The idea that the CIA's T-50 program with the #FSA "failed" & the DOD's Train, Advise, Assist & Equip program with the #YPG-#SDF "succeeded" -- one key point made here -- is a bit of a simplification.
There can't be a direct comparison, given the operational differences.
There can't be a direct comparison, given the operational differences.
https://twitter.com/amberinzaman/status/1443702492785696775
The CIA's T50 program was covert & limited strictly to weapons supply & [very] limited intel support/external advice to groups (a) active in a highly complex environment, amid hostile jihadists & (b) against governments, with airforce/s, artillery etc.
The DOD's #YPG-#SDF program was initiated amid a direct U.S military intervention, in which U.S. SOF were deployed on the ground & close air support & later artillery support was provided -- to strengthen the #SDF, incentivize its unity, and protect it from *all* rivals/enemies.
In response to the CIA's T50 program, large swathes of the #FSA coalesced & posed a far enhanced force on the battlefield -- but in doing so, they were confronted by #Syria's air force & then #Russia's.
Given complexity on the ground, resulting dynamics were far from a surprise.
Given complexity on the ground, resulting dynamics were far from a surprise.
As a result of the DOD's direct military intervention & partnership with the #YPG-#SDF, the group was provided with the space to unite, grow in professionalism & establish on-ground realities (military, governance etc.) that were de facto protected by a U.S. air & ground shield.
The #FSA was empowered enough to matter, but not enough to outcompete AQ or defend itself against an overwhelming #Syria-#Russia assault.
Let's not forget, the #SDF's "success" catalyzed multiple #Turkey military interventions & a bitter Kurd-Arab conflict that'll last decades.
Let's not forget, the #SDF's "success" catalyzed multiple #Turkey military interventions & a bitter Kurd-Arab conflict that'll last decades.
The idea that #Turkey would turn hostile to an empowered #YPG was a basic fact in 2014 -- but we chose to go down that path & create the deep & likely irreversible socio-political consequences for northern #Syria.
That's on us -- labeling that a "success" would be hubris.
That's on us -- labeling that a "success" would be hubris.
In Aug '14, military expediency & few options played a role, as did deep skepticism of #Turkey & its capacity to provide an #FSA alternative -- all true.
But the self-identified DOD "architect" of the then T&E mission told me at the time that Kurds were a kind of Arab, so...
But the self-identified DOD "architect" of the then T&E mission told me at the time that Kurds were a kind of Arab, so...
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