A thread on "Trade Multilateralism and U.S. National Security: The Making of the GATT Security Exceptions", especially for those curious about my big picture thoughts on this project. Michigan J Int'l Law has it up here: repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol41/iss…
My intensive archival work into the construction of the security exceptions illuminates, but also complicates, current debates about the interpretation of article XXI GATT, which is relevant for several disputes at the WTO.
My work provides new evidence into the making of the International Trade Organization (ITO), the original post-WW2 multilateral trade institution, through investigation of the internal debates among the lead architects of the exceptions and the ITO preparatory materials.
Here are some takeaways: My archival work shows that there is no simple explanation for how to address national security within trade disputes, nor is there clear evidence that security-related trade actions escape legal review.
In fact there were intense debates showing that even the one state most likely to invoke the exceptions – the US – was internally divided on the balance between freedom of action and trade multilateralism.
Overall this project is not about the interpretation of Article XXI GATT. My work shows the complex interdependence between economics and security, at a time when governments faced domestic and international challenges caused by the end of one war, but the birth of another;
all while generating a new institution and rules to manage international trade disputes. I do not foresee a clear-line test for identifying the boundaries of international commerce and national security. (@WorldWeaponized on showing us why that is).
My work shows there was never desire to find such a test. Members placed great faith in the ITO – in its evolving role in managing trade relations – to navigate the balance between economic & security concerns. If that has changed over time then our next question must be: Why?
