1. We’ve been tracking #Kremlin comms around the #Kremenchuk strike last week.
The dynamics—which see pro-war online ecosystems serving as a staging area for conspiracies that are ultimately adopted by the #Russia|n state—are similar to what we saw after #Bucha and #Kramatorsk.
2. This cycle repeats whenever #Russia finds itself accused of atrocities.
First, there’s denial.
That then morphs into scattershot conspiracies.
Then, the theory that “sticks,” best slotting into #Russia's campaign narrative, ends up being adopted as the official line.
News of the 27 June attack spread rapidly on Telegram.
Within minutes of the missile’s impact, a popular pro-#Kremlin channel reported that “something big” had been hit, sharing a photo of a smoke pile as evidence.
4. A few key pro-#Kremlin feeds were quick to suggest that the target had been an oil refinery and, pre-empting “NATO" criticism, noted that this would make the strike “legitimate” from a military-legal perspective.
This speculation was quickly amplified across the community.
5. When images emerged showing it was a shopping centre, not a refinery, that had been hit, #Kremlin-aligned influencers adjusted their approach and went on the offensive.
This is when conspiracy theories began proliferating at scale.
6. Some immediately suggested that the whole thing was a staged psyop (like #Bucha purportedly was).
“First footage from the impact site in #Kremenchuk is published by #Zelensky an hour later,” one user wrote, “Should there be further explanation? #Bucha and #Kramatorsk 2.0.”
Within 90 minutes of the strike, the idea that it had been staged or somehow falsified was becoming conventional wisdom.
Like with #Bucha, these theories were pinned to just a handful of pieces of “evidence.”
8. Pro-#Kremlin feeds searched for possible “clues” to support their theories.
One of the main claims was that there were too many military-aged men at the site for it to be a real shopping mall.
Instead, they held, it had actually been a secret government facility all along.
9. These theories metastasised with time.
So, when #Russia, at the #UN later that evening, suggested that #Kremenchuk was “a new, #Bucha-style provocation,” it was merely lending official weight to a narrative that had already emerged, propagated, and matured informally online.
10. When denying what had happened, #Russia|n officials could point to the countless reports that had emerged on pro-#Kremlin social media, even though these were all weakly evidenced.
Here, it's quantity that matters most, not quality or reliability.
11. Thus, the #Kremlin can rely on strategically primed and ideologically aligned audiences to propagate defensive disinformation in its favour.
1. Since last week, there have been a number of signs that #Russia may be planning to invade #Moldova.
In the last few days, there have been several likely false flag attacks in #Transnistria, events that have been amplified massively by a simultaneous influence campaign.
2. To track this, we analysed 169,000 posts shared across pro-war, #Kremlin-aligned communities on Telegram last week.
Pro-#Russia voices started by outright denying it, but by the end of the day, guided by strategic disinformation from the #Kremlin, they were blaming it on #Ukraine.
2. Initially, proponents of the invasion said it was all a lie, citing a clip of the mayor of #Bucha purportedly celebrating the liberation of the town days earlier but not mentioning any massacres.
3. Then, the preferred framing shifted to one that blamed the deaths on #Ukraine artillery fire.
The "supporting evidence" for this claim was a clip of a purported #UKR soldier talking about indiscriminate mortar fire against #RUS positions in the southeast a few weeks ago.
1. This week’s issue of al-Naba’, which was published last night, took #IS's campaign to legitimise its new leader in a new, quite surprising direction.
Directly comparing the legacy of #IS's 'caliphs' with that of the Rashidun caliphs, it pushed back on criticism—seemingly from within #IS's own circles—of Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi and played down the strategic significance of his loss.
3. #IS also pushed back on criticism about how long it had taken it to confirm that Abu Ibrahim had been killed and replaced by Abul Hasan.
Per al-Naba’, everyone who needed to had pledged allegiance within less than 48 hours of the #Atmeh raid.
1. Earlier this month, we reported that #IS comms activity had fallen off a cliff in recent weeks.
In the last few days, the reason for that has become clear: its media team was putting everything into prepping for a global campaign drumming up support for the new caliph.
2. The campaign started on 10 March, when #IS published a statement from new spox Abu ‘Umar al-Muhajir declaring that Qurashi had died and been replaced by Qurashi 2.0.
This came after a week-on-week drop in comms that left #IS supporter activities at a historic low.
3. It wasn’t enough to just publish a statement. #IS needed to show that its new leader was credible.
Accordingly, in the days that followed, it published hundreds of photographs showing fighters from West Africa to Southeast Asia pledging allegiance to the new caliph.