Half a year ago,there was a huge outcry in Germany that the EU had presumably botched #Covid19 vaccine procurements.
Now, it shows that the mistakes at the EU level are dwarfed by failures of the vaccination campaign in Germany–but no one talks about it anymore.
A thread. 1/
When early this year, Israel, the #UK and the #US pulled ahead of EU countries in the vaccination drive, there was a lot of finger pointing at the EU commission. As was broadly discussed, the Commission had looked too much after not paying excessive prices 2/
and had ended up with contracts under which vaccine producers such as #Astrazeneca believed they could serve other countries first and the EU only second. (Some of this ended before courts.)
In Germany, media called it the “Impfdebakel” (vaccination debacle).3/
Already at that point, some level-headed observers from outside the EU such as @jfkirkegaard noted that the criticism of the EU procurement was overdone and later pointed out the benefits of the EU being the world’s largest vaccine exporter. 4/
In early summer, it turned out that vaccine supply was not a problem anymore and that the delays in procurement had delayed the vaccine drive in the EU relative to the UK or the US by only 6 to eight weeks as @AndrewWattEU and I had projected earlier. 5/
Now, in the fall, it has become clear that Germany has become a laggard among Western EU countries when it comes to vaccination. In fact, even #Brazil has now vaccinated a larger part of the population than Germany. 6/
This is tragic for Germany. There is a grave (but due to the election campaign not widely discussed risk) that the fourth infection wave with #delta will hit Germany hard over the winter and that this will actually delay also the economic recovery.7/
What is also not discussed: This is now entirely a failure at the national level.
And in the end, the consequences of the failure to further roll-out vaccinations will probably be worse than those of the initial delay by 6 to 8 weeks. 8/
I do not want to go into the discussion who is in detail at fault here in Germany as it is most likely a mixture of professional institutions (like the national vaccination board) which communicate poorly with the public, 9/
a long-standing vaccination scepticism in Germany (we vaccinated later against polio than other countries and less decidedly against measles), media which seeks a false balance between those warning of #covid19 and those playing it down 10/
and a lack in leadership in this issue from all leading politicians, including most Länder governments, and both in government and in the opposition. 11/
I have to admit that I (and the rest of the @IMKflash) underestimated this hesitancy. We thought that once vaccines are widely available, we could vaccinate our way into a more normal (and more healthy) winter. 12/
We did not believe that German vaccine hesitancy would turn the country which was a vaccination frontrunner in the spring into a laggard. Our forecast for a solid recovery in the second half of 2021 was based on that view. 13/
From a European perspective it is especially sad that in the end, in many German voters’ minds, the EU will be remembered as the level which made mistakes in the #vaccine procurement, but the mistakes made at the national level migh not be remembered, 14/
as the media has focused on the election campaign and no one is talking about the real “Impfdebakel” in Germany, namely that our vaccination rate stagnates at a level which is not sufficient to really control the pandemic and below that of Brazil. /END
Spiegel journalist @claushecking has pointed out that I have been too harsh in stating that “no one is talking about the real ‘Impfdebakel’”. He is right.
There have been some brave journalists who kept pointing this out. 1/
My point was: Compared to what we have seen in the spring, the coverage now is very weak and very few seem to care (which might also be due to the fact that none of the political parties is pushing this issue before the elections).
Sorry if I formulated too harshly. /END
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Lesenswerter #Thread zur Diskussion „Innovation durch Verbote?“ von @Phuenermund.
Ein paar Ergänzungen von meiner Seite zur #EU-Dimension der Frage. 1/
Jenseits der Frage, wie Standards und Verbote auf die Innovationskraft der Unternehmen wirken, sollte man im #EU-Kontext nicht unterschätzen, wie stark die Standards in der EU auf die Innoviationen im Rest der Welt wirken. 2/
In den Politikwissenschaften und in den Randgebieten der Handelsökonomie wird seit einigen Jahren betont, dass die #EU ein „regulatory superpower“ geworden ist. @anubradford nennt dies den „Brüssel-Effekt“. 3/ scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/232/#:~:….
Ich wollte mit dem Tweet verdeutlichen, dass auch kleine Wahrscheinlichkeiten (0,01 %) in einer größeren Population eine relevante ABSOLUTE Zahl ausmachen. Ich habe nicht behauptet, dass 0,01 % der deutschen Kinder an Covid19 sterben, wenn sie infiziert sind. 2/
Es war also KEINE Projektion oder Prognose,sondern ein Beispiel.Auch wollte ich keine Panik verbreiten.
Es ging vielmehr darum, die oft gehörte Bemerkung „0,0x% Sterblichkeit ist nicht so schlimm“ etwas zu relativieren.
Ich hätte das aber wohl noch klarer formulieren sollen.
3/
Big news: According to the details in today’s quarterly report, #Biontech alone is now set to boost German GDP this year by 0.5 % and hence German GDP *growth* 2021 by 0.5 percentage points. This is quite extraordinary for a start-up. 1/
Usually, as a macroeconomist, I do not tweet about individual companies. Sometimes, however, there are rare cases where single companies have a macroeconomic relevance. #Biontech is such a rare example. 2/
Quick back-of-the-envelope calculation: #Biontech has estimated the revenue from #Covid19 vaccines for 2021 to €15.9 billion, which is roughly 0.5 % of GDP. As Biontech had only marginal sales in 2020, this impacts also GDP growth rate almost 1-to-1. 3/ investors.biontech.de/node/10446/pdf
Sehr spannende (und soweit erkennbar solide gemachte) neue Studie zur Übersterblichkeit seit 2020. Ergebnis: Deutschland ist pro Kopf mit etwa halb so vielen zusätzlichen Toten durch die Pandemie gekommen wie Frankreich, Österreich oder die Niederlande.1/ elifesciences.org/articles/69336
In den USA gab es pro Kopf etwa viermal so viele Tote wie bei uns, in Großbritannien immerhin dreimal so viele.
Hätten wir die gleiche Übersterblichkeit wie die USA, wären bei uns rd. 116.000 Menschen zusätzlich gestorben. 2/
Kanada dagegen hat rd. 20 % weniger zusätzliche Tote gehabt, Australien und Neuseeland noch weniger.
(Im PDF sehr detaillierte Tabellen mit Angabe von Datenstand, absoluten und relativen Zahlen.) 3/
Der Streit um die #Stiko-Empfehlung zu den Impfungen von Jugendlichen und dem Vorhaben der Gesundheitsminister, diese Impfungen zu forcieren, spitzt sich zu. Ein paar Gedanken von mir zu dem Thema. 1/
Vorneweg: Ich halte wissenschaftliche Beratung für politische Entscheidungsprozesse für sehr wichtig. Und: Ich kann nicht den Nutzen und Kosten von Impfungen abwägen, da ich kein Mediziner bin. 2/
Als Volkswirt (und früherer Journalist) habe ich allerdings einige Erfahrung mit der Kommunikation wissenschaftler Empfehlungen und der Kommunikation von Entscheidungen, in die solche Expertise einfließt. 3/
Als im März vom „deutschen Impfdesaster“ geredet wurde und im Internet Prognosen zirkulierten, dass Menschen im mittleren Alter erst 2023 gegen #Covid19 geimpft würden, veröffentlichten @AndrewWattEu und ich eine Projektion zum Impfpfad mit dem Titel „Yes, we can“. 1/
In dem @imkflash Policy Brief schrieben wir, dass es rechnerisch möglich sein würde, bis Ende Juli alle impfwilligen Erwachsenen in Deutschland vollständig zu impfen. 2/ imk-boeckler.de/de/faust-detai…
Tatsächlich zeigen die Zahlen und die Lage nun, Ende Juli, das es wohl tatsächlich möglich war, allen impfwilligen Erwachsenen ein Impfangebot zu machen. Leider scheint es aber nicht so viele Impfwillige zu geben, wie wir angenommen hatten. 3/