THREAD on this article from Martin Indyk, who argues that the Middle East has become less important to United States and therefore should reduce its commitment to the region.
1. I don’t disagree with the premise, which was developed by @tcwittes and Mara Karlin in a Foreign Affairs article last year. Indeed, I have a similar piece coming out in the Texas National Security Review, and a volume I co-edited with Dafna Rand hits many of the same themes.
2. But there are a number of problems with the execution of the argument. For one, Indyk fails to differentiate between US military and non-military investments in the ME. While it’s true that US is over-committed in military terms, it’s not true in a diplomatic sense.
3. Not only does non-military intervention carry fewer risks, but vast majority of what US has spent in region, in terms of money and lives, was incurred by DOD. Diplomacy is not a panacea, but it is a far less costly form of US engagement that can produce results.
4. Indyk also overstates the case in arguing there are “few vital interests” at stake in ME. It’s more accurate to say the US has “fewer vital interests” left in the region. Oil is a prime example. He acknowledges that ME oil can have a huge effect on gas prices in US, but...
5. he downplays the significance of this fact. Any US president will consider price of gas, which is central to health of American economy, a vital interest. US has oil production independence, but not price independence.
6. Indyk also vacillates on the question of Israel. While he avers that two-state solution is no longer a vital US interest, he also says Israel’s security remains a “national interest.” It’s legitimate to ask whether the 2 state solution is necessary for US, or even feasible.
7. But to imply, as he does, that Israel’s security is in no way jeopardized by the fate of the Palestinian people is misleading. If the US considers Israel a national interest, then it has a national interest in reaching a durable settlement between Israelis and Palestinians.
8. Now, such a settlement can take different forms: 2 states, 1 state with equal rights, confederation. But the point is it matters to US. To be clear, I’m not arguing the welfare of the Palestinians is not also a US interest; I’m just taking the argument on Indyk’s terms.
9. Indyk also dramatically exaggerates similarities between Obama and Trump. Their instincts were similar in that both wanted to extricate US from ME, but their actual track records are different. Obama sought assisuously to avoid new open-ended commitments in region.
10. Yes, he intervened in Libya, but then he suspended US involvement (perhaps prematurely). US interventions in Iraq and Syria were fairly small and only came in response to a legitimate threat (the rise of ISIS). Trump by contrast has deployed close to 20k troops to region...
11. in response to an Iranian challenge that he precipitated and on open-ended terms that are especially vulnerable to an indefinite commitment. Obama wasn’t pleased that he was forced to spend more time on ME, but he methodically sought to contain those commitments.
12. Trump, whatever his rhetoric, does not possess the discipline, attention to detail, or organization to prevent initial interventions from snowballing over time. Finally, the article seems to imply that both Obama and Trump were hoodwinked into staying in the ME.
13. Indyk appears to suggest that Obama and Trump had the right instincts but were persuaded against their better judgment to stray from their original course. Trump aside, Obama wasn’t tricked into fighting ISIS, which posed a real threat to region, Euro partners, and the US.
14. The substantial time he spent negotiating the JCPOA was not a bad investment, despite Trump’s decision to withdraw from agreement. Curbing Iranian nuclear ambitions was a vital US interest. Though region was less important, it wasn’t irrelevant to US and couldnt be ignored.
15. Ultimately, a successful US policy in ME will not be predicated on “getting out” of region. Instead, it will scale back US investments to extent necessary to preserve FEWER US INTERESTS in region. And it will open up new resources to address growing threats to US.
16. Of course, in navigating such a policy, the devil is always in the details. But two things are clear. One, the imbalance between military and non-military investments in the region needs to be rectified. As a general principle, look to reduce military footprint.
17. Second, blanket declarations about staying or leaving are not helpful guidelines for planning a more humble, realistic US policy toward the Middle East. /End
