1)#Iran’s Foreign Ministry reporting that Raab spoke with Zarif ahead of this week’s #JCPOA talks in Vienna
Iran’s MFA reports Raab told Zarif “London will do its best to help negotiations bear fruit”.But #UK’s changing posture toward Iran should noted
Reflections on UK-JCPOA👇
2) Two weeks ago, the #UK published its Integrated Review (IR) – the biggest review of UK defence, security & foreign policy since cold war - where it outlined overarching international policy objectives until 2030.
Rising concerns about #Iran’s regime featured throughout 👇
3)The most noteworthy change in relation to #Iran policy was the absence of any reference to JCPOA.
Since 2015, the #UK has explicitly defined its Iran policy through the #JCPOA & its commitment to upholding it. So the absence of any mention of the JCPOA in the IR is important
4)Not only does the IR break from such posturing for the 1st time, but it implicitly acknowledges shortcomings of #JCPOA by calling for a “more comprehensive nuclear & #regional deal”
5) Commenting on the newly published IR report, Foreign Sec Dominic Raab specifically named #Iran as the looming threat that keeps him “awake at night”, asserting that “we must never see #Iran get a nuclear weapon.”thenationalnews.com/world/europe/u…
6) Of course, while the IR underscores the #UK’s pledge on “renewed diplomatic effort[s] to prevent #Iran from developing a nuclear weapon”, this no longer appears to be exclusively confined to boundaries of the #JCPOAgov.uk/government/pub…
7) This, coupled with the calls for the agreement to be expanded to cover #Tehran’s regional destabilisation, marks a significant shift in #UK govt’s Iran policy.
8) The emergence of this new stance opens the opportunity for the #UK to play a leading role in working with the #Biden admin to explore expanding the remit of 2015 nuke agreement.
@TomTugendhat has also called on UK govt to lead efforts to “broker a replacement to the #JCPOA”
9) Given #Europe’s reluctance to tackle Iranian regional destabilisation, the #UK’s exit from the #EU means that it can, & should, play a key mediating role in bridging the gap between #Washington & #Brussels & developing a transatlantic policy towards Tehran.
10) In sum, the mood in London appears to have changed - both in govt & Parliament. There seems to be a recognition that the Iran landscape has significantly moved on from the 2015 status quo
2) Last week’s explosion in #Beirut has put significant pressure on #Iran’s activities in Lebanon, which are carried out by #Hezbollah –a Shia Islamist militia Iran’s IRGC helped create in 80s to export Islamic Revolution to #Lebanon & destroy the “Zionist regime”(#Israel)
3)Hezbollah's been 1 of Iran’s most valuable assets. Together with IRGC it's undertaken Iran’s strategic/ideological goals via terrorism, hostage-takings,assassinations, Syria + it's entrenched itself in political institutions.For Hez actions @Levitt_Mattwashingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
1)The #IRGC is eyeing Iran’s presidency & Parviz Fattah is emerging as its perfect candidate
As a strong contender for 2021, Fattah has been dominating headlines
But who is Fattah? What's his ideology? What would his presidency mean for #Iran’s domestic/foreign policy?
THREAD
2)Despite avoiding limelight, Fattah’s got lots of experience:Ahmadinejad’s energy minister (1st term) + heading Khamenei’s ideological-charitable orgs:Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation (2015-19)& Mostazafan Foundation(current role).But underpinning all of this are his ties to IRGC
3)Fattah’s a product of the #IRGC. His career began on the frontline of #Iran-Iraq War, but his links extend beyond the battlefield. After leaving gov in 2009, he became dep commander of IRGC’s construction HQ, Khatam al-Anbia & head of its investment arm,Bonyad-e Taavon-e Sepah