1. Over the last few days, we’ve been tracking a major new influence campaign being deployed by the #Taliban in #Afghanistan.
On 22 July, its networks on Twitter and Telegram were three times more active than usual – more active than they've been across all of 2022 to date.
2. This surge was the result of a defensive comms campaign aimed at legitimising the #Taliban, sparked when @Meta banned its media agencies, Bakhtar/RTA, last week.
In the wake of that, thousands started tweeting #BanTaliban in the hope that @Twitter would follow suit.
Yesterday, its Urdu WhatsApp feed shared a visual purporting that over a third of those who tweeted in its support were based in the #USA.
(Location data collected in this way is notoriously incomplete, but this is still surprising.)
(5a. We doubled-checked this data using the same software the #Taliban used, @Talkwalker, and got similar results: significantly more than a third of the accounts that tweeted #AfghansSupportTaliban in the last few days are 'located' in the #USA.)
6. Notably, most posts containing “#AfghansSupportTaliban” originated from a relatively small number of accounts.
There was a lot of behind-the-scenes coordination.
You can see that in how concentrated its distribution (pink) was compared to that of #BanTaliban (purple).
7. Moreover, the account that shared it most frequently is a fake, its profile pic pulled from a UChicago theatre website.
We can’t say for certain who's behind it, but the same pic was used by another fake ‘doctor’ pushing #Taliban comms around the takeover of #Kabul last year.
8. Whatever the case, it’s important to keep things in perspective.
This same network was more than twice as active when #Kabul fell to the #Taliban.
What we saw last week was significant hyperactivity, but nothing close to full capacity.
9. We’ll be continuing to track this in the coming weeks.
1. In recent months, we’ve been tracking chatter about the World Cup in #Qatar across #IS, #AQ, and Shi'a militant group (#SMG) networks online.
2. Interest has been fairly limited in #AQ & #SMG ecosystems but #IS|ers have been calling for attacks, with momentum for these calls spiking in recent days.
Graphs show incidence of posts with “Qatar” (yellow), “World Cup” (blue), and “football” (red).
3. One #IS call-to-arms singles out teams / supporters of Coalition member states, above all #US and #France.
There have also been multiple assertions that attacks needn’t happen only in #Qatar, the logic being that an attack anywhere during the WC will be maximally disruptive.
1. Following the explosions at #Saky airbase on Tuesday, satellite imagery (from @Planet) of their aftermath has emerged.
Multiple buildings and aircraft were destroyed – with at least three distinct craters clearly apparent.
L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
2. Several aircraft housed in 3-sided berms were destroyed, while others closer to the apparent impact craters seemed to survive.
There are a few possible explanations for this (for e.g., some aircraft may have been carrying munitions while others were not).
L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
3. In videos shared across pro-#Kremlin Telegram that had reportedly been shot immediately after the first 'strike,' smoke can be seen billowing before a large explosion at the site.
1. We’ve been tracking #Kremlin comms around the #Kremenchuk strike last week.
The dynamics—which see pro-war online ecosystems serving as a staging area for conspiracies that are ultimately adopted by the #Russia|n state—are similar to what we saw after #Bucha and #Kramatorsk.
2. This cycle repeats whenever #Russia finds itself accused of atrocities.
First, there’s denial.
That then morphs into scattershot conspiracies.
Then, the theory that “sticks,” best slotting into #Russia's campaign narrative, ends up being adopted as the official line.
News of the 27 June attack spread rapidly on Telegram.
Within minutes of the missile’s impact, a popular pro-#Kremlin channel reported that “something big” had been hit, sharing a photo of a smoke pile as evidence.