Pushing back against Russia thus 1) takes extra effort & 2) is of strategic importance beyond #Ukraine (1/11)
For proof that #Russia is not isolated, look toward big parts of Asia, LatAm, Africa, Middle East. Voting patterns at #UNGA. Who hasn’t joint sanctions against #Russia. How media beyond the "West" reports on the war in #Ukraine. And most of all: Look at #China and #India. (2/11)
Let’s take #MiddleEast: Sure, there’s few staunch supporters of #Russia (Syria). Most "sit on the fence": Reluctant to join sanctions; Saudis/UAE won't pump more oil; Even #NATO ally (!) #Turkey & closest US ally #Israel tread cautiously due to security concerns vis Russia (3/11)
I recently testified to US House Foreign Affairs Committee on this, laying out perceptions of #RussiaUkraineWar across #MENA & arguing why states will likely continue “fence-sitting”, even as the war creates food security threats to them directly! (4/11) foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearings?ID=4B…
Though it may go unnoticed in our #West-centric bubble, #Russia is now highly active diplomatically to ensure the “non-West” continues this “fence-sitting”.
Just look at who #Lavrov & RUS diplomats meet with these days.
Scroll though @mfa_russia website to get a sense. (5/11)
Again, in #MiddleEast, #Lavrov just went to Algeria & Oman. He’s headed to Bahrain & Saudi (!) in coming days. Most Arab FMs visited Moscow post- Feb 24.
Doesn’t look like full isolation to me, though Western officials like to imply it's happening: state.gov/the-administra… (6/11)
This is not to argue that Western sanctions against #Russia & current aid to #Ukraine are inconsequential. Far from it
But it does suggest we need to be extra staunch in supporting #Ukraine & making sure it doesn’t gradually slip off the agenda because our societies tire, (7/11)
...because we feel the economic impact of sanctions at home, etc.
Especially since Russia's non-isolation might further amplify a feeling in Moscow - however cautious it may be at this time - that one could “win this thing” after all:
First, #Russia has alternatives: Since it can turn to #China et al for econ. interaction (with limits, but still!), decimating its ability to wage war will be harder.
Hence a need for perseverance in supporting #Ukraine defense needs. Or in case of #Germany, to get going! (9/11)
Second, perceptions matter: if feeling of Western societies tiring—only 3 months into this war—seeps in and dominates narrative across "non-West", conclusions drawn will include: Russia “hangs in there” vs. West is “decadent and weak”.
Plus, “aggressors can get away”. (10/11)
The implications for #Ukraine – and for global order – would be far-reaching and, I would submit, not pretty. (11/11)
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The #USA/#NATO have few good options for deterring #Russia’s use of #ChemicalWeapons (CW) in #Ukraine - or punishing such use after the fact, since “the toolkit of punishments includes the very deterrents that failed to change Moscow’s calculus in the first place.” /2
I examine the lessons from multiple failures to deter #ChemicalWeapons use in #Syria, concluding: “It is hard to prevent a highly motivated actor from chemical use, especially if the deterring side fails to respond decisively to the first crossing of the “red line.” /3
Russia’s tactics @OPCW & UNSC over CW use in #Syria & the Navalny poisoning offer good indications.
Bottom line: Attribution/accountability will be a very hard lift
Thread /1
A few weeks ago, US/#NATO officials raised alarm over possible Russian CW use in #Ukraine (framed by #Russia as false-flag op conducted by UA “radicals”), warning this would be “game changer” & would elicit an “aggressive response”. Yet, no clear red line was communicated. /2
Meanwhile, a #NATO official suggested that, were there to be a CW attack delivered by mil. means, attribution to #Russia would be “immediate”. The key Q, so said official, was thus: "Is #Russia going to want to stay below the threshold of attribution?” /3
Speaking w/some contacts in #Russia to try to understand evolving sentiments in society re: #RussiaUkraineWar, 3 factors stand out for me:
1. Adaptive behaviour 2. "Besieged fortress" 3. State propaganda working wonders
A thread. /1
1. Adaptive behaviour: Many Russians say "what is expected of them" - they support the #Kremlin on #Ukraine. They might (or not!) hold different views privately, but perceived social pressures + fear of reprisal drive adaptive behaviour - so you can best cope in everyday life /2
2. Besieged fortress: Adaptive behaviour is amplified by a sense among many Russians that their isolation& life under sanctions will be for a long time. Plus, whether you wanted the war or not, Russia is now "mobilized" against immense outside pressures. Result: consolidation. /3
Having worked in Moscow when #Russia intervened in #Syria in 2015 & engaged RUS officials/experts on #Syria for yrs, I see 5 parallels in approach to #Ukraine vs #Syria
1. Sequential war: RUS recently termed 1st phase of #UkraineWar done, announcing focus on Donbas. In #Syria war, Russia had declared new phase in 2017, establishing de-escalation zones (DEZs) in Western parts, which freed up regime resources to take more territory toward the East
Once that was done, regime/Russia turned back & we saw sequential take-over of DEZs (E Ghouta, Homs, Deraa) in 2018 under guise of CT. Not at all to say that sequencing in Ukraine will be the same. Return of larger-scale fighting toward W Ukraine will depend on...
#Russia and #UA, after 3 meetings - Feb 28, March 3 and 7 - in Belarus keep "constantly" talking online now; in video talks, working groups have been created. Zelenskiy on the talks: the sides are talking, "and not just throwing around ultimatums";
Podolyak: There's a dozen proposals on the table, on the political & military settlement: ceasefire (& formula for it), withdrawal of RUS troops...now all is addressed in working groups...once "mutual reciprocal legal formats" are worked out, there will be 4th (physical) meeting;
For those interested in context, amid fears that #Russia might stage false-flag chem. (or bio) attack in #Ukraine, I've followed the #Russia#Chemical weapons dossier
Some background readings that might be useful (1/6)
After #US-#Russia cooperation in removing #Syria's declared CW in 2013-14, things unravelled, w/Russia obstructing efforts at attribution & accountability for CW use in Syria. Over time, rebels were blamed for staging "false-flag attacks". Long read: tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108… (2/6)
I commented here on how the Russian narrative on #CW in Syria - always shielding the Syrian government, blaming rebels for "false-flag" ops - must be understood in context of broader Russian war objectives in Syria: nonproliferation.org/chemical-weapo… (3/6)