Thread by @KasraAarabi

1)The #IRGC is eyeing Iran’s presidency & Parviz Fattah is emerging as its perfect candidate

As a strong contender for 2021, Fattah has been dominating headlines

But who is Fattah? What's his ideology? What would his presidency mean for #Iran’s domestic/foreign policy?

THREAD

2)Despite avoiding limelight, Fattah’s got lots of experience:Ahmadinejad’s energy minister (1st term) + heading Khamenei’s ideological-charitable orgs:Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation (2015-19)& Mostazafan Foundation(current role).But underpinning all of this are his ties to IRGC

3)Fattah’s a product of the #IRGC. His career began on the frontline of #Iran-Iraq War, but his links extend beyond the battlefield. After leaving gov in 2009, he became dep commander of IRGC’s construction HQ, Khatam al-Anbia & head of its investment arm,Bonyad-e Taavon-e Sepah

4)Both of these entities have been blacklisted by #West due to their links to the proliferation of sensitive nuclear equipment — as has Fattah himself, who is on both the #US & #EU’s sanctions list treasury.gov/press-center/p…

5)Even after his departure from organs directly controlled by #IRGC, Fattah went out of his way to maintain his close ties, going as far as remaining on its payroll during both his tenure as minister of energy & head of Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation

6)As an ideological purist, Fattah's rejected the notion that the Islamic Revolution’s ideology can/should evolve.There's only 1 “school of Khomeini”, in his view, based on “devotion to the system, supporting the supreme leader, following martyrs path & never forgetting Khomeini"

7)He describes himself as having the “culture of the frontline,” which itself is a reflection of the core tenets of his beliefs: a militant blend of #Shia Islamism, hinged on divine submission to #Iran’s supreme leader & supporting the so-called “downtrodden”(mostazafin) class

8)Fattah's militaristic obedience/loyalty to Khamenei is emblematic of his IRGC DNA & rooted in IRGC's “Alavi Doctrine.”For Khamenei Fattah’s passed the loyalty test after he denounced Ahmadinejad for going against his will.‌ For doctrine see @InstituteGC👇institute.global/policy/beyond-…

9)While some describe Fattah as #Ahmadinejad 2.0, his traits are more like Soleimani. Like #Soleimani, Fattah's always overtly ensured no man is greater than supreme leader #Khamenei favors these personalities,which are easier to control & less likely to challenge his authority

10)But, should he become president, what does all this mean practically?

Fattah’s domestic agenda would almost certainly be defined by increased state support for poorer, religious #Iranians (the mostazafin) & furthering the Islamization of #Iran

11)The former would incl populist photo-ops & cash handouts. Like other hardline purists,he views Islamic Rev as being about supporting”mostazafin”(regime’s core support base).Yesterday,he attacked elite for not returning assets to his charitable org -posturing for 2021 election

12)Accelerating domestic Islamization would also be a top priority. This would see an authoritarian push to nurture the regime’s #Shia Islamist ideology across every aspect of society, with goal of creating a more radical generation See @SaeidGolkar 👇washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…

13)Such would see a greater domestic role #IRGC, Basij & Islamic Development Org (body that promotes regime’s Islamist ideology in society).Fattah’s recent actions demonstrate his willingness to empower the #IRGC domestically, esp since #COVID19 see newsweek.com/post-pandemic-…

14)For #Khamenei, prioritization of mostazafin & domestic Islamization could not be more important. Since 2017, anti-regime unrest has been led by poorer Iranians + they've also suffered most from #COVID19 - increasing fears of post-pandemic unrest that threatens regime survival

15)Simultaneously, the regime is also worried that the human and economic consequences of #COVID19 could affect the ideological commitment of its security forces & in turn reduce their willingness to suppress protests👇mei.edu/publications/w…

16)Fattah can already flaunt tangible “results” on these issues. As head of Imam Khomeini Relief Found, he increased income of families’ dependent on its aid by 300% +worked with Islamic Dev Org to create 2000 offices to “institutionalize Islam" in society iqna.ir/fa/news/378105…

17) A return to “revolutionary values” at home would be accompanied by a zealous foreign policy. This would bring increased commitment to regional militancy & further militarization of the Islamic Republic — all with the blessing of Ayatollah Khamenei. This would be an #IRGC FP

18)Again, Fattah is very well placed to achieve this. He’s already built a strong personal network in region, having accompanied the late Soleimani on many trips to Syria/Leb/Iraq. This incl close ties to #Assad, #Hezbollah's Nasrallah & senior ranks in Iraqi Hashd al-Shaabi

19)These personal relationships could prove valuable for Khamenei’s goal to strengthen “axis of resistance".This could not be more important in post-Soleimani context, which has seen Iran struggle to fill the void #Soleimani left behind.See @JasonMBrodsky google.co.uk/amp/s/m.jpost.…

20)Increasing funds for regional militias would likely be a top priority for Fattah.While #Iran’s economy - which has lost 15% GDP due to #COVID19 -may not be in right condition for this, the regime's shown no hesitation in prioritizing ideological objectives over domestic needs

21)Fattah's already shown willingness to divert money from home to abroad. In Feb he revealed that as head of Bonyad-e Taavon-e Sepah (which is barred from military spending) he allocated funds to pay wages of Fatemiyoun militia, upon Soleimani’s request google.co.uk/amp/s/en.radio…

22)Prospects for a future deal with #Iran under a Fattah presidency? While Fattah initially praised the 2015 nuke deal, his comments were merely a reflection of the SL’s position at the time. As #Khamenei’s position on the deal changed, so too did Fattah’s

23) The ultra-hardline Jebeh Paydari faction that has ruled out talks with West is looking to endorse Fattah - an indication of his approach. Since Soleimani strike,Fattah's been a leading voice calling for “hard revenge” against #US through military means khabaronline.ir/news/1339894/%…

24)For Khamenei, who is giving posts to young radicals to ensure continuation of his hardline vision after his demise, Fattah is an attractive choice. Fattah would further consolidate #IRGC, escalate domestic Islamization & increase regional militancy.See foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/22/ira…

25) For full analysis see my piece for @MiddleEastInst, which is the 1st comprehensive analysis of Parviz Fattah (& has been referenced + reacted to in newspapers in #Iran). Huge thanks to @mideasteditor for a fantastic edit! mei.edu/publications/i…