Hanna Notte Profile picture
May 29 11 tweets 9 min read
The imperative that we must not waver in supporting #Ukraine is reinforced by a factor we often overlook in our #West-centric bubble:

#Russia is not isolated globally.

Pushing back against Russia thus 1) takes extra effort & 2) is of strategic importance beyond #Ukraine (1/11)
For proof that #Russia is not isolated, look toward big parts of Asia, LatAm, Africa, Middle East. Voting patterns at #UNGA. Who hasn’t joint sanctions against #Russia. How media beyond the "West" reports on the war in #Ukraine. And most of all: Look at #China and #India. (2/11)
Let’s take #MiddleEast: Sure, there’s few staunch supporters of #Russia (Syria). Most "sit on the fence": Reluctant to join sanctions; Saudis/UAE won't pump more oil; Even #NATO ally (!) #Turkey & closest US ally #Israel tread cautiously due to security concerns vis Russia (3/11)
I recently testified to US House Foreign Affairs Committee on this, laying out perceptions of #RussiaUkraineWar across #MENA & arguing why states will likely continue “fence-sitting”, even as the war creates food security threats to them directly! (4/11) foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearings?ID=4B…
Though it may go unnoticed in our #West-centric bubble, #Russia is now highly active diplomatically to ensure the “non-West” continues this “fence-sitting”.

Just look at who #Lavrov & RUS diplomats meet with these days.

Scroll though @mfa_russia website to get a sense. (5/11)
Again, in #MiddleEast, #Lavrov just went to Algeria & Oman. He’s headed to Bahrain & Saudi (!) in coming days. Most Arab FMs visited Moscow post- Feb 24.

Doesn’t look like full isolation to me, though Western officials like to imply it's happening: state.gov/the-administra… (6/11)
This is not to argue that Western sanctions against #Russia & current aid to #Ukraine are inconsequential. Far from it

But it does suggest we need to be extra staunch in supporting #Ukraine & making sure it doesn’t gradually slip off the agenda because our societies tire, (7/11)
...because we feel the economic impact of sanctions at home, etc.

Especially since Russia's non-isolation might further amplify a feeling in Moscow - however cautious it may be at this time - that one could “win this thing” after all: (8/11)
First, #Russia has alternatives: Since it can turn to #China et al for econ. interaction (with limits, but still!), decimating its ability to wage war will be harder.

Hence a need for perseverance in supporting #Ukraine defense needs. Or in case of #Germany, to get going! (9/11)
Second, perceptions matter: if feeling of Western societies tiring—only 3 months into this war—seeps in and dominates narrative across "non-West", conclusions drawn will include: Russia “hangs in there” vs. West is “decadent and weak”.

Plus, “aggressors can get away”. (10/11)
The implications for #Ukraine – and for global order – would be far-reaching and, I would submit, not pretty. (11/11)

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Hanna Notte

Hanna Notte Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @HannaNotte

Apr 18
Many worry that #Russia might turn to #ChemicalWeapons in #Ukraine, as things go increasingly poorly for it on the battlefield.

In my latest for the @washingtonpost, I examine the (limited) options to deter/punish such a horrible scenario: washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/0…

🧵/1
The #USA/#NATO have few good options for deterring #Russia’s use of #ChemicalWeapons (CW) in #Ukraine - or punishing such use after the fact, since “the toolkit of punishments includes the very deterrents that failed to change Moscow’s calculus in the first place.” /2
I examine the lessons from multiple failures to deter #ChemicalWeapons use in #Syria, concluding: “It is hard to prevent a highly motivated actor from chemical use, especially if the deterring side fails to respond decisively to the first crossing of the “red line.” /3
Read 9 tweets
Apr 11
What will happen, should #Russia use #ChemicalWeapons (CW) in #Ukraine as it escalates in the Donbas?

Russia’s tactics @OPCW & UNSC over CW use in #Syria & the Navalny poisoning offer good indications.

Bottom line: Attribution/accountability will be a very hard lift

Thread /1
A few weeks ago, US/#NATO officials raised alarm over possible Russian CW use in #Ukraine (framed by #Russia as false-flag op conducted by UA “radicals”), warning this would be “game changer” & would elicit an “aggressive response”. Yet, no clear red line was communicated. /2
Meanwhile, a #NATO official suggested that, were there to be a CW attack delivered by mil. means, attribution to #Russia would be “immediate”. The key Q, so said official, was thus: "Is #Russia going to want to stay below the threshold of attribution?” /3
Read 18 tweets
Apr 6
Speaking w/some contacts in #Russia to try to understand evolving sentiments in society re: #RussiaUkraineWar, 3 factors stand out for me:

1. Adaptive behaviour
2. "Besieged fortress"
3. State propaganda working wonders

A thread. /1
1. Adaptive behaviour: Many Russians say "what is expected of them" - they support the #Kremlin on #Ukraine. They might (or not!) hold different views privately, but perceived social pressures + fear of reprisal drive adaptive behaviour - so you can best cope in everyday life /2
2. Besieged fortress: Adaptive behaviour is amplified by a sense among many Russians that their isolation& life under sanctions will be for a long time. Plus, whether you wanted the war or not, Russia is now "mobilized" against immense outside pressures. Result: consolidation. /3
Read 6 tweets
Mar 28
Having worked in Moscow when #Russia intervened in #Syria in 2015 & engaged RUS officials/experts on #Syria for yrs, I see 5 parallels in approach to #Ukraine vs #Syria

1. Sequential war
2. Encirclement/corridors
3. "Human shield" claims
4. Foreign fighters
5. CW claims

Thread.
1. Sequential war: RUS recently termed 1st phase of #UkraineWar done, announcing focus on Donbas. In #Syria war, Russia had declared new phase in 2017, establishing de-escalation zones (DEZs) in Western parts, which freed up regime resources to take more territory toward the East
Once that was done, regime/Russia turned back & we saw sequential take-over of DEZs (E Ghouta, Homs, Deraa) in 2018 under guise of CT. Not at all to say that sequencing in Ukraine will be the same. Return of larger-scale fighting toward W Ukraine will depend on...
Read 13 tweets
Mar 13
MUST READ. #UA negotiator M. Podolyak gives insights into #Russia-#Ukraine talks to @Kommersant. Bottom line: cautious hope that #Russian war aims lowered and negotiated settlement possible over time. Summary of main points from @kommersant 👇kommersant.ru/doc/5252292?fb…
#Russia and #UA, after 3 meetings - Feb 28, March 3 and 7 - in Belarus keep "constantly" talking online now; in video talks, working groups have been created. Zelenskiy on the talks: the sides are talking, "and not just throwing around ultimatums";
Podolyak: There's a dozen proposals on the table, on the political & military settlement: ceasefire (& formula for it), withdrawal of RUS troops...now all is addressed in working groups...once "mutual reciprocal legal formats" are worked out, there will be 4th (physical) meeting;
Read 6 tweets
Mar 11
For those interested in context, amid fears that #Russia might stage false-flag chem. (or bio) attack in #Ukraine, I've followed the #Russia #Chemical weapons dossier

-in #Syria,
-re @navalny poisoning &
- @OPCW
for years.

Some background readings that might be useful (1/6)
After #US-#Russia cooperation in removing #Syria's declared CW in 2013-14, things unravelled, w/Russia obstructing efforts at attribution & accountability for CW use in Syria. Over time, rebels were blamed for staging "false-flag attacks". Long read: tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108… (2/6)
I commented here on how the Russian narrative on #CW in Syria - always shielding the Syrian government, blaming rebels for "false-flag" ops - must be understood in context of broader Russian war objectives in Syria: nonproliferation.org/chemical-weapo… (3/6)
Read 6 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(