As a lot of discussions already started on what to expect from #Biden within the #transatlantic relationship, let me list few ideas I laid out for @WashInstitute about what it could specifically mean in the #MiddleEast :
(I’ll paste in this thread some excerpts of a longer paper on Europe-US cooperation in the #MiddleEast since the end of the Cold War, available here 👇)
1/ A key prerequisite to reset the transatlantic dialog on the #MiddleEast : the ball is in Europe’s court to make concrete proposals on a limited list of priorities. (cc @jbdacey)
2/ Transatlantic partners have to think specifically on their method of coordination on the #MiddleEast. The framework isn’t really there beyond some strong bilateral channels of cooperation. MENA is a region were small Europeans coalitions are very relevant (cc @ErikBrattberg)
3/ Define what “great power competition” means in the #MiddleEast. Europe has to acknowledge that #China is the US foreign policy priority but Washington should explain the specific trade offs (cc @tobiaschneider) it implies in MENA (cc @MichaelSinghDC).
4/ A hard truth Europeans have to take into consideration is that they have a credibility issue in DC Middle East expert circles (cc @JyShapiro). Unity, effectiveness & better explaining the relevance of the existing European policy toolbox will be key to address this.
5/ Be specific on #burdensharing. The #NATO 2% GDP target isn’t really relevant for coop in the #MiddleEast. I think @jana_puglierin & @ClaudMajor will agree we have to focus on specific capabilities, interoperability and shared political assessments.
6/ A larger but essential part of these discussions is to clarify US positions regarding European *operational* autonomy. (cc @jeffdlightfoot & @OlivierR_Bel)
7/ Speaking of a renewed transatlantic agenda should be done with great *humility*. Grand Western schemes for the #MiddleEast are ineffective, counterproductive & outdated. Let’s rather push for a more targeted & effective cooperation in sync with bilat relations in the region.
9/ A third priority should also be to set a shared agenda within multilateral institutions active in the #MiddleEast (UN, WB, IMF, WHO...) to address structural governance issues & post #COVID recovery. (Cc @ChristianHanelt)
10/ This is just the start of a discussion on which all the colleagues tagged have published great articles. There is however not much time: regional foreign policies will factor Biden’s victory in but they might still create new facts on the ground & not wait for January. (End)
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Pas mal de points très contestables dans cette tribune. Mais prenons les choses dans l’ordre: nouvelobs.com/idees/20201114…
1/ Tout d’abord, ce texte fait suite aux menaces de mort contre une journaliste. Je veux donc commencer par exprimer mon soutien à Judith Bernard face à des comportements inacceptables en démocratie. Aucune opinion ne justifie une menace de mort. Aucune.
2/ Sur le fond, je suis le premier à me réjouir de débats argumentés et respectueux sur ces sujets qui méritent toute notre attention, mais, dans cet esprit, je dois dire que cette tribune multiplie les myopies.
In the context of recent terrorist attacks in France & after a week of outrage in Muslim countries over the Charlie Hebdo caricature, @EmmanuelMacron gave a long interview to @AJArabic today to counter misunderstandings and misinformation about his recent statements. Key points:
1/ Macron started by recalling that France had been attacked multiple times by extremists who were distorting the message of Islam and regretted that disinformation had been spread on social media about the situation.
2/ He recalled the roots of FR secularism based on the protection of freedom of speech & freedom of religion: a long struggle between the state and the Catholic Church and where caricatures on all religions (& politicians) are a tradition.
THREAD – One of the many questions related to the #US election next week is the future of American engagement in the #MiddleEast. All actors in the region are already hedging their bets. But what about #Europe’s interest in the Middle East & North Africa ?
Through 50+ interviews, I have looked back at the evolution of transatlantic cooperation in the MENA region since the end of the Cold War & tried in this @WashInstitute piece to assess the potential implications of the US election next week. washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
Let’s start with a paradox: while for many in the MENA, Europe & the US represent the « West », there is no clear “Western” framework of cooperation about the Middle East.
I understand @ishaantharoor may not have chosen the title and that presenting this as a clash of two leaders’ ego is catchy. But this is missing major issues, at least four of them :
1/ How it started: there is a constant disregard in reports for the fact that FR-TUR tensions started and continue in Northeastern #Syria because Ankara’s milit interventions disturbed the fight c/ #ISIS. Why is it important ?
Because the US was the main player on the ground and the failure to find an understanding with TUR led to the escalation we saw in October 2019 when TUR intervened and the US withdrew without consulting its European allies.
I have been in DC for more than a year now and I'm struck by the soul searching going on in the US expert community regarding what to do in the #MiddleEast. Numerous articles discuss a potential #US "withdrawal" from the Middle East. Here is a thread and a reading list:
A first dimension of this debate is a 2016 article from Andrew J Bacevich, making a general case against interventionism and a call to "end endless wars". foreignaffairs.com/articles/unite…
But I feel that the discussion intensified in 2019 when voices like @Martin_Indyk, a Peace Process veteran, echoed similar concerns based on the analysis that only few vital American interests were still at stake in the Middle East. wsj.com/articles/the-m…
2/ A more serious analysis of the rethoric wld show TUR officials started issuing insulting statements against Macron personally in 2019, while his own statements focused on policy disagreements with TUR. There are simply no “rhetorical broadsides against Erdogan”.