretaries support releasing military aid. It is being held up solely bc of Trump. There are records of all these meetings.
9/ Talor gets readout of July 10 meeting with Sondland and Ukranian officials at WH in which Sondland pressed for Ukrainian investigations, which so outraged Bolton he called it a "drug deal" and told NSC official Fiona Hill to contact WH lawyers.
10/ The tell here is Taylor's description of Ukrainian officials confusion in the July 10 meeting. They are essentially being told about two contradictory US policies. Ukrainian officials later say Zelensky "Does not want to be used as a pawn in a US re-lection campaign."
11/ This is the damning part: the Acting US Ambassador to the Ukraine does not receive a full read out of the July 25 Trump-Zelensky call, only a "cryptic summary." Just crazy. the White House won't tell an Ambassador to the Ukraine about a call with the Ukrainian Pres.
12/ Taylor doesn't see an official read out of the call til its publicly released on September 25. Let's repeat. The US Amb to Ukraine has to wait two months to find out contents of a call between Trump and the Ukrainian President. This is extraordinary and without precedent.
13/ Taylor (p. 10) relays to Bolton his concern about Trump withholding aid to Ukraine and writes Pompeo a letter. Congress will get this letter, you can be certain. Pompeo uses this letter in WH meeting on Ukraine aid. Taylor kept receipts, made copies, left a paper trail.
14/ Taylor learns during Pence's Warsaw visit that Sondland told his Ukrainian counterpart that US security assistance would not be released until Zelensky agreed to an investigation of Burisma. NSC aid Tim Morrison says Trump insisted that Zelensky "go a microphone" and say...
15/ That Zelensky is opening an investigation into Biden and the 2016 election. Sondland Sept 9 says Trump insistent that Zelensky had to "clear things up and do it in public." Note that Ukrainians still getting conflicting policy signals from two opposing currents.
16/ On September 11, aid is released, after this blows up. So what can we learn, from the perspective of a historian of US foreign policy? First, the friction between the 'regular' and 'irregular' policy tracks leaves a thick documentary trail that Congress can track down.
17/ Taylor notes at how US policymakers who are frozen out of the regular policy loop, as well as Ukrainians, are confused because of conversations in the Giuliani led track. In bureaucratic terms this is damning. High level policymakers frozen out of their own policy tracks.
18/ Taylor also notes how many people are aware that a highly irregular policy group is running things, that they are undermining established US policy, that they are making corrupt domestic political demands, and - crucially - that they are trying to cover their tracks.
19/ This is as damning as it gets, and Taylor recorded everything, as a good bureaucrat does. I don't see any possible wriggle room for Trump defenders here. This is a highly persuasive, exhaustively documented account of abuse of power from an unimpeachably credible source.
20/ If I were reading this years later, as a historian poring through the archives, this would read like a textbook conspiracy to undermine existing US policy in the service of a covert domestic political agenda, undertaken on a shadow policy track. Wow. Wow. Wow. END
As @arakeys notes, I was mistaken in saying that it was unprecedented for an Ambassador to be shut out of the policy loop by his own Govt. Nixon and Kissinger did it all the time. So unusual, not unprecedented:
