1. Many analysts are now fully convinced that a large #escalation of #Russia's #war against #Ukraine is imminent. However, we should not discount the possibilty that the #Kremlin is still playing a #gameofchicken. A major war would be a sharp break with #Putin's past behaviour.
2. The prospect of an imminent large war dictates negotiations and deescalation - possibly involving even concessions by Kyiv and the West. In contrast, a #chickengame demands calm, firmness, and composure. The apt strategy is then to not blink rather than to quickly compromise.
1. Western politicians have not yet understood that they need to find adequate answers to an escalation of not only & not so much Russian traditional warfare, but also of Moscow's already intense hybrid war (economic, cyber, etc.) against #Ukraine, e.g.: researchgate.net/publication/29…
2. The Ukrainian state can collapse not only following a large Russian armed invasion, but also as a result of its continued subversion, destabilization & sabotage. Putin may choose the second option in order to avoid Western "monster sanctions" while achieving the same effects.
3. The repercussion for the EU of a Ukrainian collapse as a result of Russian hybrid warfare could be similar to those of an "ordinary" military offensive. The Kremlin primarily wants a destruction of rather than necessarily a war against a pro-Western Ukrainian state.
My five kopecks on the current "correlation of forces" here in #Ukraine, building on @jhzachau's and my rough scenarios outline for the @SCEEUS_UI@UISweden below: 1. It is now increasingly likely that some kind of #Russian escalation will happen. ui.se/forskning/cent…
2. This could, for instance, aim to bring the borders of the so-called "people's republics" in the #Donbas in line with their "constitutions" which claim that the entire #Donetsk and #Luhansk#oblasts belong to these pseudo-states.
3. Intensified shelling by the “republics” of government-controlled locations as well as an array of non-kinetic attacks on #Ukraine have already begun. kyivindependent.com/national/over-…
3. Es könnten demnächst Millionen ukrainischer Flüchtlinge in die EU, ja womöglich nach Deutschland selbst strömen. Was genau tut Berlin bei Ankunft der zweiten, dritten... Million verzweifelter Menschen über die grüne EU-Ostgrenze? Mauer & Stacheldraht an der Oder-Neisse-Linie?
1. A common Western misperception is that Ukrainians are unhappy about not getting enough direct help from the West. euractiv.com/section/politi…
2. A far more salient desire here is that the West stops indirectly co-financing the Russian war against Ukraine via its intense trade, monetary and investment relations with Russia.
3. The Western talk about European values, international law, strong solidarity etc. appears as hollow, and the generous Western developmental help for Ukraine as ridiculous.
NOTHING PERSONAL? STRICTLY BUSINESS?
1/3: At first glance, these Russian company appointments look like commercial strategy. They, it seems, belong to the PRIVATE life of retired Western politicians who get remunerated for some Russian lobbying at home. Fishy, but understandable.
2/3: Yet, the example of #GerhardSchröder's role for the #Kremlin in Germany indicates that the appointments are part of a Russian GEOPOLITICAL strategy. It would be therefore of interest what position the POLITICAL homes of these Western politicians take.
3/3: Since the companies, the politicians work for are parts or clients of the Russian state, the parties where the politicians remain influential, like the #SPD, #LesRepublicains etc, turn into frameworks of Moscow's foreign affairs. Is that desirable, permissible, tolerable...?