The most important thing about the SG's amicus brief in Trump v. Vance is that it *rejects* the absurd argument by Trump that a state grand jury is categorically barred from investigating, or obtaining evidence about, a sitting president. [1]
supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/1…
supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/1…
The SG argues instead that a GJ can only obtain such info by showing that it has a "particularized need for the evidence" and that it can't obtain the evidence elsewhere. That showing probably wouldn't be hard for the GJ to meet here. But, in any event, ... [2]
... the SG offers no basis at all for the notion that the Constitution requires such a a showing. The SG's entire brief is is predicated on the notion that a state GJ subpoena *could* "impose substantial burdens on the President’s ... discharge of his constitutional duties." [3]
The SG is right: A GJ subpoena *could* impose such a substantial burden on a POTUS's discharge of constitutional duties--just as a private lawsuit against the president for his pre-presidential acts might likewise do so. [4]
That's why, as the Court noted in Clinton v. Jones, the “high respect that is owed to the office of the Chief Executive * * * should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding, including the timing and scope of discovery.” [5]
But the SG doesn't identify a single way in which *this* subpoena could possibly impose any burdens on Trump's "discharge of his constitutional duties," let alone "substantial burdens"--b/c of course it doesn't. Indeed, any burdens here ... [8]
... obviously are far lesser than those imposed (and that loomed) in the Paula Jones case. If the burdens in Jones weren't enough to preclude discovery--nor even a trial!--and didn't require the sort of heightened showing the SG asks for here, ... [7]
... then the much less significant--indeed, nonexistent--burdens in this case [the SG doesn't identify a single one] likewise don't raise any serious constitutional question. [8 (end)]
