So happy this review essay w/ @dshyde on regime type and IR is on #FirstView @IntOrgJournal. We've been working on this for a long, long time. Here’s a thread on where it came from, what we hope it does, and some still-forming thoughts on how it applies to the US-Iran crisis. 1/
We started from the premise that there was lots of new work on autocracies in IR (AIR) and revitalized interest in democracies in IR (DIR), but there wasn’t that much conversation between these literatures. 2/
And neither one was integrated into debates over international structure, norms, or economic trends (books by @SevaUT, @ConradCourtenay & @EmilyHRitter are exceptions!). 3/
Example: AIR shows some autocracies can behave similarly to democracies in crises or conflicts (books by @jessicalpweeks & @jessicacweiss); DIR work shows variation in democracies’ constraint & advantage in conflict and trade (Baum & @pbkpotter, @hvm1 & @dustintingley, Naoi). 4/
Idea of domestic audience constraint is central: AIR shows some autocracies can be highly constrained by domestic audiences, DIR shows variation in democratic constraint. But what’s the upshot? Does it mean regime type doesn’t matter for IR? Much work implies it doesn’t. 5/
We argue that’s premature & regime type is still crucial in IR, but for different reasons. We develop a “malleable constraints” framework and show that democracies and autocracies might be capable of achieving similar levels of constraint, but at different costs or risks. 6/
We show some constraint comes from domestic structure (@jessicalpweeks, @pbkpotter & Baum); some from strategic leaders, who can pay “agency costs” to alter audience exposure (e.g., allowing protests, per @jessicacweiss, or using diff't tools per @hvm1 & @dustintingley; Naoi). 7/
But autocracies face greater risks when constraints shift. US-Iran crisis illustrates: both sides faced domestic audiences, but when the Iranians had to take responsibility for downing of jet, crowds that had been mourning Soleimani days before were protesting regime again. 8/
Trump had much more room for maneuver as a Republican without much political risk, per this thread by @KSchultz3580; also narrower base that will tolerate just about anything he does. And worst that happens is he’s voted out. 9/
This is not democratic advantage in terms of constraint, but rather in terms of resilience, flexibility and plasticity in institutions, and leaders’ ability to take advantage of their “agency space” at lower risk to themselves and to institutions (see also: Brexit). 10/
Big caveat, and where international level comes in: this form of democratic advantage may depend on great power backing of democracy at international level; could change with rise of china (see @SevaUT). 11/
We lay out this argument drawing on the books we review and try to chart a course for next steps. We cite a TON more work in the essay, but of course, we couldn’t cite everything. There is so much excellent new work on domestic politics in IR. 12/
We hope the essay is useful and we are really grateful to the many, many people who helped along the way. 13/ENDS
