1. Since last week, there have been a number of signs that #Russia may be planning to invade #Moldova.
In the last few days, there have been several likely false flag attacks in #Transnistria, events that have been amplified massively by a simultaneous influence campaign.
2. To track this, we analysed 169,000 posts shared across pro-war, #Kremlin-aligned communities on Telegram last week.
3. The main claims are strikingly similar to those that emerged in the run-up to #Russia’s invasion of #Ukraine in February.
They revolve around pre-emptive justifications for war based on #Transnistria|n ‘insecurity’ and talk of #Ukraine’s ‘looming threat.’
4. On 25 April, there was a surge in pro-#Kremlin rhetoric around #Transnistria as supporters of #Moscow began to share news of a string of explosions in #Tiraspol.
5. A day later on 26 April, #Kremlin supporters doubled down on this rhetoric, citing a video showing local security forces at high alert on the lookout for 'terrorist infiltrators.'
6. Things came to a head later that day when new footage emerged showing ‘unknown gunmen’ who had ‘crossed illegally’ from #Ukraine shooting three RPGs at the MGB HQ in #Tiraspol.
There was now ‘evidence’ of Ukrainian involvement.
7. In the days since, pro-war communities have also been sharing a video clip of a Moldovan woman saying ‘#Russia|n soldiers will be greeted with bread, salt and wine’ when they come to #Moldova.
1. In recent months, we’ve been tracking chatter about the World Cup in #Qatar across #IS, #AQ, and Shi'a militant group (#SMG) networks online.
2. Interest has been fairly limited in #AQ & #SMG ecosystems but #IS|ers have been calling for attacks, with momentum for these calls spiking in recent days.
Graphs show incidence of posts with “Qatar” (yellow), “World Cup” (blue), and “football” (red).
3. One #IS call-to-arms singles out teams / supporters of Coalition member states, above all #US and #France.
There have also been multiple assertions that attacks needn’t happen only in #Qatar, the logic being that an attack anywhere during the WC will be maximally disruptive.
1. Following the explosions at #Saky airbase on Tuesday, satellite imagery (from @Planet) of their aftermath has emerged.
Multiple buildings and aircraft were destroyed – with at least three distinct craters clearly apparent.
L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
2. Several aircraft housed in 3-sided berms were destroyed, while others closer to the apparent impact craters seemed to survive.
There are a few possible explanations for this (for e.g., some aircraft may have been carrying munitions while others were not).
L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
3. In videos shared across pro-#Kremlin Telegram that had reportedly been shot immediately after the first 'strike,' smoke can be seen billowing before a large explosion at the site.
1. Over the last few days, we’ve been tracking a major new influence campaign being deployed by the #Taliban in #Afghanistan.
On 22 July, its networks on Twitter and Telegram were three times more active than usual – more active than they've been across all of 2022 to date.
2. This surge was the result of a defensive comms campaign aimed at legitimising the #Taliban, sparked when @Meta banned its media agencies, Bakhtar/RTA, last week.
In the wake of that, thousands started tweeting #BanTaliban in the hope that @Twitter would follow suit.